Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

OSCAR: A Collaborative Bandwidth Aggregation System

The exponential increase in mobile data demand, coupled with growing user expectation to be connected in all places at all times, have introduced novel challenges for researchers to address. Fortunately, the wide spread deployment of various network technologies and the increased adoption of multi-interface enabled devices have enabled researchers to develop solutions for those challenges. Such solutions aim to exploit available interfaces on such devices in both solitary and collaborative forms. These solutions, however, have faced a steep deployment barrier. In this paper, we present OSCAR, a multi-objective, incentive-based, collaborative, and deployable bandwidth aggregation system. We present the OSCAR architecture that does not introduce any intermediate hardware nor require changes to current applications or legacy servers. The OSCAR architecture is designed to automatically estimate the system's context, dynamically schedule various connections and/or packets to different interfaces, be backwards compatible with the current Internet architecture, and provide the user with incentives for collaboration. We also formulate the OSCAR scheduler as a multi-objective, multi-modal scheduler that maximizes system throughput while minimizing energy consumption or financial cost. We evaluate OSCAR via implementation on Linux, as well as via simulation, and compare our results to the current optimal achievable throughput, cost, and energy consumption. Our evaluation shows that, in the throughput maximization mode, we provide up to 150% enhancement in throughput compared to current operating systems, without any changes to legacy servers. Moreover, this performance gain further increases with the availability of connection resume-supporting, or OSCAR-enabled servers, reaching the maximum achievable upper-bound throughput

Cooperative smartphone relay selection based on fair power utilization for network coverage extension

This paper presents a relay selection algorithm based on fair battery power utilization for extending mobile network coverage and capacity by using a cooperative communication strategy where mobile devices can be utilized as relays. Cooperation improves the network performance for mobile terminals, either by providing access to out-of-range devices or by facilitating multi-path network access to connected devices. In this work, we assume that all mobile devices can benefit from using other mobile devices as relays and investigate the fairness of relay selection algorithms. We point out that signal strength based relay selection inevitably leads to unfair relay selection and devise a new algorithm that is based on fair utilization of power resources on mobile devices. We call this algorithm Credit based Fair Relay Selection (CF-RS) and in this paper show through simulation that the algorithm results in fair battery power utilization, while providing similar data rates compared with traditional approaches. We then extend the solution to demonstrate that adding incentives for relay operation adds clear value for mobile devices in the case they require relay service. Typically, mobile devices represent self-interested users who are reluctant to cooperate with other network users, mainly due to the cost in terms of power and network capacity. In this paper, we present an incentive based solution which provides clear mutual benefit for mobile devices and demonstrate this benefit in the simulation of symmetric and asymmetric network topologies. The CF-RS algorithm achieves the same performance in terms of achievable data rate, Jain's fairness index and utility of end devices in both symmetric and asymmetric network configurations

Game theory for collaboration in future networks

Cooperative strategies have the great potential of improving network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. This new paradigm in terms of network management, however, requires a novel design and analysis framework targeting a highly flexible networking solution with a distributed architecture. Game Theory is very suitable for this task, since it is a comprehensive mathematical tool for modeling the highly complex interactions among distributed and intelligent decision makers. In this way, the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g. content providers, cloud providers, home providers, brokers, network providers or users) should be found to optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure. The authors discuss in this chapter several Game Theory models/concepts that are highly relevant for enabling collaboration among the diverse players, using different ways to incentivize it, namely through pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight several related open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information games in this area.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing

Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Community Networks and Sustainability: a Survey of Perceptions, Practices, and Proposed Solutions

