On elimination of quantifiers in some non-classical mathematical theories

Elimination of quantifiers is shown to fail dramatically for a group of well-known mathematical theories (classically enjoying the property) against a wide range of relevant logical backgrounds. Furthermore, it is suggested that only by moving to more extensional underlying logics can we get the property back

Analyzing Individual Proofs as the Basis of Interoperability between Proof Systems

We describe the first results of a project of analyzing in which theories formal proofs can be ex- pressed. We use this analysis as the basis of interoperability between proof systems.Comment: In Proceedings PxTP 2017, arXiv:1712.0089

Some Concerns Regarding Ternary-relation Semantics and Truth-theoretic Semantics in General

This paper deals with a collection of concerns that, over a period of time, led the author away from the Routley–Meyer semantics, and towards proof- theoretic approaches to relevant logics, and indeed to the weak relevant logic MC of meaning containment

Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism

We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical

On theories of random variables

We study theories of spaces of random variables: first, we consider random variables with values in the interval $[0,1]$, then with values in an arbitrary metric structure, generalising Keisler's randomisation of classical structures. We prove preservation and non-preservation results for model theoretic properties under this construction: i) The randomisation of a stable structure is stable. ii) The randomisation of a simple unstable structure is not simple. We also prove that in the randomised structure, every type is a Lascar type

Intuitionism and the Modal Logic of Vagueness

Intuitionistic logic provides an elegant solution to the Sorites Paradox. Its acceptance has been hampered by two factors. First, the lack of an accepted semantics for languages containing vague terms has led even philosophers sympathetic to intuitionism to complain that no explanation has been given of why intuitionistic logic is the correct logic for such languages. Second, switching from classical to intuitionistic logic, while it may help with the Sorites, does not appear to offer any advantages when dealing with the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. We offer a proposal that makes strides on both issues. We argue that the intuitionist’s characteristic rejection of any third alethic value alongside true and false is best elaborated by taking the normal modal system S4M to be the sentential logic of the operator ‘it is clearly the case that’. S4M opens the way to an account of higher-order vagueness which avoids the paradoxes that have been thought to infect the notion. S4M is one of the modal counterparts of the intuitionistic sentential calculus and we use this fact to explain why IPC is the correct sentential logic to use when reasoning with vague statements. We also show that our key results go through in an intuitionistic version of S4M. Finally, we deploy our analysis to reply to Timothy Williamson’s objections to intuitionistic treatments of vagueness

Tarski's influence on computer science

The influence of Alfred Tarski on computer science was indirect but significant in a number of directions and was in certain respects fundamental. Here surveyed is the work of Tarski on the decision procedure for algebra and geometry, the method of elimination of quantifiers, the semantics of formal languages, modeltheoretic preservation theorems, and algebraic logic; various connections of each with computer science are taken up