On the complexity of designing distributed protocols.

"Reprinted from Information and Control, vol. 53, no.3, 1982."Bibliography: leaves 217-218."ONR/N00014-77-C-0532(NR041-519)

On the complexity of designing distributed protocols

"November 1982."Bibliography: leaves 8-9.Christos H. Papadimitriou, John Tsitsiklis

Gossip vs. Markov Chains, and Randomness-Efficient Rumor Spreading

We study gossip algorithms for the rumor spreading problem which asks one node to deliver a rumor to all nodes in an unknown network. We present the first protocol for any expander graph $G$ with $n$ nodes such that, the protocol informs every node in $O(\log n)$ rounds with high probability, and uses $\tilde{O}(\log n)$ random bits in total. The runtime of our protocol is tight, and the randomness requirement of $\tilde{O}(\log n)$ random bits almost matches the lower bound of $\Omega(\log n)$ random bits for dense graphs. We further show that, for many graph families, polylogarithmic number of random bits in total suffice to spread the rumor in $O(\mathrm{poly}\log n)$ rounds. These results together give us an almost complete understanding of the randomness requirement of this fundamental gossip process. Our analysis relies on unexpectedly tight connections among gossip processes, Markov chains, and branching programs. First, we establish a connection between rumor spreading processes and Markov chains, which is used to approximate the rumor spreading time by the mixing time of Markov chains. Second, we show a reduction from rumor spreading processes to branching programs, and this reduction provides a general framework to derandomize gossip processes. In addition to designing rumor spreading protocols, these novel techniques may have applications in studying parallel and multiple random walks, and randomness complexity of distributed algorithms.Comment: 41 pages, 1 figure. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1304.135

Security Protocol Specification and Verification with AnBx

Designing distributed protocols is complex and requires actions at very different levels: from the design of an interaction flow supporting the desired application-specific guarantees, to the selection of the most appropriate network-level protection mechanisms. To tame this complexity, we propose AnBx, a formal protocol specification language based on the popular Alice & Bob notation. AnBx offers channels as the main abstraction for communication, providing different authenticity and/or confidentiality guarantees for message transmission. AnBx extends existing proposals in the literature with a novel notion of forwarding channels, enforcing specific security guarantees from the message originator to the final recipient along a number of intermediate forwarding agents. We give a formal semantics of AnBx in terms of a state transition system expressed in the AVISPA Intermediate Format. We devise an ideal channel model and a possible cryptographic implementation, and we show that, under mild restrictions, the two representations coincide, thus making AnBx amenable to automated verification with different tools. We demonstrate the benefits of the declarative specification style distinctive of AnBx by revisiting the design of two existing e-payment protocols, iKP and SET

Autonomic computing architecture for SCADA cyber security

Cognitive computing relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These technologies can be used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment and can autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation. IBM first used the term ‘Autonomic Computing’ in 2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has been inspired by the human biological autonomic system. An autonomic system is self-healing, self-regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator