Informal proof, formal proof, formalism

Increases in the use of automated theorem-provers have renewed focus on the relationship between the informal proofs normally found in mathematical research and fully formalised derivations. Whereas some claim that any correct proof will be underwritten by a fully formal proof, sceptics demur. In this paper I look at the relevance of these issues for formalism, construed as an anti-platonistic metaphysical doctrine. I argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that all proofs are fully formalisable, if formal proofs are required to be finitary, but that, on a proper view of the way in which formal proofs idealise actual practice, this restriction is unjustified and formalism is not threatened

Is an archaeological contribution to the theory of social science possible? Archaeological data and concepts in the dispute between Jean-Claude Gardin and Jean-Claude Passeron

The issue of the definition and position of archaeology as a discipline is examined in relation to the dispute which took place from 1980 to 2009 between the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin and the sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron. This case study enables us to explore the actual conceptual relationships between archaeology and the other sciences (as opposed to those wished for or prescribed). The contrasts between the positions declared by the two researchers and the rooting of their arguments in their disciplines are examined: where the sociologist makes use of his philosophical training, the archaeologist relies mainly on his work on semiology and informatics. Archaeology ultimately plays a minor role in the arguments proposed. This dispute therefore cannot be considered as evidence for the movement of concepts between archaeology and the social sciences. A blind spot in the debate, relating to the ontological specificities of archaeological objects, nevertheless presents itself as a possible way of implementing this movement

An attempt at a proxemic description of politeness from the ethological-evolutionary persepctive

The article reflects on different aspects of politeness theory viewed from the ethological and evolutionary perspective. The author offers an explanation of politeness phenomena along proxemic lines – accordingly, politeness is shown to be an essentially distancing mechanism, consisting of three major types of sociofugal (i.e. distance-increasing) strategies – discourse dislocation, cognitive distancing, and personal distancing. These findings are then related to the ethology of territorial behaviours – it is hypothesised that politeness constitutes a verbal means of aggression appeasement. Finally, the author attempts to explain the transfer of spatial behaviours to the domain of discursive interaction by appealing to Donald’s conception of mimesis

Strategic management accounting and performance implications: a literature review and research agenda

The important role that management accounting plays in driving organisational performance has been reiterated in the literature. In line with that importance, the call for more effort to enhance knowledge on strategic management accounting has increased over the years. Responding to that call, this study utilised a qualitative approach that involved a systematic review to synthesise existing literature towards understanding the strategic management accounting foundation, contingency factors, and organisational performance impact. Based on the evidence in reviewed literature, we flag key directions for advancing this theoretical premise towards providing further insights that would enable practitioners strategically align their strategic management accounting practices for optimal organisational performance. The limitations of this study have been acknowledged

Three Applications of an Austin/Wittgenstein Ontological Insight

On the first page of How to do Things with Words, Austin claims that `making a statement" is primary, and `statement" derivative – a `logical construction", as he calls it, out of the makings of statements. Wittgenstein, in similar vein, takes `explaining the meaning" to be primary with `meaning" a derivative notion. He says that `[m]eaning is what an explanation of meaning explains (Wittgenstein 1974, 68). Part of Wittgenstein"s point is that giving explanations of meaning is, like the making of statements, a perfectly common, everyday occurrence, but asking what meaning is is a perverse question of the sort that gives philosophy a bad name – Austin makes the same point in his paper `The Meaning of a Word" (Austin 1961, 23-43). Wittgenstein"s diagnosis of why philosophers are misled is very simple: the mistake lies in supposing that, for every noun there is an object named (unum nomen, unum nominatum) and so coming to believe that there is something – some thing – named by the noun `meaning". He says that he wants to cure us of the temptation to look about us for some object which you might call `the meaning" (Wittgenstein 1958, 1). This is hardly a new insight. Kant famously argued, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that the noun `time" does not name a thing and one consequence of this conclusion is that talk of the Big Bang as marking the beginning of time is nonsensical. Are there some comparably important conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis that the nouns `meaning" and `statement" do not name objects? The answer, as I hope to demonstrate, is `Yes"

Axiomatising Questions

Accounts of the formal semantics of natural language often adopt a pre-existing framework. Such formalisations rely upon informal narrative to explain the intended interpretation of an expression - an expression that may have different interpretations in different circumstances, and may supports patterns of behaviour that exceed what is intended. This ought to make us question the sense in which such formalisations capture our intuitions about semantic behaviour. In the case of theories of questions and answers, a question might be interpreted as a set (of possible propositional answers), or as a function (that yields a proposition given a term that is intended to be interpreted as a phrasal answer), but the formal theory itself provides no means of distinguishing such sets and functions from other cases where they are not intended to represent questions, or their answers. Here we sketch an alternative approach to formalisation a theory of questions and answers that aims to be sensitive to such ontological considerations

Causes and Strategies for Requesting Clarification in Dialogue

Schlangen D. Causes and Strategies for Requesting Clarification in Dialogue. In: Proceedings of the 5th Workshop of the ACL SIG on Discourse and Dialogue. Boston, USA; 2004