Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg

We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according to an exogenously specified sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector. We study the existence and uniqueness of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them, looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well behaved. We especially stress the importance of single crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a marginal version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose definition involves both policy dimensions.

Entering Student Affairs: A Comparative Study of Graduate School Choice

This article describes the college choice process of graduate students in College Student Personnel programs at a public university and a private religiously affiliated university. Despite differences in size, mission, and location of the two institutions studied, the research findings show that respondent populations were similar demographically and in the factors important to their choice of college, their reasons for choosing the field of student affairs, and the processes they used to select a graduate school

A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making

We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. We show that if all legislators are risk averse or if even limited transfers are possible, then delay is only possible if the status quo lies in the core. Thus, we expect immediate agreement in multidimensional models, where the core is typically empty. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: moderate status quos imply moderate policy outcomes, and legislative patience implies policy moderation

Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice

In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical. How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple, scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative. We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded

Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy

Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between this style of political science experimentation and economics experimentation parallels the connection between economic theory and formal political theory.

Mobility, education and labor market outcomes for U.S. graduates: Is selectivity important?

The literature on human capital, and its positive effects on individuals and regional economies, is now vast. The linkages between human capital and migration have also found a fertile ground in recent years especially in Europe where many studies have focused on interregional migration of graduates and highly skilled individuals. However, the literature on this phenomenon in the USA is less developed. Using the SESTAT database from NSF, this paper aims at contributing to the understanding of inter-state migration behavior of graduates in the USA and its effects on their career outcomes. It builds on the existing literature not only by focusing specifically on the US context, but also incorporating into the empirical model a correction for the possible selection bias that arises from the dual relationship between migration propensity and human capital endowment. Our estimated Mincerian earning equations, corrected for migrant self-selectivity, show that indeed repeat migration is associated with higher average salaries, while late migration is associated with a salary penalty. As for the other control variables, our results are consistent with what has been found in the labor economics literature. Female workers suffer from a salary penalty, while experience, level of education and employer size are all associated with higher average salaries. The labor market also rewards different fields of study differently

Governance choice on a serial network

This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.Governance choice · Transportation · Infrastructure · Fiscal federalism