600 research outputs found
On the Computational Complexity of Non-dictatorial Aggregation
We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an
algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes
cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that the
collective outcome is not simply the choices made by a single member of the
society. We consider the setting in which the members of a society take a
position on a fixed collection of issues, where for each issue several
different alternatives are possible, but the combination of choices must belong
to a given set of allowable voting patterns. Such a set is called a
possibility domain if there is an aggregator that is non-dictatorial, operates
separately on each issue, and returns values among those cast by the society on
each issue. We design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given a set
of voting patterns, whether or not is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if
is a possibility domain, then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time
such a non-dictatorial aggregator for . We then show that the question of
whether a Boolean domain is a possibility domain is in NLOGSPACE. We also
design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether is a uniform
possibility domain, that is, whether admits an aggregator that is
non-dictatorial even when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in
the case of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial
time a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists. Then, we turn our
attention to the case where is given implicitly, either as the set of
assignments satisfying a propositional formula, or as a set of consistent
evaluations of an sequence of propositional formulas. In both cases, we provide
bounds to the complexity of deciding if is a (uniform) possibility domain.Comment: 21 page
Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue
We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set
of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several
positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is
restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We require the aggregation to
be supportive, i.e. for every issue the corresponding component of
every aggregator on every issue should satisfy . We prove that, in such a set-up, non-dictatorial
aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible if and only if
either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society of only two members
or a ternary aggregator exists that either on every issue is a majority
operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies , or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e.
the corresponding component satisfies We then introduce a notion of uniformly non-dictatorial
aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when
restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue,
differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets
of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator.
Then making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint
satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial
complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns has a
uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted
conservative constraint satisfaction problem on , in the sense introduced by
Bulatov and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable;
otherwise it is NP-complete
Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class
of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games
that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games,
strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and
gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends
Nakamura's theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable
games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives
that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.Comment: 35 pages; To appear in Journal of Mathematical Economics; Appendix
added, Propositions, Remarks, etc. are renumbere
A Formal Separation Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Behavior
It is common in multiagent systems to make a distinction between "strategic"
behavior and other forms of intentional but "nonstrategic" behavior: typically,
that strategic agents model other agents while nonstrategic agents do not.
However, a crisp boundary between these concepts has proven elusive. This
problem is pervasive throughout the game theoretic literature on bounded
rationality and particularly critical in parts of the behavioral game theory
literature that make an explicit distinction between the behavior of
"nonstrategic" level-0 agents and "strategic" higher-level agents (e.g., the
level-k and cognitive hierarchy models). Overall, work discussing bounded
rationality rarely gives clear guidance on how the rationality of nonstrategic
agents must be bounded, instead typically just singling out specific decision
rules and informally asserting them to be nonstrategic (e.g., truthfully
revealing private information; randomizing uniformly). In this work, we propose
a new, formal characterization of nonstrategic behavior. Our main contribution
is to show that it satisfies two properties: (1) it is general enough to
capture all purportedly "nonstrategic" decision rules of which we are aware in
the behavioral game theory literature; (2) behavior that obeys our
characterization is distinct from strategic behavior in a precise sense
Three Puzzles on Mathematics, Computation, and Games
In this lecture I will talk about three mathematical puzzles involving
mathematics and computation that have preoccupied me over the years. The first
puzzle is to understand the amazing success of the simplex algorithm for linear
programming. The second puzzle is about errors made when votes are counted
during elections. The third puzzle is: are quantum computers possible?Comment: ICM 2018 plenary lecture, Rio de Janeiro, 36 pages, 7 Figure
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections
Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting
in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting
honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no strategy-proof voting rule
that simultaneously satisfies certain combinations of desirable properties.
Researchers have attempted to get around the impossibility results in several
ways such as domain restriction and computational hardness of manipulation.
However these approaches have been shown to have limitations. Since prevention
of manipulation seems to be elusive, an interesting research direction
therefore is detection of manipulation. Motivated by this, we initiate the
study of detection of possible manipulators in an election.
We formulate two pertinent computational problems - Coalitional Possible
Manipulators (CPM) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators given Winner (CPMW),
where a suspect group of voters is provided as input to compute whether they
can be a potential coalition of possible manipulators. In the absence of any
suspect group, we formulate two more computational problems namely Coalitional
Possible Manipulators Search (CPMS), and Coalitional Possible Manipulators
Search given Winner (CPMSW). We provide polynomial time algorithms for these
problems, for several popular voting rules. For a few other voting rules, we
show that these problems are in NP-complete. We observe that detecting
manipulation maybe easy even when manipulation is hard, as seen for example, in
the case of the Borda voting rule.Comment: Accepted in AAMAS 201
Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable simple games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted
Algorithmically Efficient Syntactic Characterization of Possibility Domains
We call domain any arbitrary subset of a Cartesian power of the set {0,1} when we think of it as reflecting abstract rationality restrictions on vectors of two-valued judgments on a number of issues. In Computational Social Choice Theory, and in particular in the theory of judgment aggregation, a domain is called a possibility domain if it admits a non-dictatorial aggregator, i.e. if for some k there exists a unanimous (idempotent) function F:D^k - > D which is not a projection function. We prove that a domain is a possibility domain if and only if there is a propositional formula of a certain syntactic form, sometimes called an integrity constraint, whose set of satisfying truth assignments, or models, comprise the domain. We call possibility integrity constraints the formulas of the specific syntactic type we define. Given a possibility domain D, we show how to construct a possibility integrity constraint for D efficiently, i.e, in polynomial time in the size of the domain. We also show how to distinguish formulas that are possibility integrity constraints in linear time in the size of the input formula. Finally, we prove the analogous results for local possibility domains, i.e. domains that admit an aggregator which is not a projection function, even when restricted to any given issue. Our result falls in the realm of classical results that give syntactic characterizations of logical relations that have certain closure properties, like e.g. the result that logical relations component-wise closed under logical AND are precisely the models of Horn formulas. However, our techniques draw from results in judgment aggregation theory as well from results about propositional formulas and logical relations
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