New Evidence from Sequential ADF Tests

There has been mixed evidence regarding the existence of rational bubbles in the foreign exchange markets. This paper introduces recently developed sequential unit root tests into the analysis of exchange rates bubbles. We find strong evidence of explosive behavior in the nominal Sterling-dollar exchange rate. However, this explosive behavior should not be simply interpreted as evidence of rational bubbles, as we show that it might be driven by the relative prices of traded goods

Intertemporal Consumption and Debt Aversion

This paper tests how subjects behave in an intertemporal consumption/saving experiment when borrowing is allowed and whether subjects treat debt differently than savings. Two treatments create environments where either saving or borrowing is required for optimal consumption. Since both treatments share the same optimal consumption levels, actual consumption choices can be directly compared across treatments. The experimental findings imply that deviations from optimal behavior are higher when subjects have to borrow than when they have to save in order to consume optimally, suggesting debt-aversion. Signifiant underconsumption is observed when subjects have to borrow in order to reach optimal consumption. Only weak evidence is found suggesting that subjects over-consume when saving is necessary for optimal consumption

Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability

We examine strategic awareness in experimental games, that is, the question of whether subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others’ actions. We conduct a beauty contest game and elicit measures of cognitive ability and beliefs about others’ cognitive ability. We show that the effect of cognitive ability is highly non-linear. Subjects below a certain threshold choose numbers in the whole interval and their behavior does not correlate with beliefs about others’ ability. In contrast, subjects who exceed the threshold avoid choices above 50 and react very sensitively to beliefs about the cognitive ability of others

Aversion to Hiring Algorithms: Transparency, Gender Profiling, and Self-Confidence

We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision between themselves and another worker is made either by a participant in the role of a manager or by an algorithm. In a second set of experiments, managers choose whether they want to delegate their hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the baseline treatments, we observe that workers choose the manager more often than the algorithm, and managers also prefer to make the hiring decisions themselves rather than delegate them to the algorithm. When the algorithm does not use workers' gender to predict their job task performance and workers know this, they choose the algorithm more often. Providing details on how the algorithm works does not increase the preference for the algorithm, neither for workers nor for managers. Providing feedback to managers about their performance in hiring the best workers increases their preference for the algorithm, as managers are, on average, overconfident

Testing the Preferred-Habitat Theory

Testing the Preferred-Habitat Theory: The Role ofTime-Varying Risk Aversion Abstract: This paper examines the preferred-habitat theory under time-varying risk aversion. The predicted positive relation between the term spread and relative supply of longer-term debt is stronger when risk aversion is high. To capture this effect, a time-varying coefficient model is introduced and applied to German bond data. The results support the theoretical predictions and indicate substantial time variation: under high risk aversion, yield spreads react about three times more strongly than when risk aversion is low. The accumulated response of term spreads to a one standard deviation change in debt supply ranges between 5 and 33 basis points

Behavioral regulatory agencies

This article analyses how the commitment problem in regulation, and the potential for a strategic delegation solution, is affected by the consideration of bounded rationality by agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. Regulators and other agents have endogenous preferences. Non-optimizing behavior, expert biases (and related de-biasing strategies), and a concern for fairness and process also modify the traditional regulatory game. As a result, on the one hand independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust regulatory system, and on the other hand their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments

A productive clash of cultures: Injecting economics into leadership research

Research on leadership in economics has developed in parallel to the literature in management and psychology and links between the fields have been sparse. Whereas modern leadership scholars mostly focus on transformational and related leadership styles, economists have mainly emphasized the role of contracts, control rights, and incentives. We argue that both fields could profit from enriching their approach with insights from the other field. We review and synthesize the economics literature on leadership in organizations and discuss how leadership scholars in management and psychology can benefit from the detailed understanding of transactional methods that economists have developed. We link the contributions in economics to a broad set of topics including the foundations of leadership, leader emergence, and leader effectiveness. At the same time, we also point out limitations of the economic approach and outline how the integration of leadership research and economics would broaden the scope of future studies