Price, Wage and Employment Response to Shocks: Evidence from the WDN Survey

This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the Eurosystem's Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend - in theoretically sensible ways - on the intensity of competition in firms' product markets, on the importance of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment. Focusing on the pass-through of cost shocks to prices, our results suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this pass-through stronger.Wage bargaining, Labour-market institutions, Survey data, European Union.

Price, wage and employment response to shocks: evidence from the WDN survey

This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the Eurosystem's Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend - in theoretically sensible ways - on the intensity of competition in firms' product markets, on the importance of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment. Focusing on the passthrough of cost shocks to prices, our results suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this pass-through stronger. --Wage bargaining,labour-market institutions,survey data,European Union

Price, wage and employment response to shocks: evidence from the WDN survey

This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend – in theoretically sensible ways – on the intensity of competition in firms’ product markets, on the importance of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment. Focusing on the passthrough of cost shocks to prices, our results suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this pass-through stronger. JEL Classification: J31, J38, P50European Union, Labour-market institutions, survey data, wage bargaining

The simple micro-economics of public-private partnerships

We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse agent chooses unobservable efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We begin by studying the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and operation into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on the contractual framework and the quality of the information held by the government. We then extend the basic model in several directions. We consider the factors that affect the optimal allocation of demand risk and their implications for the use of user charges and the choice of contract length. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade-off between incentive and flexibility in long-term PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPP contracts, including cost overruns. We also consider how the institutional environment, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affects contract design and incentives. We conclude with some policy implications on the desirability of PPPs

ANALISIS KELEMBAGAAN NELAYAN KAPAL SLEREK DI DESA PENGAMBENGAN KECAMATAN NEGARA KABUPATEN JEMBARANA BALI: STUDI HUBUNGAN KERJA DAN DINAMIKA PENDAPATAN NELAYAN

Economic relations between capital owners and fishermen will lead to institutional changes (rules of the game) that are obeyed together to maintain the continuity of fishing activities. Institutional that occurs in coastal communities is an interaction between economic agents to achieve certain goals such as welfare. The purposes of this study are 1) Analyzing institutions in fishing efforts using Slerek boat related to working relationship patterns and income dynamics 2) Analyzing the institutional impact on the employment of coastal communities. Based on the results of this qualitative research obtained data that the institutions formed in fishing business activities using slerek boat are the result of continuous interaction so that an unwritten pattern of rules of the games is created that comes from the agreement of the economic agents involved in it. Institutional related labor relations are dominated by agreements between land, sea and patching skippers. The most prominent working relationships appear in the profit sharing system consisting of three systems, namely the system for the light of the moon, the system for three and the clean system of the beach. Institutional related income dynamics are influenced by fish prices, the number of catches, the revenue sharing system implemented, operational costs. The impact caused by the existence of economic institutions on fishing business activities using slerek boat to the absorption of labor is the amount of labor needed in one pair of slerek boat is 46 people

Trade and Development in Vietnam: Exploring Investment Linkages

This paper presents and uses a new, stylized single country dynamic CGE model to explore the trade-development linkages in Vietnam. Application of this framework involves addressing three basic questions: 1. Does a model that properly determines capacity additions and more fully captures macroeconomic accounting and growth dynamics predict trade levels in a satisfactory manner? 2. Are those capacity additions determined by trade liberalization, and if so, which aspects of trade liberalization? 3. Under this framework what are expected impacts of trade liberalization initiatives, such as past bilateral trade agreements and recent WTO accession, taking into account their potential effect on incentives to invest via both tariff changes and institutional reforms? We also explore the role of the state in determining investment patterns, since the government of Vietnam has played a crucial role in setting both the aggregate level and sectoral pattern of investment in the past. But recently there has been a recovery of foreign investment as well as an upsurge of investment by the domestic private sector. Moreover, Vietnam’s WTO accession agreement was as much about incentives to FDI as it was about tariff concessions, and it spurred ongoing institutional reforms that impact the investment climate.trade, development, Vietman, investment linkages

Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers

Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers. Surprisingly, however, there has been little sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in this context. The scant existing scholarship is either limited to specific subject areas or focused primarily on judicial doctrine without addressing the use of historical practice in broader conceptual or theoretical terms. To the extent that the issue has been discussed, most accounts of how historical practice should inform the separation of powers require “acquiescence” by the branch of government whose prerogatives the practice implicates, something that is viewed as critical to giving historical practice the force of law. Yet the concept of acquiescence has been treated much too casually in the literature. Claims about acquiescence are typically premised on a Madisonian conception of interbranch competition, pursuant to which Congress and the Executive Branch are each assumed to have the tools and the motivation consistently to guard against encroachments on their authority. It has become apparent from political science scholarship, however, that the Madisonian model does not accurately reflect the dynamics of modern congressional-executive relations. This requires a reexamination of the premises and implications of the idea of institutional acquiescence in particular, and of the role of historical practice more generally. Ultimately, we argue, the problems with the Madisonian model are not fatal to crediting historical practice in interpreting the separation of powers. But they do require more attention to the reasons why such practice is invoked, the extent to which the reasons demand institutional acquiescence, and the precise method by which such acquiescence is identified. To illustrate the importance of each of these questions, we present three case studies of constitutional debates concerning the separation of powers in which practice-based arguments are prominent - war powers, congressional-executive agreements, and removal of executive officers

Price, wage and employment response to shocks : evidence from the wdn survey

This paper analyses information from survey data collected in the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) on patterns of firm-level adjustment to shocks. We document that the relative intensity and the character of price vs. cost and wage vs. employment adjustments in response to cost-push shocks depend - in theoretically sensible ways - on the intensity of competition in firms’ product markets, on the importance of collective wage bargaining and on other structural and institutional features of firms and of their environment. Focusing on the pass-through of cost shocks to prices, our results suggest that the pass-through is lower in highly competitive firms. Furthermore, a high degree of employment protection and collective wage agreements tend to make this pass through stronge

The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse agent chooses unobservable efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We begin by studying the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and operation into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on the contractual framework and the quality of the information held by the government. We then extend the basic model in several directions. We consider the factors that affect the optimal allocation of demand risk and their implications for the use of user charges and the choice of contract length. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade-off between incentive and flexibility in long-term PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPP contracts, including cost overruns. We also consider how the institutional environment, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affects contract design and incentives. We conclude with some policy implications on the desirability of PPPs.Contracting out, public-private partnerships, public-service provision

Institutions and Inequality in Liberalizing Markets: Explaining Different Trajectories of Institutional Change in Social Europe

Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-061-25-0444]