How to Derive the Other 37 Valid Modal Syllogisms from the Syllogism ◇A£I◇I-1

Syllogistic reasoning plays an important role in natural language information processing. In order to provide a consistent interpretation for Aristotelian modal syllogistic, this paper firstly proves the validity of the syllogism ◇A£I◇I-1, and then takes it as the basic axiom to derive the other 37 valid modal syllogisms on the basis of some reasoning rules in classical propositional logic, the transformation between any one of Aristotelian quantifiers and its three negative quantifiers, the symmetry of the Aristotelian quantifier some and no, and some relevant definitions and facts. In other words, there are reducibility between the modal syllogism ◇A£I◇I-1 and the other 37 valid modal syllogisms. There are infinitely many modal syllogism instances in natural language corresponding to every valid modal syllogism, thus this study has important practical significance and theoretical value for natural language information processing in computer science

Greek and Roman Logic

In ancient philosophy, there is no discipline called “logic” in the contemporary sense of “the study of formally valid arguments.” Rather, once a subfield of philosophy comes to be called “logic,” namely in Hellenistic philosophy, the field includes (among other things) epistemology, normative epistemology, philosophy of language, the theory of truth, and what we call logic today. This entry aims to examine ancient theorizing that makes contact with the contemporary conception. Thus, we will here emphasize the theories of the “syllogism” in the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. However, because the context in which these theories were developed and discussed were deeply epistemological in nature, we will also include references to the areas of epistemological theorizing that bear directly on theories of the syllogism, particularly concerning “demonstration.” Similarly, we will include literature that discusses the principles governing logic and the components that make up arguments, which are topics that might now fall under the headings of philosophy of logic or non-classical logic. This includes discussions of problems and paradoxes that connect to contemporary logic and which historically spurred developments of logical method. For example, there is great interest among ancient philosophers in the question of whether all statements have truth-values. Relevant themes here include future contingents, paradoxes of vagueness, and semantic paradoxes like the liar. We also include discussion of the paradoxes of the infinite for similar reasons, since solutions have introduced sophisticated tools of logical analysis and there are a range of related, modern philosophical concerns about the application of some logical principles in infinite domains. Our criterion excludes, however, many of the themes that Hellenistic philosophers consider part of logic, in particular, it excludes epistemology and metaphysical questions about truth. Ancient philosophers do not write treatises “On Logic,” where the topic would be what today counts as logic. Instead, arguments and theories that count as “logic” by our criterion are found in a wide range of texts. For the most part, our entry follows chronology, tracing ancient logic from its beginnings to Late Antiquity. However, some themes are discussed in several eras of ancient logic; ancient logicians engage closely with each other’s views. Accordingly, relevant publications address several authors and periods in conjunction. These contributions are listed in three thematic sections at the end of our entry

Quantum Non-Objectivity from Performativity of Quantum Phenomena

We analyze the logical foundations of quantum mechanics (QM) by stressing non-objectivity of quantum observables which is a consequence of the absence of logical atoms in QM. We argue that the matter of quantum non-objectivity is that, on the one hand, the formalism of QM constructed as a mathematical theory is self-consistent, but, on the other hand, quantum phenomena as results of experimenter's performances are not self-consistent. This self-inconsistency is an effect of that the language of QM differs much from the language of human performances. The first is the language of a mathematical theory which uses some Aristotelian and Russellian assumptions (e.g., the assumption that there are logical atoms). The second language consists of performative propositions which are self-inconsistent only from the viewpoint of conventional mathematical theory, but they satisfy another logic which is non-Aristotelian. Hence, the representation of quantum reality in linguistic terms may be different: from a mathematical theory to a logic of performative propositions. To solve quantum self-inconsistency, we apply the formalism of non-classical self-referent logics

Causality and Coextensiveness in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 1.13

I discuss an important feature of the notion of cause in Post. An. 1. 13, 78b13–28, which has been either neglected or misunderstood. Some have treated it as if Aristotle were introducing a false principle about explanation; others have understood the point in terms of coextensiveness of cause and effect. However, none offers a full exegesis of Aristotle's tangled argument or accounts for all of the text's peculiarities. My aim is to disentangle Aristotle's steps to show that he is arguing in favour of a logical requirement for a middle term's being the appropriate cause of its explanandum. Coextensiveness between the middle term and the attribute it explains is advanced as a sine qua non condition of a middle term's being an appropriate or primary cause. This condition is not restricted either to negative causes or to middle terms in second‐figure syllogisms, but ranges over all primary causes qua primary

A system of relational syllogistic incorporating full Boolean reasoning

We present a system of relational syllogistic, based on classical propositional logic, having primitives of the following form: Some A are R-related to some B; Some A are R-related to all B; All A are R-related to some B; All A are R-related to all B. Such primitives formalize sentences from natural language like `All students read some textbooks'. Here A and B denote arbitrary sets (of objects), and R denotes an arbitrary binary relation between objects. The language of the logic contains only variables denoting sets, determining the class of set terms, and variables denoting binary relations between objects, determining the class of relational terms. Both classes of terms are closed under the standard Boolean operations. The set of relational terms is also closed under taking the converse of a relation. The results of the paper are the completeness theorem with respect to the intended semantics and the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem.Comment: Available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10849-012-9165-

Two Squares of Opposition: for Analytic and Synthetic Propositions

In the paper I prove that there are two squares of opposition. The unconventional one is built up for synthetic propositions. There a, i are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are subcontrary, a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation

Rejection in Łukasiewicz's and Słupecki's Sense

The idea of rejection originated by Aristotle. The notion of rejection was introduced into formal logic by Łukasiewicz [20]. He applied it to complete syntactic characterization of deductive systems using an axiomatic method of rejection of propositions [22, 23]. The paper gives not only genesis, but also development and generalization of the notion of rejection. It also emphasizes the methodological approach to biaspectual axiomatic method of characterization of deductive systems as acceptance (asserted) systems and rejection (refutation) systems, introduced by Łukasiewicz and developed by his student Słupecki, the pioneers of the method, which becomes relevant in modern approaches to logic

G\"odel's Notre Dame Course

This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled "G\"odel's natural deduction", which presented and made comments about the natural deduction system in G\"odel's unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave at the University of Notre Dame in 1939. In that earlier paper, which was itself a companion to a paper that examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to G\"odel and general proof theory, one can find a brief summary of G\"odel's notes for the Notre Dame course. In order to put the earlier paper in proper perspective, a more complete summary of these interesting notes, with comments concerning them, is given here.Comment: 18 pages. minor additions, arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1604.0307