8 research outputs found
Round-Efficient Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Scheme Against General Adversary
In the model of Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Schemes (PSMTs), there are channels between a sender and a receiver,
and they share no key. An infinitely powerful adversary can corrupt (observe and forge) the messages sent through
some subset of channels. For non-threshold adversaries called , Kumar et al. showed a many round PSMT \cite{KGSR}.
In this paper, we show round efficient PSMTs against -adevrsaries. We first give a -round PSMT which runs in polynomial time in the size of the underlying linear secret sharing scheme. We next present a -round PSMT which is inefficient in general. (However, it is efficient for some special case.
On the Price of Proactivizing Round-Optimal Perfectly Secret Message Transmission
In a network of nodes (modelled as a digraph), the goal of a perfectly secret message transmission (PSMT) protocol is to replicate sender\u27s message at the receiver\u27s end without revealing any information about to a computationally unbounded adversary that eavesdrops on any nodes. The adversary may be mobile too -- that is, it may eavesdrop on a different set of nodes in different rounds. We prove a necessary and sufficient condition on the synchronous network for the existence of -round PSMT protocols, for any given ; further, we show that round-optimality is achieved without trading-off the communication complexity; specifically, our protocols have an overall communication complexity of elements of a finite field to perfectly transmit one field element. Apart from optimality/scalability, two interesting implications of our results are: (a) adversarial mobility does not affect its tolerability: PSMT tolerating a static -adversary is possible if and only if PSMT tolerating mobile -adversary is possible; and (b) mobility does not affect the round optimality: the fastest PSMT protocol tolerating a static -adversary is not faster than the one tolerating a mobile -adversary
Muckle+: End-to-End Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchanges
End-to-end authenticity in public networks plays a significant role. Namely, without authenticity, the adversary might be able to retrieve even confidential information straight away by impersonating others. Proposed solutions to establish an authenticated channel cover pre-shared key-based, password-based, and certificate-based techniques. To add confidentiality to an authenticated channel, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols usually have one of the three solutions built in. As an amplification, hybrid AKE (HAKE) approaches are getting more popular nowadays and were presented in several flavors to incorporate classical, post-quantum, or quantum-key-distribution components. The main benefit is redundancy, i.e., if some of the components fail, the primitive still yields a confidential and authenticated channel. However, current HAKE instantiations either rely on pre-shared keys (which yields inefficient end-to-end authenticity) or only support one or two of the three above components (resulting in reduced redundancy and flexibility).
In this work, we present an extension of a modular HAKE framework due to Dowling, Brandt Hansen, and Paterson (PQCrypto\u2720) that does not suffer from the above constraints. While their instantiation, dubbed Muckle, requires pre-shared keys (and hence yields inefficient end-to-end authenticity), our extended instantiation called Muckle+ utilizes post-quantum digital signatures. While replacing pre-shared keys with digital signatures is rather straightforward in general, this turned out to be surprisingly non-trivial when applied to HAKE frameworks (resulting in a significant model change with adapted proof techniques)
Must the Communication Graph of MPC Protocols be an Expander?
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) on incomplete communication networks has been studied within two primary models: (1) Where a partial network is fixed a priori, and thus corruptions can occur dependent on its structure, and (2) Where edges in the communication graph are determined dynamically as part of the protocol. Whereas a rich literature has succeeded in mapping out the feasibility and limitations of graph structures supporting secure computation in the fixed-graph model (including strong classical lower bounds), these bounds do not apply in the latter dynamic-graph setting, which has recently seen exciting new results, but remains relatively unexplored.
In this work, we initiate a similar foundational study of MPC within the dynamic-graph model. As a first step, we investigate the property of graph expansion. All existing protocols (implicitly or explicitly) yield communication graphs which are expanders, but it is not clear whether this is inherent.
Our results consist of two types (for constant fraction of corruptions):
* Upper bounds: We demonstrate secure protocols whose induced communication graphs are not expander graphs, within a wide range of settings (computational, information theoretic, with low locality, even with low locality and adaptive security) each assuming some form of input-independent setup.
* Lower bounds: In the setting without setup and adaptive corruptions, we demonstrate that for certain functionalities, no protocol can maintain a non-expanding communication graph against all adversarial strategies. Our lower bound relies only on protocol correctness (not privacy), and requires a surprisingly delicate argument.
More generally, we provide a formal framework for analyzing the evolving communication graph of MPC protocols, giving a starting point for studying the relation between secure computation and further, more general graph properties
Proceedings of the Second International Mobile Satellite Conference (IMSC 1990)
Presented here are the proceedings of the Second International Mobile Satellite Conference (IMSC), held June 17-20, 1990 in Ottawa, Canada. Topics covered include future mobile satellite communications concepts, aeronautical applications, modulation and coding, propagation and experimental systems, mobile terminal equipment, network architecture and control, regulatory and policy considerations, vehicle antennas, and speech compression
Passions, Pedagogies, and 21st Century Technologies
Once again, Gail Hawisher and Cynthia Selfe offer a volume that will set the agenda in the field of computers and composition scholarship for a decade. The technology changes that scholars of composition studies face as the next century opens couldn\u27t be more dramatic or deserving of passionate study. While we have always used technologies (e.g., the pencil) to communicate with each other, the electronic technologies we now use have changed the world in ways that we have yet to identify or appreciate fully. Likewise, the study of language and literate exchange, even our understanding of terms like literacy, text, and visual, has changed beyond recognition, challenging even our capacity to articulate them.https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/usupress_pubs/1118/thumbnail.jp
Astronautics and aeronautics, 1963 chronology on science, technology, and policy
Chronological compilation of events relating to space exploration and exploitatio