Reasoning about Minimal Belief and Negation as Failure

We investigate the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of MBNF, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure introduced by Lifschitz, which can be considered as a unifying framework for several nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming. We characterize the complexity and provide algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF. In particular, we show that entailment in propositional MBNF lies at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy, hence it is harder than reasoning in all the above mentioned propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We also prove the exact correspondence between negation as failure in MBNF and negative introspection in Moore's autoepistemic logic

Implementing Default and Autoepistemic Logics via the Logic of GK

The logic of knowledge and justified assumptions, also known as logic of grounded knowledge (GK), was proposed by Lin and Shoham as a general logic for nonmonotonic reasoning. To date, it has been used to embed in it default logic (propositional case), autoepistemic logic, Turner's logic of universal causation, and general logic programming under stable model semantics. Besides showing the generality of GK as a logic for nonmonotonic reasoning, these embeddings shed light on the relationships among these other logics. In this paper, for the first time, we show how the logic of GK can be embedded into disjunctive logic programming in a polynomial but non-modular translation with new variables. The result can then be used to compute the extension/expansion semantics of default logic, autoepistemic logic and Turner's logic of universal causation by disjunctive ASP solvers such as claspD(-2), DLV, GNT and cmodels.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014

Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Logics between Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Logic under Coherence

Recently, it has been shown that probabilistic entailment under coherence is weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. Moreover, probabilistic entailment under coherence is a generalization of default entailment in System P. In this paper, we continue this line of research by presenting probabilistic generalizations of more sophisticated notions of classical default entailment that lie between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence. That is, the new formalisms properly generalize their counterparts in classical default reasoning, they are weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and they are stronger than probabilistic entailment under coherence. The new formalisms are useful especially for handling probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. They can also be applied for probabilistic belief revision. More generally, in the same spirit as a similar previous paper, this paper sheds light on exciting new formalisms for probabilistic reasoning beyond the well-known standard ones.Comment: 10 pages; in Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR-2002), Special Session on Uncertainty Frameworks in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, pages 265-274, Toulouse, France, April 200

On Properties of Update Sequences Based on Causal Rejection

We consider an approach to update nonmonotonic knowledge bases represented as extended logic programs under answer set semantics. New information is incorporated into the current knowledge base subject to a causal rejection principle enforcing that, in case of conflicts, more recent rules are preferred and older rules are overridden. Such a rejection principle is also exploited in other approaches to update logic programs, e.g., in dynamic logic programming by Alferes et al. We give a thorough analysis of properties of our approach, to get a better understanding of the causal rejection principle. We review postulates for update and revision operators from the area of theory change and nonmonotonic reasoning, and some new properties are considered as well. We then consider refinements of our semantics which incorporate a notion of minimality of change. As well, we investigate the relationship to other approaches, showing that our approach is semantically equivalent to inheritance programs by Buccafurri et al. and that it coincides with certain classes of dynamic logic programs, for which we provide characterizations in terms of graph conditions. Therefore, most of our results about properties of causal rejection principle apply to these approaches as well. Finally, we deal with computational complexity of our approach, and outline how the update semantics and its refinements can be implemented on top of existing logic programming engines.Comment: 59 pages, 2 figures, 3 tables, to be published in "Theory and Practice of Logic Programming

Embedding Defeasible Logic into Logic Programming

Defeasible reasoning is a simple but efficient approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that has recently attracted considerable interest and that has found various applications. Defeasible logic and its variants are an important family of defeasible reasoning methods. So far no relationship has been established between defeasible logic and mainstream nonmonotonic reasoning approaches. In this paper we establish close links to known semantics of logic programs. In particular, we give a translation of a defeasible theory D into a meta-program P(D). We show that under a condition of decisiveness, the defeasible consequences of D correspond exactly to the sceptical conclusions of P(D) under the stable model semantics. Without decisiveness, the result holds only in one direction (all defeasible consequences of D are included in all stable models of P(D)). If we wish a complete embedding for the general case, we need to use the Kunen semantics of P(D), instead.Comment: To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programmin