Self-reflection as dialectic: How we can follow the Delphian calling to self-knowledge whilst avoiding Narcissus' fate

Self-reflection refers to our ability to think about ourselves and our lives and to ask and answer questions ranging from "Who am I?" to "Why did I do this?". It is thus considered a valuable means to gain self-knowledge. Structurally, reflection involves two elements, a reflecting and a reflected-on, in other words a subject and an object. In the case of self- reflection, subject and object are the same, the reflecting is the reflected-on. As subject and object are traditionally conceived of as radically opposed i.e. mutually exclusive, this situation has led to considering self-reflection problematic: If self-reflection is always reflection on an object, it is thought that self-reflection cannot yield insight into oneself qua subject and might even represent a danger to one’s subjectivity which is characteristic of lived life. Refuting the mutual exclusiveness of subject and object, self-reflection can be regained as a valuable means to gain self-knowledge. It is thereby going to be demonstrated that self-reflection has a dialectical structure. The nature of the self-knowledge yielded by self-reflection conceived of as dialectic is going to be explored. A final part shows how a dialectical account of self- reflection proves useful in clarifying the role which self-reflection plays in schizophrenia

Evolution of Representations and Intersubjectivity as sources of the Self. An Introduction to the Nature of Self-Consciousness.

It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about elements of the environment including conspecifics, and can also represent parts of the subject without refering to a notion of self (we introduce the notion of "auto-representation" that does not carry the notion of self-representation). Next step uses the performance of intersubjectivity (mirror neurons level in evolution) where a subject has the capability to mentally simulate the observed action of a conspecific (Gallese 2001). We propose that this intersubjectivity allows the subject to identify his auto-representation with the representations of his conspecifics, and so to consider his auto-representation as existing in the environment. We show how this evolutionary stage can introduce a notion of self-representation for a subject, opening a road to self-conciousness and to self. This evolutionary approach to the self via self- representation is close to the current theory of the self linked to representations and simulations (Metzinger 2003). We use a scenario about how evolution has brought the performance of self-representation to self-consciousness. We develop a process describing how the anxiety increase resulting from identification with endangered or suffering conspecifics may have called for the development of tools to limit this anxiety (empathy, imitation, language), and how these tools have accelerated the evolutionary process through a positive feedback on intersubjectivity (Menant 2004, 2005). We finish by summarizing the points addressed, and propose some possible continuations

Self Optimizing Control Of An Evaporation Process Under Noisy Measurements

Recently, Cao (2004) presented a decentralized cascade self-optimizing control strategy and implemented on an evaporation process. In this method, the local optimal condition of a self optimizing control system is derived and this optimal condition is expressed as a gradient function in terms of the existing process measurements. This gradient function can then be used as a controlled variable to achieve local self optimization. Good results were obtained subject to noise free measurements but the performance deteriorates when measurement noise presents. This paper presents a method to overcome the detrimental effect of measurement noises on self-optimising control. Filtering the process measurements in conjunction with self-optimising control can reduce the effect of measurement noise on the process performance. The benefit of this method is quantified in terms of the total operating cost reduction compared to non-filtered gradient control. Operating cost comparison of a 10 hour period for various cases subject to the same disturbances clearly shows that the implementation of the proposed strategy reduces the operating cost

Descartes and Hume on I-thoughts

Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thou-ghts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s approaches to self-consciousness, as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes’s view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume’s seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subjec

Evolutionary Advantages of Inter-Subjectivity and Self-Consciousness through Improvements of Action Programs

Evolutionary advantages of consciousness and intersubjectivity are part of current philosophical debates on the nature of consciousness.\ud Both are linked and intersubjectivity is sometimes considered as a form of consciousness [1]. Regarding the evolution of consciousness, studies tend to focus on phenomenal consciousness [2].\ud We would like here to bring the focus on self-consciousness and continue the build up of a corresponding evolutionary scenario. We also propose to introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal\ud consciousness.\ud Our starting point is the evolutionary scenario based on the evolution of intersubjectivity that goes thru the identification with conspecifics at pre-human primate time frame [3, 4, 5]. The scenario considers that such identification with conspecifics brought the non self-conscious auto-representation carried by our prehuman\ud primate ancestors to merge with the representations of conspecifics. The latter transferred to the auto-representation the characteristics of an entity existing in\ud the environment, and by this way introduced some first elements of self-consciousness for our pre-human ancestors. In addition, an anxiety increase coming from the identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics produced an evolutionary engine based on anxiety limitation. We want here to complement this evolutionary approach by introducing the improvement of action programs as a contributor to the evolutionary advantages of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness.\ud We look at the possibility for a subject to improve the action programs that conspecifics implement. The performance of identification with conspecifics allows the subject to consider that errors made by conspecifics are\ud potentially her own errors, and consequently allows the subject to correct the errors of conspecifics for her own benefit. We describe the process of non successful action\ud identification from the perspective of an observer and present the synergetic action program improvements with their contribution to the evolution of intersubjectivity and\ud self-consciousness. We add this contribution to the existing evolutionary scenario on self-consciousness and introduce a possible evolutionary link between self-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. We use for that the relation existing between phenomenal consciousness and pre-reflexive self-consciousness [6] and propose to link the latter to the proposed evolutionary nature of self-consciousness.\ud We finish by summarizing the points addressed and by introducing some possible continuations.\u

How far can it be argued that rationality of modernity creates a dehumanised and disenchanted self?

This essay seeks to discover just how far it can be argued that rationality of modernity can do so by focusing on various theorists and their position on the subject. Max Weber is a key philosopher whose perspective is considered throughout the discourse of the essay on topics such as secularisation, capitalism, formal rationality, bureaucracy and ‘iron cages’ which imprison the self. Ritzer’s theory of ‘McDonaldization’ is also considered, arguing that his specific tenets of control and efficiency lead to dehumanisation. This is concurred by Bryman and his postulations of ‘emotional labour’. Marxist theory is also accounted for, around the subject of reification; the transformation of the consciousness of a human into an object. The extreme depths of the argument surrounding the rationality of modernity are presented through applying the theories to the nature of the Nazi Holocaust. Finally, consideration is given as to how to re-humanise and re-enchant the self through postmodernist observation and a case study on the power of community

Creating citizen-consumers? Public service reform and (un)willing selves

About the book: Postmodern theories heralded the "death of the subject", and thereby deeply contested our intuition that we are free and willing selves. In recent times, the (free) will has come under attack yet again. Findings from the neuro- and cognitive sciences claim the concept of will to be scientifically untenable, specifying that it is our brain rather than our 'self' which decides what we want to do. In spite of these challenges however, the willing self has come to take centre stage in our society: juridical and moral practices ascribing guilt, or the organization of everyday life attributing responsibilities, for instance, can hardly be understood without taking recourse to the willing subject. In this vein, the authors address topics such as the genealogy of the concept of willing selves, the discourse on agency in neuroscience and sociology, the political debate on volition within neoliberal and neoconservative regimes, approaches toward novel forms of relational responsibility as well as moral evaluations in conceptualizing autonomy