Community network (CN) initiatives have been around for roughly two decades, evangelizing a distinctly different paradigm for building, maintaining, and sharing network infrastructure but also defending the basic human right to Internet access. Over this time they have evolved into a mosaic of systems that vary widely with respect to their network technologies, their offered services, their organizational structure, and the way they position themselves in the overall telecommunications’ ecosystem. Common to all these highly differentiated initiatives is the sustainability challenge. We approach sustainability as a broad term with an economical, political, and cultural context. We first review the different perceptions of the term. These vary both across and within the different types of stakeholders involved in CNs and are reflected in their motivation to join such initiatives. Then, we study the diverse approaches of CN operators towards the sustainability goal. Given the rich context of the term, these range all the way from mechanisms to fund their activities, to organizational structures and social activities serving as incentives for the engagement of their members. We iterate on incentive mechanisms that have been proposed and theoretically analyzed in the literature for CNs as well as tools and processes that have been actually implemented in them. Finally, we enumerate lessons that have been learned out of these two decades of CNs’ operation and discuss additional technological and regulatory issues that are key to their longer-term sustainability

Fair relay selection in wireless rural networks using game theory

Access to Internet is the key to facilitate the economic growth and development of the rural communities and to bridge the digital-divide between the urban and rural population. The traditional broadband access technologies are not always suitable for the rural areas due to their difficult topography and sparsely populated communities. Specialized relay stations can be deployed to extend the coverage of a wireless rural network but they come with an inherited increase in the infrastructural cost. An alternative is to utilize the in-range users as relays to enhance the coverage range of the wireless rural network. In this thesis, the in-range ordinary users termed as primary users (PUs) are used to act as relays for the out-of-range users called the secondary users (SUs). Two relay selection solutions, the Fair Battery Power Consumption (FBPC) algorithm and the Credit based Fair Relay Selection (CF-RS) protocol have been proposed with the aim of providing fair chance to every PU to assist the SUs, thus resulting in fair utilization of battery power of all relays along with the coverage extension. The FBPC algorithm uses the concept of proportional fairness as the relay selection criterion. However, if only proportionally fair consumption of battery power is taken as the relay selection parameter, the FBPC algorithm may result in selecting relays with poor channel conditions. The rural network may also consist of selfish PUs which need to be incentivized to use their resources for the SUs. The CF-RS protocol is developed which takes into account both the achievable data rate and consumption of battery power for selection of a relay. The CF-RS protocol is formulated using Stackelberg game which employs a credit-based incentive mechanism to motivate the self-interested PUs to help the SUs by providing instantaneous as well as long term benefit to the PUs. A basic network model consisting of PUs and SUs has been simulated and the performance of the FBPC algorithm and the CF-RS protocol have been evaluated in terms of data rate and utility achievable at the SUs, dissipation of battery power of the PUs and Jain’s fairness index to determine fairness in utilization of battery power. The results obtained show that the FBPC algorithm achieves approximately 100% fairness for utilization of battery power of relays but compromises the data rate attainable by the SUs. Thus the FBPC algorithm shall be viewed as a trade-off between the fair battery power dissipation of relays and the data rate achievable by the SUs. Whereas, the CF-RS protocol provides 55% better utility and longer service time to the SUs without harming the attainable data rate and achieves 80% fairness. When the CF-RS protocol is used for relay selection, it is advantageous even for the self-interested users to participate in the relaying process to earn some benefit to utilize it when needed to buy assistance from other users

Mechanisms for improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems

Given its potential for a large variety of real-life applications, smartphone crowdsensing has recently gained tremendous attention from the research community. Smartphone crowdsensing is a paradigm that allows ordinary citizens to participate in large-scale sensing surveys by using user-friendly applications installed in their smartphones. In this way, fine-grained sensing information is obtained from smartphone users without employing fixed and expensive infrastructure, and with negligible maintenance costs. Existing smartphone sensing systems depend completely on the participants\u27 willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information regarding the events being monitored. Therefore, it becomes paramount to scalably and effectively determine, enforce, and optimize the information quality of the sensing reports submitted by the participants. To this end, mechanisms to improve information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems were designed in this work. Firstly, the FIRST framework is presented, which is a reputation-based mechanism that leverages the concept of mobile trusted participants to determine and improve the information quality of collected data. Secondly, it is mathematically modeled and studied the problem of maximizing the likelihood of successful execution of sensing tasks when participants having uncertain mobility execute sensing tasks. Two incentive mechanisms based on game and auction theory are then proposed to efficiently and scalably solve such problem. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanisms developed in this thesis outperform existing state of the art in improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems --Abstract, page iii