Virtual Evidence: A Constructive Semantics for Classical Logics

This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using constructive type theory. Such semantics seems impossible because classical logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), not accepted in constructive logic since it does not have computational meaning. However, the apparently oracular powers expressed in the LEM, that for any proposition P either it or its negation, not P, is true can also be explained in terms of constructive evidence that does not refer to "oracles for truth." Types with virtual evidence and the constructive impossibility of negative evidence provide sufficient semantic grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational meaning. This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of constructive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the logical operators in classical contexts. Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic, propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, double negation translation, computational content, virtual evidenc

On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

Perspectives for proof unwinding by programming languages techniques

In this chapter, we propose some future directions of work, potentially beneficial to Mathematics and its foundations, based on the recent import of methodology from the theory of programming languages into proof theory. This scientific essay, written for the audience of proof theorists as well as the working mathematician, is not a survey of the field, but rather a personal view of the author who hopes that it may inspire future and fellow researchers

Variable types for meaning assembly: a logical syntax for generic noun phrases introduced by most

This paper proposes a way to compute the meanings associated with sentences with generic noun phrases corresponding to the generalized quantifier most. We call these generics specimens and they resemble stereotypes or prototypes in lexical semantics. The meanings are viewed as logical formulae that can thereafter be interpreted in your favourite models. To do so, we depart significantly from the dominant Fregean view with a single untyped universe. Indeed, our proposal adopts type theory with some hints from Hilbert \epsilon-calculus (Hilbert, 1922; Avigad and Zach, 2008) and from medieval philosophy, see e.g. de Libera (1993, 1996). Our type theoretic analysis bears some resemblance with ongoing work in lexical semantics (Asher 2011; Bassac et al. 2010; Moot, Pr\'evot and Retor\'e 2011). Our model also applies to classical examples involving a class, or a generic element of this class, which is not uttered but provided by the context. An outcome of this study is that, in the minimalism-contextualism debate, see Conrad (2011), if one adopts a type theoretical view, terms encode the purely semantic meaning component while their typing is pragmatically determined

Logic of Intuitionistic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Perfect Knowledge Transfer)

We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent), and only in that, that consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts) in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs). Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP, and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic (originally proved by Goedel).Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667; extended start of Section 1 and 2.1; extended paragraph after Fact 1; dropped the N-rule as primitive and proved it derivable; other, non-intuitionistic family members: arXiv:1208.1842, arXiv:1208.591

On Constructive Axiomatic Method

In this last version of the paper one may find a critical overview of some recent philosophical literature on Axiomatic Method and Genetic Method.Comment: 25 pages, no figure

Logic of Negation-Complete Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Epistemic Deciders)

We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function. LDiiP's agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed as a negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of S4-provability.Comment: Expanded Introduction. Added Footnote 4. Corrected Corollary 3 and 4. Continuation of arXiv:1208.184