The Metaphysics of Mental Representation

The representational theory of mind (RTM) explains the phenomenon of intentionality in terms of the existence and nature of mental representations. Despite the typical characterisation of mental representations in terms of their semantics, RTM is best understood as a metaphysical – more specifically formal ontological – theory whose primary defining feature is stipulating the existence of a class of mental particulars called representations. In this regard it is false, since mental representations do not exist. My argument is primarily methodological. Using an extended analysis of mereology and its variants as paradigmatic examples of a formal ontological theory, I argue for a 'synthetic’ approach to ontology which seeks to form a sound descriptive characterisation of the relevant phenomena from empirical data, to which philosophical analysis is applied to produce a rigorous theory. The value and necessity of this method is proved by example in our discussion of mereology which is shown to be defensible given certain assumptions, in particular perdurantism, but still inadequate as an account of parthood without considerable supplementation. We also see that there are viable alternatives which adopt a more synthetic approach and do not require the same assumptions. Having effectively demonstrated the value of a synthetic approach in ontology I critically examine the methodology employed by RTM and find it severely lacking. In the guise of ‘commonsense psychology’ RTM cavalierly imposes a theoretical framework without regard to empirical data, and this results in a severe distortion of the phenomenon of intentionality it purports to explain. RTM is methodologically unsound, and so its commitment to the existence of mental representations is utterly undermined. Furthermore the most attractive aspect of RTM – its semantics – can be separated from any commitment to mental representations existing. Even RTM’s strongest advocates lack motivation to believe that mental representations exist

Emergent Wholes and the Porosity of Dynamic Objects

Claims in the metaphysics of strong emergence, featuring autonomous and possibly reflexive downward causal capacity, methodologically require, though ultimately ignore, units of analysis qua unified wholes. I argue that this avoidance of mereological and wider metaphysical debates denies the metaphysics of emergence clarity and cohesion and urgent application to conceptions of structure and agency. In this thesis, using a refined, non-linear, irreproducible, non-ontologically reductionist open-system physicalism and empiricism, I show that claims in the metaphysics of emergence hastily assume first the integration and subsequently the individuation of objects that become the subject of these strong claims. These assumptions, I believe, are actually the cause for the insurmountable gap between pure ontological reduction on the one side, and pure ontological and irreducible property emergence on the other. Furthermore, in using this new physicalism in the context of strong emergence, the traditional boundary between ontology and epistemology—going far beyond the standard weak-strong divide in the emergence discourse—can no longer be respected. As such, the nature of emergent properties is critical to assessing the nature of objects qua wholes with respect to the conditions for their integration and individuation. The major contribution to the metaphysics of emergence that this thesis provides is the realisation that, when we assume all physical objects are open and porous, all claims for persisting, emergent wholes are necessarily based on physical assumptions of integration and individuation. Synthetically I offer a method for understanding the individuation of ‘quidditious’ objects via properties when such a physicalist framework is employed

Handbook of the First World Congress on Logic and Religion

This is the handbook of abstracts of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion, which took place in João Pessoa, Brazil, April 01-05, 2015