On the Correspondence between Display Postulates and Deep Inference in Nested Sequent Calculi for Tense Logics

We consider two styles of proof calculi for a family of tense logics, presented in a formalism based on nested sequents. A nested sequent can be seen as a tree of traditional single-sided sequents. Our first style of calculi is what we call "shallow calculi", where inference rules are only applied at the root node in a nested sequent. Our shallow calculi are extensions of Kashima's calculus for tense logic and share an essential characteristic with display calculi, namely, the presence of structural rules called "display postulates". Shallow calculi enjoy a simple cut elimination procedure, but are unsuitable for proof search due to the presence of display postulates and other structural rules. The second style of calculi uses deep-inference, whereby inference rules can be applied at any node in a nested sequent. We show that, for a range of extensions of tense logic, the two styles of calculi are equivalent, and there is a natural proof theoretic correspondence between display postulates and deep inference. The deep inference calculi enjoy the subformula property and have no display postulates or other structural rules, making them a better framework for proof search

Syntactic Interpolation for Tense Logics and Bi-Intuitionistic Logic via Nested Sequents

We provide a direct method for proving Craig interpolation for a range of modal and intuitionistic logics, including those containing a "converse" modality. We demonstrate this method for classical tense logic, its extensions with path axioms, and for bi-intuitionistic logic. These logics do not have straightforward formalisations in the traditional Gentzen-style sequent calculus, but have all been shown to have cut-free nested sequent calculi. The proof of the interpolation theorem uses these calculi and is purely syntactic, without resorting to embeddings, semantic arguments, or interpreted connectives external to the underlying logical language. A novel feature of our proof includes an orthogonality condition for defining duality between interpolants

From Display to Labelled Proofs for Tense Logics

We introduce an effective translation from proofs in the display calculus to proofs in the labelled calculus in the context of tense logics. We identify the labelled calculus proofs in the image of this translation as those built from labelled sequents whose underlying directed graph possesses certain properties. For the basic normal tense logic Kt, the image is shown to be the set of all proofs in the labelled calculus G3Kt

Complete Additivity and Modal Incompleteness

In this paper, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story weaves together a paper of van Benthem, `Syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness theorems,' and a longstanding open question: whether every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal algebras, or as we call them, V-BAOs. Using a first-order reformulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in van Benthem's paper resolves the open question in the negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to V-BAOs, namely the provability logic GLB. We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is V-complete. After these results, we generalize the Blok Dichotomy to degrees of V-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem's theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness

Deciding regular grammar logics with converse through first-order logic

We provide a simple translation of the satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse into GF2, which is the intersection of the guarded fragment and the 2-variable fragment of first-order logic. This translation is theoretically interesting because it translates modal logics with certain frame conditions into first-order logic, without explicitly expressing the frame conditions. A consequence of the translation is that the general satisfiability problem for regular grammar logics with converse is in EXPTIME. This extends a previous result of the first author for grammar logics without converse. Using the same method, we show how some other modal logics can be naturally translated into GF2, including nominal tense logics and intuitionistic logic. In our view, the results in this paper show that the natural first-order fragment corresponding to regular grammar logics is simply GF2 without extra machinery such as fixed point-operators.Comment: 34 page

Hybrid type theory: a quartet in four movements

This paper sings a song -a song created by bringing together the work of four great names in the history of logic: Hans Reichenbach, Arthur Prior, Richard Montague, and Leon Henkin. Although the work of the first three of these authors have previously been combined, adding the ideas of Leon Henkin is the addition required to make the combination work at the logical level. But the present paper does not focus on the underlying technicalities (these can be found in Areces, Blackburn, Huertas, and Manzano [to appear]) rather it focusses on the underlying instruments, and the way they work together. We hope the reader will be tempted to sing along

On the Concept of a Notational Variant

In the study of modal and nonclassical logics, translations have frequently been employed as a way of measuring the inferential capabilities of a logic. It is sometimes claimed that two logics are “notational variants” if they are translationally equivalent. However, we will show that this cannot be quite right, since first-order logic and propositional logic are translationally equivalent. Others have claimed that for two logics to be notational variants, they must at least be compositionally intertranslatable. The definition of compositionality these accounts use, however, is too strong, as the standard translation from modal logic to first-order logic is not compositional in this sense. In light of this, we will explore a weaker version of this notion that we will call schematicity and show that there is no schematic translation either from first-order logic to propositional logic or from intuitionistic logic to classical logic