Energy saving market for mobile operators

Ensuring seamless coverage accounts for the lion's share of the energy consumed in a mobile network. Overlapping coverage of three to five mobile network operators (MNOs) results in enormous amount of energy waste which is avoidable. The traffic demands of the mobile networks vary significantly throughout the day. As the offered load for all networks are not same at a given time and the differences in energy consumption at different loads are significant, multi-MNO capacity/coverage sharing can dramatically reduce energy consumption of mobile networks and provide the MNOs a cost effective means to cope with the exponential growth of traffic. In this paper, we propose an energy saving market for a multi-MNO network scenario. As the competing MNOs are not comfortable with information sharing, we propose a double auction clearinghouse market mechanism where MNOs sell and buy capacity in order to minimize energy consumption. In our setting, each MNO proposes its bids and asks simultaneously for buying and selling multi-unit capacities respectively to an independent auctioneer, i.e., clearinghouse and ends up either as a buyer or as a seller in each round. We show that the mechanism allows the MNOs to save significant percentage of energy cost throughout a wide range of network load. Different than other energy saving features such as cell sleep or antenna muting which can not be enabled at heavy traffic load, dynamic capacity sharing allows MNOs to handle traffic bursts with energy saving opportunity.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figures, to be published in ICC 2015 workshop on Next Generation Green IC

Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

This is an Invited paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Litigation, Stock Markets, Queues, Financial Crashes, Brand Loyalty, War of Attrition, Bertrand, Perfect Competition, E-Commerce, Spectrum Auctions, Treasury Auctions, Electricity

A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy

We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.Competition policy, capacity accumulation, Cournot competition, asymmetric duopoly, regulatory consistency, differential games

Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})