Jurisprudence and Structural Realism

Some Anglophone legal theorists look to analytic philosophy for core presuppositions. For example, the epistemological theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard Quine shape the theories of Dennis Patterson and Brian Leiter, respectively. These epistemologies are anti-foundational since they reject the kind of certain grounding that is exemplified in Cartesian philosophy. And, they are coherentist in that they seek to legitimate truth-claims by reference to entire linguistic systems. While these theories are insightful, the current context of information and communication technologies (ICT) has created new informational concepts and issues. As a result, the analytic epistemologies are increasingly challenged by alternative perspectives. One such alternative is Structural Realism (SR), which is influential among the natural sciences, and especially physics. Informational Structural Realism, (ISR) is a variant of SR that was introduced by Luciano Floridi. Unlike the coherentist theories, ISR promotes examination of the connections among types of information and informational structures. It is an important shift for legal theory today, since the challenges that the ICT presents have to do with pattern recognition across vast domains of diverse data. An informational jurisprudence is now required to understand the issues emerging from the ICT

Threats and challenges to the scientific representation of semantics: Carnap, Quine, and the Lessons of Semantic Skepticism

We will approach the problem of semantic skepticism by comparing Quine's view with Carnap's strategy for finding intensional equivalences that guarantee a solution to the paradox of analysis; and then we will consider how the Intensionalists use these possible solutions to save the scientificity of semantics. Quine disagrees with Carnap that plausible solutions to the question of intensional equivalence provide us with explanations for the difficult problems. These are ones where, in contrast to mere extensional indistinguishability of expressions, we need a stronger determination to choose the right interpretation. And then he has a skeptical answer to which the semanticist-linguist cannot remain insensitive. The problem is that a semanticist can only say that he has an "object" of inquiry if a normative property can be reconstructed, but that is not guaranteed by the mathematical theory used to infer intensional values. Finally, we would like to point out the relevance of skeptical doctrines about semantics that go beyond the mere haunting of relativism or quietism about meaning. Without a skeptical approach, we argue, we lose sight of the unique nature of language and its peculiar property of being an object shaped by pressures on its own ability to be theorized. &nbsp

A Defense of Scientific Platonism without Metaphysical Presuppositions

From the Platonistic standpoint, mathematical edifices form an immaterial, unchanging, and eternal world that exists independently of human thought. By extension, “scientific Platonism” says that directly mathematizable physical phenomena – in other terms, the research field of physics – are governed by entities belonging to this objectively existing mathematical world. Platonism is a metaphysical theory. But since metaphysical theories, by definition, are neither provable nor refutable, anti-Platonistic approaches cannot be less metaphysical than Platonism itself. In other words, anti-Platonism is not “more scientific” than Platonism. All we can do is to compare Platonism and its negations under epistemological criteria such as simplicity, economy of hypotheses, or consistency with regard to their respective consequences. In this paper I intend to show that anti-Platonism claiming in a first approximation (i) that mathematical edifices consist of meaningless signs assembled according to arbitrary rules, and (ii) that the adequacy of mathematical entities and phenomena covered by physics results from idealization of these phenomena, is based as much as Platonism on metaphysical presuppositions. Thereafter, without directly taking position, I try to launch a debate focusing on the following questions: (i) To maintain its coherence, is anti-Platonism not constrained to adopt extremely complex assumptions, difficult to defend, and not always consistent with current realities or practices of scientific knowledge? (ii) Instead of supporting anti-Platonism whatever the cost, in particular by the formulation of implausible hypotheses, would it not be more adequate to accept the idea of a mathematical world existing objectively and governing certain aspects of the material world, just as we note the existence of the material world which could also not exist

