This Paper Might Change your Mind

Rational decision change can happen without information change. This is a problem for standard views of decision theory, on which linguistic intervention in rational decision-making is captured in terms of information change. But the standard view gives us no way to model interventions involving expressions that only have an attentional effects on conversational contexts. How are expressions with non-informational content - like epistemic modals - used to intervene in rational decision making? We show how to model rational decision change without information change: replace a standard conception of value (on which the value of a set of worlds reduces to values of individual worlds in the set) with one on which the value of a set of worlds is determined by a selection function that picks out a generic member world. We discuss some upshots of this view for theorizing in philosophy and formal semantics

Neural correlates of cognitive dissonance and choice-induced preference change

According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individual's preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called “cognitive dissonance” claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573–594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individual's preferences

Moral disengagement and the motivational gap in climate change

Although climate change jeopardizes the fundamental human rights of current as well as future people, current actions and ambitions to tackle it are inadequate. There are two prominent explanations for this motivational gap in the climate ethics literature. The first maintains that our conventional moral judgement system is not well equipped to identify a complex problem such as climate change as an important moral problem. The second explanation refers to people’s reluctance to change their behaviour and the temptation to shirk responsibility. We argue that both factors are at play in the motivational gap and that they are complemented by crucial moral psychological insights regarding moral disengagement, which enables emitters to dissociate self-condemnation from harmful conduct. In this way, emitters are able to maintain their profligate, consumptive lifestyle, even though this conflicts with their moral standards with respect to climate change. We provide some illustrations of how strategies of moral disengagement are deployed in climate change and discuss the relationship between the explanations for the motivational gap and moral disengagement. On the basis of this explanatory framework, we submit that there are three pathways to tackle the motivational gap and moral disengagement in climate change: making climate change more salient to emitters and affirming their self-efficacy; reconsidering the self-interested motives that necessitate moral disengagement; and tackling moral disengagement directly

AN ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT STATION FUNDING DECISIONS

The decision-making process by which academic departments within an experiment station allocate funds among commodities is examined. The decision to conduct research on some commodities and not on others introduces a problem of censored dependent variables. In order to overcome this problem, a simultaneous equations model with selectivity was used; it was applied to data from the Idaho Experiment Station. The results indicated a simultaneous relationship between research funding levels and expected benefits. Marginal products of one dollar in research investment were $53.80 for applied research, and$8.49 for maintenance research.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,

Optimization of QD in Projector Space

In a pair of correlated quantum systems a measurement in one corresponds to a change in the state of the other. In the process, information is lost. Measurement along which set of projectors would accompany minimum loss in information content is the optimization problem of quantum discord and is an important aspect of a classical to quantum transition because it asks us to look for the most classical states. This optimization problem is known to be NP-complete and is important because discord is defined through it making it a major obstacle on every computation. The standard zero discord condition helps us move to a stronger measure that addresses the correlated observables, in such a context we show that discord minimizes at the diagonal basis of the reduced density matrices and present an analytical expression of the measure