Determinateness of Strategic Games with a Potential

AMS classification: 90D05

Characterizing properties of approximate solutions for optimization problems

optimization

On consistent solutions for strategic games

Nash equilibrium;game theory

Economic Theory in the Mathematical Mode

Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 8, 1983general equilibrium;

Potential Games and Interactive Decisions with Multiple Criteria.

Abstract: Game theory is a mathematical theory for analyzing strategic interaction between decision makers. This thesis covers two game-theoretic topics. The first part of this thesis deals with potential games: noncooperative games in which the information about the goals of the separate players that is required to determine equilibria, can be aggregated into a single function. The structure of different types of potential games is investigated. Congestion problems and the financing of public goods through voluntary contributions are studied in this framework. The second part of the thesis abandons the common assumption that each player is guided by a single goal. It takes into account players who are guided by several, possibly conflicting, objective functions.

The cybernetics of nonzero sum games – the prisoner's dilemma reinterpreted as a pure conflict game with nature, with empirical applications

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.In this thesis a new solution concept is developed for n-player, nonzero sum games. The solution concept is based in reinterpreting the n-player nonzero sum game into 2-player zero sum games. The n-player nonzero sum game is first rewritten as an n + 1 player coalition game. The definition of zero sum payment is that one player pays the other what he gets in a given outcome (coalition of the n + 1 player game). Who pays whom depends on the coalition. More than one 2-player zero sum interpretation game always results from the procedure, and criteria are established to select one of the zero sum interpretation games. The solution concept defines results identical to the minimax concept when applied directly to zero sum 2-player games. When applied to 2-player prisoner’s dilemma games, the solution procedure assigns mixed strategies to the prisoners, thereby “resolving” the dilemma. The mixed strategies vary with the payoffs (up to a linear transformation). For prisoner’s dilemma matrices which have been used in large numbers of gaming experiments, the solution concept predicts dynamically, i.e., by play number, the “fraction of cooperative choices” for (approximately) the first 30 plays. In addition, the mixed strategy appears in a game between each subject (prisoner) and the n + 1st player (district attorney), suggesting that the subjects have been playing against the experimenter. Empirical evidence for this conclusion is given. A theorem is proved for n-player prisoner’s dilemma games. Game theory is reviewed to show the roots of this solution concept in the heuristic use of zero sum n-player games in the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory, and in rational decision making models, e.g., “games against Nature.” The empirical and formal difficulties of the equilibrium point solution concept for nonzero sum games are discussed. Detailed connections between game theory and cybernetics are discussed

On the determinateness of m x infinity-bimatrix games

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