Distributed reflection denial of service attack: A critical review

As the world becomes increasingly connected and the number of users grows exponentially and “things” go online, the prospect of cyberspace becoming a significant target for cybercriminals is a reality. Any host or device that is exposed on the internet is a prime target for cyberattacks. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is accountable for the majority of these cyberattacks. Although various solutions have been proposed by researchers to mitigate this issue, cybercriminals always adapt their attack approach to circumvent countermeasures. One of the modified DoS attacks is known as distributed reflection denial-of-service attack (DRDoS). This type of attack is considered to be a more severe variant of the DoS attack and can be conducted in transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP). However, this attack is not effective in the TCP protocol due to the three-way handshake approach that prevents this type of attack from passing through the network layer to the upper layers in the network stack. On the other hand, UDP is a connectionless protocol, so most of these DRDoS attacks pass through UDP. This study aims to examine and identify the differences between TCP-based and UDP-based DRDoS attacks

An interoperable and secure architecture for internet-scale decentralized personal communication

Interpersonal network communications, including Voice over IP (VoIP) and Instant Messaging (IM), are increasingly popular communications tools. However, systems to date have generally adopted a client-server model, requiring complex centralized infrastructure, or have not adhered to any VoIP or IM standard. Many deployment scenarios either require no central equipment, or due to unique properties of the deployment, are limited or rendered unattractive by central servers. to address these scenarios, we present a solution based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) standard, utilizing a decentralized Peer-to-Peer (P2P) mechanism to distribute data. Our new approach, P2PSIP, enables users to communicate with minimal or no centralized servers, while providing secure, real-time, authenticated communications comparable in security and performance to centralized solutions.;We present two complete protocol descriptions and system designs. The first, the SOSIMPLE/dSIP protocol, is a P2P-over-SIP solution, utilizing SIP both for the transport of P2P messages and personal communications, yielding an interoperable, single-stack solution for P2P communications. The RELOAD protocol is a binary P2P protocol, designed for use in a SIP-using-P2P architecture where an existing SIP application is modified to use an additional, binary RELOAD stack to distribute user information without need for a central server.;To meet the unique security needs of a fully decentralized communications system, we propose an enrollment-time certificate authority model that provides asserted identity and strong P2P and user-level security. In this model, a centralized server is contacted only at enrollment time. No run-time connections to the servers are required.;Additionally, we show that traditional P2P message routing mechanisms are inappropriate for P2PSIP. The existing mechanisms are generally optimized for file sharing and neglect critical practical elements of the open Internet --- namely link-level security and asymmetric connectivity caused by Network Address Translators (NATs). In response to these shortcomings, we introduce a new message routing paradigm, Adaptive Routing (AR), and using both analytical models and simulation show that AR significantly improves message routing performance for P2PSIP systems.;Our work has led to the creation of a new research topic within the P2P and interpersonal communications communities, P2PSIP. Our seminal publications have provided the impetus for subsequent P2PSIP publications, for the listing of P2PSIP as a topic in conference calls for papers, and for the formation of a new working group in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), directed to develop an open Internet standard for P2PSIP

Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense System

Distributed denial-of-service (DoS) attacks present a great threat to the Internet, and existing security mechanisms cannot detect or stop them successfully. The problem lies in the distributed nature of attacks, which engages the power of a vast number of coordinated hosts. To mitigate the impacts of DDoS attacks, it is important to develop such defenses system that canbothdetect andreact against ongoing attacks. The attacks ideally should be stopped as close to the sources as possible, saving network resources andreducing congestion. The DDoS defense system that is deployed at the source-end should prevent the machines at associated network from participating in DDoS attacks. The primary objective of this project, which is developing a DDoS defense system, is to provide good service to a victim's legitimate clients during the attack, thus canceling the denial-of-service effect. The scope of study will coverthe aspect of howthe attack detection algorithms work and identify the attack traffic, hence develop appropriate attack responses. As a source-end defense against DDoS attacks, the attack flows can be stopped before they enter the Internet core and before they aggregate with other attack flows. The methodology chosen for this project is the combination of sequential and iterative approaches of the software development process, which comprises of six main phases, which are initial planning phase, requirement definition phase, system design phase, coding and testing phase, implementation phase, and lastly maintenance and support phase. The system used a source router approach, in which the source router serves as a gateway between the source network containing some of the attack nodes and the rest of the Internet, to detectand limitDDoS streams long before they reach the target. This will be covered in the Findings section of the report. TheDiscussion section will be focus more onthe architecture onthe system, which having three important component; observation, rate-limiting and traffic-policing

Introducing the SlowDrop Attack

In network security, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks target network systems with the aim of making them unreachable. Last generation threats are particularly dangerous because they can be carried out with very low resource consumption by the attacker. In this paper we propose SlowDrop, an attack characterized by a legitimate-like behavior and able to target different protocols and server systems. The proposed attack is the first slow DoS threat targeting Microsoft IIS, until now unexploited from other similar attacks. We properly describe the attack, analyzing its ability to target arbitrary systems on different scenarios, by including both wired and wireless connections, and comparing the proposed attack to similar threats. The obtained results show that by executing targeted attacks, SlowDrop is successful both against conventional servers and Microsoft IIS, which is closed source and required us the execution of so called \u201cnetwork level reverse engineering\u201d activities. Due to its ability to successfully target different servers on different scenarios, the attack should be considered an important achievement in the slow DoS field