von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage Theorems for Causal Decision Making

Causal thinking and decision making under uncertainty are fundamental aspects of intelligent reasoning. Decision making under uncertainty has been well studied when information is considered at the associative (probabilistic) level. The classical Theorems of von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage provide a formal criterion for rational choice using purely associative information. Causal inference often yields uncertainty about the exact causal structure, so we consider what kinds of decisions are possible in those conditions. In this work, we consider decision problems in which available actions and consequences are causally connected. After recalling a previous causal decision making result, which relies on a known causal model, we consider the case in which the causal mechanism that controls some environment is unknown to a rational decision maker. In this setting we state and prove a causal version of Savage's Theorem, which we then use to develop a notion of causal games with its respective causal Nash equilibrium. These results highlight the importance of causal models in decision making and the variety of potential applications.Comment: Submitted to Journal of Causal Inferenc

The emergence of choice: Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

Consider the chess game: When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve

Accounting for accounting's role in the neoliberalization processes of social housing in England:A Bourdieusian perspective

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.Abstract This paper seeks to account for how accounting is implicated in the neoliberalization processes of social housing in England. It adopts a processual view which instead of conceptualizing neoliberalism as static and ‘end-state’, views it as a dynamic process of neoliberalization. We draw upon Bourdieu’s notions of field, capital and habitus to frame our study. We focus on reform of the regulation of social housing in England during the period 2006–2016. We show that the process of neoliberalization of social housing in England was instigated by the state’s intervention to change the structure of the field in terms of norms, power relations and positions of players on the field. These changes brought about simultaneous changes in the habitus of the field as well as the structure and habitus of Housing Associations as sub-fields. We demonstrate how these changes create and reproduce a new system of domination where the tenant is the dominated player. We highlight the role accounting played in these changes in terms of being used as a tool by the regulator to achieve social control and drive change within Housing Associations and by the Housing Associations to evidence conformity with the new norms and adaptation

The calculative reproduction of social structures : The field of gem mining in Sri Lanka

Peer reviewedPostprin

Decision-making and strategic thinking through analogies

When faced with a complex scenario, how does understanding arise in one’s mind? How does one integrate disparate cues into a global, meaningful whole? Consider the chess game: how do humans avoid the combinatorial explosion? How are abstract ideas represented? The purpose of this paper is to propose a new computational model of human chess intuition and intelligence. We suggest that analogies and abstract roles are crucial to solving these landmark problems. We present a proof-of-concept model, in the form of a computational architecture, which may be able to account for many crucial aspects of human intuition, such as (i) concentration of attention to relevant aspects, (ii) \ud how humans may avoid the combinatorial explosion, (iii) perception of similarity at a strategic level, and (iv) a state of meaningful anticipation over how a global scenario \ud may evolve

Combinatorial Games with a Pass: A dynamical systems approach

By treating combinatorial games as dynamical systems, we are able to address a longstanding open question in combinatorial game theory, namely, how the introduction of a "pass" move into a game affects its behavior. We consider two well known combinatorial games, 3-pile Nim and 3-row Chomp. In the case of Nim, we observe that the introduction of the pass dramatically alters the game's underlying structure, rendering it considerably more complex, while for Chomp, the pass move is found to have relatively minimal impact. We show how these results can be understood by recasting these games as dynamical systems describable by dynamical recursion relations. From these recursion relations we are able to identify underlying structural connections between these "games with passes" and a recently introduced class of "generic (perturbed) games." This connection, together with a (non-rigorous) numerical stability analysis, allows one to understand and predict the effect of a pass on a game.Comment: 39 pages, 13 figures, published versio