3,043 research outputs found
Continuous-time integral dynamics for Aggregative Game equilibrium seeking
In this paper, we consider continuous-time semi-decentralized dynamics for
the equilibrium computation in a class of aggregative games. Specifically, we
propose a scheme where decentralized projected-gradient dynamics are driven by
an integral control law. To prove global exponential convergence of the
proposed dynamics to an aggregative equilibrium, we adopt a quadratic Lyapunov
function argument. We derive a sufficient condition for global convergence that
we position within the recent literature on aggregative games, and in
particular we show that it improves on established results
Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints
We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of
each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy.
As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of
Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. By exploiting a characterization of the two
equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance
with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we
propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are
capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents.
Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of
route choice on a road network.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (Accepted without changes). The
first three authors contributed equall
Distributed Learning for Stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
This work examines a stochastic formulation of the generalized Nash
equilibrium problem (GNEP) where agents are subject to randomness in the
environment of unknown statistical distribution. We focus on fully-distributed
online learning by agents and employ penalized individual cost functions to
deal with coupled constraints. Three stochastic gradient strategies are
developed with constant step-sizes. We allow the agents to use heterogeneous
step-sizes and show that the penalty solution is able to approach the Nash
equilibrium in a stable manner within , for small step-size
value and sufficiently large penalty parameters. The operation
of the algorithm is illustrated by considering the network Cournot competition
problem
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