The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

Game Theory

"Money and Equilibrium: Two Alternative Nodes Of Coordination Of Economic Activities"

Economic theory has undergone a very deep transformation during the last forty years. Its method and its tools of analysis have evolved dramatically. The standards by which theoretical statements are now appreciated are far more demanding, especially from a formal point of view, than was the case before World War II. Precision and logical validity in raising questions and problems have increased as well. The set of hypotheses necessary to deal with the usual issues of political economy has been made more explicit, allowing everyone to have a more clearer interpretation of what has been done in the different fields. The content and the relevance of the concept of equilibrium have been strongly affected by these transformations. This paper, obviously, does not attempt to give an account of all these changes. It will focus on just one consequence of this evolution: the relevance of the concept of equilibrium in dealing with the traditional question of the working of the market, the central institution in our economies. To put the matter very briefly, the question addressed here concerns the place of equilibrium in economic theory: does mainstream economics allow for another theoretical reference? For two centuries at least, equilibrium was referred to as a particular situation towards which the market mechanism was supposed to drive the economy. An important issue was to prove this conjecture. Whereas mainstream economists (Smith, Ricardo, Stuart Mill, Marshall and Walras) endeavored to prove the stability of the market, critical authors tried to show that certain fundamental flaws of the market mechanism make instability and crisis the rule in a capitalist economy. Among the factors said to be responsible for this result, the monetary character of the economy seems the most important (as was emphasized by Boisguilbert, Sismondi and Marx in the past and by Keynes in our time).

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 2. application to natural and environmental resources

This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.Environmental Economics&Policies,Fisheries&Aquaculture,Common Property Resource Development,Economic Theory&Research,Ecosystems and Natural Habitats

Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes

This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a well-known solution rule for the class of linear production processes. Despite their stability properties, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players that are necessary for optimal production plans. This paper shows that, in general, the aforementioned drawback cannot be avoided allowing only allocations within the core of the cooperative game associated to the original linear production process, and therefore a new solution set named EOwen is introduced. For any player whose resources are needed in at least one optimal production plan, the EOwen set contains at least one allocation that assigns a strictly positive payoff to such player. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.The authors want to thank the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology for providing financial support under Grants MTM200767433 and MTM201019576, and the Junta de Andalucia/Feder (Spain) under Grant FQM5849. Special thanks are due to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.Perea Rojas Marcos, F.; Puerto Albandoz, J.; Fernández García, FR. (2012). Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes. European Journal of Operational Research. 220(1):125-131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.01.013S125131220

"The Capitalist Development of the Economy and the Structure of Financial Institutions"

This paper evolves from the sharp contrast in Smithian and Keynesian views about the relationship between the financial structure and the economy. The Smithian perspective implies that the financial structure is irrelevant, whereas the Keynesian position concludes that effective financing is necessary for the "capital development of the economy"- there is also a need to constrain any tendency of what Keynes referred to as speculation to dominate. Thus, the essential elements of equilibrium in Keynesian theory, the financial theory of investment and the investment theory of business cycles, are most apt when examined as outcomes of processes that operate over time. During the 1980s, there was a sharp increase in speculative financing resulting from the trend toward leveraged buyouts and the rising demand for short-term marketable corporate liabilities. A main characteristic of a capitalist economy that is stagnant or immersed in a depression is that the capital development of the economy is not progressing. The 1980s were filled with examples of financing inept investments, while the current climate is one of grossly inadequate investment levels to create a progressive full-employment economy. The financial instability interpretation of Keynes rests upon the profitability of debt financing, and incorporates the potential collapse of asset values in an environment of speculative and Ponzi financing. Consequently, the financial structure is significantly more fragile today than earlier in the post World War II era.

Redistribution of tax resources: a cooperative game theory approach

We consider the problem of how to distribute public expenditure among the different regions of an economic entity after all taxes have been collected. Typical examples are: the regions that make up a country, the states of a federal country, or the countries of a confederation of countries. We model the problem as a cooperative game in coalitional form, called the tax game. This game estimates the fiscal resources collected in each region, or coalition of regions, by differentiating between what comes from economic activity within each region and what comes from trade with the other regions. This methodology provides a measure of the disagreement within a region, or coalitions of regions, with respect to the budget received. Similarly, the stability of a budget allocation can be inferred by its situation within the core of the corresponding tax game. We consider the Spanish case as an example and show that the current regional financial system has a moderate degree of instability. We introduce two budget allocation rules, both borrowed from the cooperative games literature: the balanced allocation, which coincides with the nucleolus and with the Shapley value of the tax game, and the weighted balanced allocation, which coincides with the weighted Shapley value. We compare both budget allocation rules with the current Spanish financial system

Envelopment methodology to measure and compare subcontractor productivity at the firm level

This paper describes a conceptual approach to measure and compare productivity of resource utilization at the firm level, adapting a set of techniques known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Within this approach, the paper addresses the issues of multiple inputs and multiple outputs of a construction firm, level of detail for data collection, and the required transformations to correct for differences among projects. In particular, we focus on the resource management of subcontractors. Subcontractors manage multiple, concurrent projects and must allocate limited resources across these projects. Interaction between projects and resource allocation creates non-linear effects, and therefore the productivity of the firm is not simply the productivity of its projects. The proposed measurement methodology will allow assessment of the impact of different management policies (including many of those proposed by lean construction researchers) on firm performance. It is hoped that this novel approach to productivity measurement will help subcontractors identify efficient practices and superior management policies, and will promote adoption of these policies.<br /

Farmer response to rationed and uncertain irrigation supplies

Water resource management / Water use efficiency / Evapotranspiration / Agricultural production / Irrigated farming / Irrigation scheduling / Water allocation / Water supply / Water scarcity / Water delivery / Reservoirs / Uncertainty / Yield

Operations Research Games: A Survey

This paper surveys the research area of cooperative games associated with several types of operations research problems in which various decision makers (players) are involved.Cooperating players not only face a joint optimisation problem in trying, e.g., to minimise total joint costs, but also face an additional allocation problem in how to distribute these joint costs back to the individual players.This interplay between optimisation and allocation is the main subject of the area of operations research games.It is surveyed on the basis of a distinction between the nature of the underlying optimisation problem: connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory.cooperative games;operational research

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 1. basic theory

Game theory provides useful insights into the way parties that share a scarce resource may plan their use of the resource under different situations. This review provides a brief and self-contained introduction to the theory of cooperative games. It can be used to get acquainted with the basics of cooperative games. Its goal is also to provide a basic introduction to this theory, in connection with a couple of surveys that analyze its use in the context of environmental problems and models. The main models (bargaining games, transfer utility, and non-transfer utility games) and issues and solutions are considered: bargaining solutions, single-value solutions like the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and multi-value solutions such as the core. The cooperative game theory (CGT) models that are reviewed in this paper favor solutions that include all possible players and ignore the strategic stages leading to coalition building. They focus on the possible results of the cooperation by answering questions such as: Which coalitions can be formed? And how can the coalitional gains be divided to secure a sustainable agreement? An important aspect associated with the solution concepts of CGT is the equitable and fair sharing of the cooperation gains.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Livestock&Animal Husbandry,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Education for Development (superceded)