Church's thesis and related axioms in Coq's type theory

"Church's thesis" ($\mathsf{CT}$) as an axiom in constructive logic states that every total function of type $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is computable, i.e. definable in a model of computation. $\mathsf{CT}$ is inconsistent in both classical mathematics and in Brouwer's intuitionism since it contradicts Weak K\"onig's Lemma and the fan theorem, respectively. Recently, $\mathsf{CT}$ was proved consistent for (univalent) constructive type theory. Since neither Weak K\"onig's Lemma nor the fan theorem are a consequence of just logical axioms or just choice-like axioms assumed in constructive logic, it seems likely that $\mathsf{CT}$ is inconsistent only with a combination of classical logic and choice axioms. We study consequences of $\mathsf{CT}$ and its relation to several classes of axioms in Coq's type theory, a constructive type theory with a universe of propositions which does neither prove classical logical axioms nor strong choice axioms. We thereby provide a partial answer to the question which axioms may preserve computational intuitions inherent to type theory, and which certainly do not. The paper can also be read as a broad survey of axioms in type theory, with all results mechanised in the Coq proof assistant

Computability in constructive type theory

We give a formalised and machine-checked account of computability theory in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC), the constructive type theory underlying the Coq proof assistant. We first develop synthetic computability theory, pioneered by Richman, Bridges, and Bauer, where one treats all functions as computable, eliminating the need for a model of computation. We assume a novel parametric axiom for synthetic computability and give proofs of results like Rice’s theorem, the Myhill isomorphism theorem, and the existence of Post’s simple and hypersimple predicates relying on no other axioms such as Markov’s principle or choice axioms. As a second step, we introduce models of computation. We give a concise overview of definitions of various standard models and contribute machine-checked simulation proofs, posing a non-trivial engineering effort. We identify a notion of synthetic undecidability relative to a fixed halting problem, allowing axiom-free machine-checked proofs of undecidability. We contribute such undecidability proofs for the historical foundational problems of computability theory which require the identification of invariants left out in the literature and now form the basis of the Coq Library of Undecidability Proofs. We then identify the weak call-by-value λ-calculus L as sweet spot for programming in a model of computation. We introduce a certifying extraction framework and analyse an axiom stating that every function of type ℕ → ℕ is L-computable.Wir behandeln eine formalisierte und maschinengeprüfte Betrachtung von Berechenbarkeitstheorie im Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC), der konstruktiven Typtheorie die dem Beweisassistenten Coq zugrunde liegt. Wir entwickeln erst synthetische Berechenbarkeitstheorie, vorbereitet durch die Arbeit von Richman, Bridges und Bauer, wobei alle Funktionen als berechenbar behandelt werden, ohne Notwendigkeit eines Berechnungsmodells. Wir nehmen ein neues, parametrisches Axiom für synthetische Berechenbarkeit an und beweisen Resultate wie das Theorem von Rice, das Isomorphismus Theorem von Myhill und die Existenz von Post’s simplen und hypersimplen Prädikaten ohne Annahme von anderen Axiomen wie Markov’s Prinzip oder Auswahlaxiomen. Als zweiten Schritt führen wir Berechnungsmodelle ein. Wir geben einen kompakten Überblick über die Definition von verschiedenen Berechnungsmodellen und erklären maschinengeprüfte Simulationsbeweise zwischen diesen Modellen, welche einen hohen Konstruktionsaufwand beinhalten. Wir identifizieren einen Begriff von synthetischer Unentscheidbarkeit relativ zu einem fixierten Halteproblem welcher axiomenfreie maschinengeprüfte Unentscheidbarkeitsbeweise erlaubt. Wir erklären solche Beweise für die historisch grundlegenden Probleme der Berechenbarkeitstheorie, die das Identifizieren von Invarianten die normalerweise in der Literatur ausgelassen werden benötigen und nun die Basis der Coq Library of Undecidability Proofs bilden. Wir identifizieren dann den call-by-value λ-Kalkül L als sweet spot für die Programmierung in einem Berechnungsmodell. Wir führen ein zertifizierendes Extraktionsframework ein und analysieren ein Axiom welches postuliert dass jede Funktion vom Typ N→N L-berechenbar ist

First-order modal logic in the necessary framework of objects

I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only the cardinalities of these sets matters, and that not all pairs of infinite sets determine the same logic. I use so-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and show how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Williamson’s argument

Modal Logics of Topological Relations

Logical formalisms for reasoning about relations between spatial regions play a fundamental role in geographical information systems, spatial and constraint databases, and spatial reasoning in AI. In analogy with Halpern and Shoham's modal logic of time intervals based on the Allen relations, we introduce a family of modal logics equipped with eight modal operators that are interpreted by the Egenhofer-Franzosa (or RCC8) relations between regions in topological spaces such as the real plane. We investigate the expressive power and computational complexity of logics obtained in this way. It turns out that our modal logics have the same expressive power as the two-variable fragment of first-order logic, but are exponentially less succinct. The complexity ranges from (undecidable and) recursively enumerable to highly undecidable, where the recursively enumerable logics are obtained by considering substructures of structures induced by topological spaces. As our undecidability results also capture logics based on the real line, they improve upon undecidability results for interval temporal logics by Halpern and Shoham. We also analyze modal logics based on the five RCC5 relations, with similar results regarding the expressive power, but weaker results regarding the complexity

Synthetic Undecidability and Incompleteness of First-Order Axiom Systems in Coq

We mechanise the undecidability of various frst-order axiom systems in Coq, employing the synthetic approach to computability underlying the growing Coq Library of Undecidability Proofs. Concretely, we cover both semantic and deductive entailment in fragments of Peano arithmetic (PA) as well as ZF and related fnitary set theories, with their undecidability established by many-one reductions from solvability of Diophantine equations, i.e. Hilbert’s tenth problem (H10), and the Post correspondence problem (PCP), respectively. In the synthetic setting based on the computability of all functions defnable in a constructive foundation, such as Coq’s type theory, it sufces to defne these reductions as metalevel functions with no need for further encoding in a formalised model of computation. The concrete cases of PA and the considered set theories are supplemented by a general synthetic theory of undecidable axiomatisations, focusing on well-known connections to consistency and incompleteness. Specifcally, our reductions rely on the existence of standard models, necessitating additional assumptions in the case of full ZF, and all axiomatic extensions still justifed by such standard models are shown incomplete. As a by-product of the undecidability of set theories formulated using only membership and no equality symbol, we obtain the undecidability of frst-order logic with a single binary relation

Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon - Computationally

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some consistent and recursively enumerable theories which cannot be extended to any complete and consistent and recursively enumerable theory. Though any consistent and decidable theory can be extended to a complete and consistent and decidable theory. Thus deduction and consistency are not decidable in logic, and an analogue of Rice's Theorem holds for recursively enumerable theories: all the non-trivial properties of such theories are undecidable

Self-referential theories

We study the structure of families of theories in the language of arithmetic extended to allow these families to refer to one another and to themselves. If a theory contains schemata expressing its own truth and expressing a specific Turing index for itself, and contains some other mild axioms, then that theory is untrue. We exhibit some families of true self-referential theories that barely avoid this forbidden pattern