Satan stultified: a rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf

Benacerraf criticizes Lucas’ argument against Mechanism because, in his opinion, it depends too much on how the system we are talking about is presented and because the argument put in form of challenge reduces itself to a contest of wits between Lucas and the mechanists. In Benacerraf opinion, Lucas should clarify the sense of utilised notions and the argument would have to be reconstructed as formally as possible, in order to determine the involved philosophical premises. Moreover Benacerraf maintains that, instead of abandoning the idea that human mind is a machine, we could assume that minds are machines for which it is not possible to prove the consistency or that they are inadequate for arithmetic; moreover minds could be machines whose characteristics we are not able to specify. However, Lucas answers that the requirement of reconstructing his argument in a formal way misunderstands his project: his argument is not a direct proof but a dialectical argument, a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanist argument, and so the attempt to reconstruct it as a rigorous proof is a distortion of the original argument, that is essentially dialectical. What about the hypothesis suggested by Benacerraf, Lucas disputes that we are able to manage arithmetic and we don’t seem as inconsistent as an inconsistent system is, because we are selective while an inconsistent system is not; at the other hand, the idea that we are machine but we don’t know anything about what kind of machine we are evacuates Mechanism of all content

FORMALITY AND REPRESENTATIONAL RELATIVISM: A CRITICAL PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION INTO KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AS ONE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

This paper provides a philosophical discussion of Knowledge Representation [KR], which has become an influential interdisciplinary and technology friendly research field through Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science. While KR appears an increasingly fashionable and subsequently blurred term, it originally emerged out of genuine meta-theoretical considerations. Subsequently, the reconstruction of KR's formal, structural and functional foundations should call for further philosophical evaluation of KR's interdisciplinary and practical potential. The focus is put on KR's logical and semiotical roots, both methodologically and historically, whose exposure prove necessary for a proper understanding and possible criticism of KR's [technological] applicability. The stipulation of analytical symbol theory is new in this context, but nevertheless necessary, as only a more principal semiotic focus may allow an appropriate evaluation of symbolic intelligence, which has to be considered KR's essence

Hilary Putnam\u27s Consistency Objection against Wittgenstein\u27s Conventionalism in Mathematics

Hilary Putnam first published the consistency objection against Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of mathematics in 1979. In 1983, Putnam and Benacerraf raised this objection against all conventionalist accounts of mathematics. I discuss the 1979 version and the scenario argument, which supports the key premise of the objection. The wide applicability of this objection is not apparent; I thus raise it against an imaginary axiomatic theory T similar to Peano arithmetic in all relevant aspects. I argue that a conventionalist can explain the consistency of T and suggest that an analogous explanation can be provided for the consistency of Peano arithmetic

The Principle Of Excluded Middle Then And Now: Aristotle And Principia Mathematica

The prevailing truth-functional logic of the twentieth century, it is argued, is incapable of expressing the subtlety and richness of Aristotle's Principle of Excluded Middle, and hence cannot but misinterpret it. Furthermore, the manner in which truth-functional logic expresses its own Principle of Excluded Middle is less than satisfactory in its application to mathematics. Finally, there are glimpses of the "realism" which is the metaphysics demanded by twentieth century logic, with the remarkable consequent that Classical logic is a particularly inept instrument to analyze those philosophies which stand opposed to the "realism" it demands

Won\u27t Get Fooled Again: The Dogma of Quine\u27s “Two Dogmas”

[From the Introduction] In the 1950’s, W.V.O. Quine published what he thought was a crippling blow to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Hailed as one of the most important philosophical articles in the 20th century, the “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” sought to demonstrate how the concept of analyticity is circular in nature. The conclusions that Quine drew from this argument envisioned the collapse of reductionism and, subsequently, the verification theory. Both were theories central to the logical positivists whose hard-nosed doctrine dominated Anglo-American philosophy for much of early 20th Century. Although it has attracted criticism and praise, the article has held a profound influence in Western philosophy. Unfortunately, the article is flawed in the same manner the author critiques analyticity and the two doctrines following in its wake: the “Two Dogmas” is dogmatic itself. Quine’s essay strictly holds to ideas and claims that are clearly not true, highly contested, or preposterous. This article’s first critique exposes two major dogmatisms cleverly embedded under the superficial and swift analysis. Readers are required to agree with Quine on the assertion that all definitions are synonyms. This ignores axiological components of the relationship between them as well as demand agreement with the Cluster theory of naming. The second dogmatism is the blatant ignorance of two extremely conflicting theories of meaning (logical positivist and ordinary language philosophy) that is embodied in his dual categories of analyticity. For Quine to bridge the gap between the theories and ground analyticity, what he really did was set up an impossible task of needing to conform one theory of meaning to another. The third dogmatism that Quine, his followers and his critics are guilty of is the avoidance of syntheticity, thereby leaving the other half of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy untouched