postbid market interaction and auction choice

We study the influence of product market competition on the first-price sealed auction and the English ascending auction with independent cost types. Bidders, valuing the license basing on the information released in the first stage license bidding game and the possible game they will play in the product market, care about not only whether they can win and thus how much to bid, but also the information released in the auction when they win. As in the English ascending auction, all bidders are able to constantly adjust their belief about their potential rival’s cost distribution, and the higher the bid goes, the lower the potential rival’s cost, the lower the expected gain from winning a license, thus bidders will keep downgrade the value of license and bid more conservatively and the government will generate lower expected revenue from the English auction than in first-price sealed auction. In particular, if the government uses the English ascending auction while the Bertrand price-cutting game being played in the product market, then all bidders except the two lowest cost type bidder will quit the bidding game sequentially and the expected revenue will be close to zero. Furthermore, as the Bertrand competition is more intensive than the Cournot competition, the government’s expected revenue is lower when the product market game played as a Bertrand gameAuction, Oligopoly

On the concept of locational competition

Locational competition means that the immobile factors of production in a country compete for internationally mobile capital and technology. Locational competition influences the restraint set of national players and redefines their opportunity costs. Thus, the bargaining position of the trade unions is affected. Also the manoeuvring space of government in terms of taxation and institutional arrangements is reduced. Governments are more or less forced into an economic policy (and institutional) benchmarking. A high degree of openness means that a country is exposed more to external changes. We therefore can expect that smaller countries will be the innovators in world wide institutional competition.

Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with sequential capacity choice

Duopoly;Capacity;microeconomics

Regional agreements and trade services - policy issues

Every major regional trade agreement now has a services dimension. Is trade in services so different that there is need to modify the conclusions on preferential agreements pertaining to goods reached so far? The authors first examine the implications of unilateral policy choices in a particular services market. They then explore the economics of international cooperation and identify the circumstances in which a country is more likely to benefit from cooperation in a regional rather than multilateral forum.Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Services,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration

Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly

We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long- run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run.Emissions trading, Initial permit allocation, Bertrand competition, EU ETS, Endogenous technology choice, Kreps and Scheinkman, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, L13, Q28, D43,

Prices and Exchange Rates: A Theory of Disconnect

I present a sticky-wage model of exchange rate pass-through with heterogeneous producers and endogenous markups. The model shows that low levels of exchange rate pass-through to firm- and aggregate-level import prices coexist with large in trade flows. After an exchange rate shock, aggregate import prices are subject to a composition bias due to changes in the extensive margin of trade (the number of goods traded between countries). At the firm level, each producer adjusts its markups depending on its own productivity and the change in the competitive environment generated by the exchange rate movement. Firm-level price responses are asymmetric---different for appreciations and depreciations---and adjustments in the intensive margin of trade (firm-level exports) are substantial. In general equilibrium, the model shows that firm reallocations increase the persistence exogenous shocks.Exchange rate pass-through; Expenditure switching regime; Heterogenous firms; Endogenous markups

A Simple Business-cycle Model with Schumpeterian Features

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of imperfect competition where a sunk cost of creating a new product regulates the type of entry that dominates in the economy: new products or more competition in existing industries. Considering the process of product innovation is irreversible, introduces hysteresis in the business cycle. Expansionary shocks may lead the economy to a new ‘prosperity plateau,’ but contractionary shocks only affect the market power of mature industries.Entry; Hysteresis; Mark-up.

A Simple Business-Cycle Model with Schumpeterian Features

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of imperfect competition where a sunk cost of creating a new product regulates the type of entry that dominates in the economy: new products or more competition in existing industries. Considering the process of product innovation is irreversible, introduces hysteresis in the business cycle. Expansionary shocks may lead the economy to a new 'prosperity plateau,' but contractionary shocks only affect the market power of mature industries.Entry; hysteresis, mark-up

A Simple Business-Cycle Model with Schumpeterian Features

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of imperfect competition where a sunk cost of creating a new product regulates the type of entry that dominates in the economy: new products or more competition in existing industries. Considering the process of product innovation is irreversible, introduces hysteresis in the business cycle. Expansionary shocks may lead the economy to a new ‘prosperity plateau,’ but contractionary shocks only affect the market power of mature industriesEntry, Hysteresis, Mark-up