27,983 research outputs found
Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication".
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the
ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular
semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal
logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with
the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction
between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the
strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the
functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with
"idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the
intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of
Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years
later
The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism and the universal algorithm
I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of the philosophy
of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I consider the natural potentialist
systems arising from the models of arithmetic under their natural extension
concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative extensions
and more. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional modal
assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with
parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences,
however, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are
sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of
arithmetic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality
principle, which asserts that every possibly necessary statement is already
true, and these models are equivalently characterized as those satisfying a
maximal theory. The main S4 analysis makes fundamental use of the
universal algorithm, of which this article provides a simplified,
self-contained account. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the
philosophical differences of several fundamentally different potentialist
attitudes---linear inevitability, convergent potentialism and radical branching
possibility---are expressed by their corresponding potentialist modal
validities.Comment: 38 pages. Inquiries and commentary can be made at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/arithmetic-potentialism-and-the-universal-algorithm.
Version v3 has further minor revisions, including additional reference
Non‐Classical Knowledge
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker-than-classical K3 logic.
I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to--whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non-classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities
Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?
The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and
their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many
areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status,
and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic
view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical
and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about
their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering
complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic
absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of
logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the
impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep
logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open,
modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on
his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and
Alonso, E., 201
- …