Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is a need to introduce more spectrally efficient technologies and spectrum management regimes. That led to an environment where commercial wireless broadband need to share spectrum with the federal and non-federal operations. Implementing sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing agreements must be implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable.\ud \ud With the significant exception of license-free wireless systems, commercial wireless services are based on exclusive use. With the policy change facilitating spectrum sharing, it becomes necessary to consider how sharing might take place in practice. Beyond the technical aspects of sharing, that must be resolved lie questions about how usage rights are appropriately determined and enforced. This paper is reasoning about enforcement in a particular spectrum bands (1695-1710 MHz and 3.5 GHz) that are currently being proposed for sharing between commercial services and incumbent spectrum users in the US. We examine three enforcement approaches, exclusion zones, protection zones and pure ex post and consider their implications in terms of cost elements, opportunity cost, and their adaptability

Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Managing Shared Access to a Spectrum Commons

The open access, unlicensed or spectrum commons approach to managing shared access to RF spectrum offers many attractive benefits, especially when implemented in conjunction with and as a complement to a regime of marketbased, flexible use, tradable licensed spectrum ([Benkler02], [Lehr04], [Werbach03]). However, as a number of critics have pointed out, implementing the unlicensed model poses difficult challenges that have not been well-addressed yet by commons advocates ([Benjam03], [Faulhab05], [Goodman04], [Hazlett01]). A successful spectrum commons will not be unregulated, but it also need not be command & control by another name. This paper seeks to address some of the implementation challenges associated with managing a spectrum commons. We focus on the minimal set of features that we believe a suitable management protocol, etiquette, or framework for a spectrum commons will need to incorporate. This includes: (1) No transmit only devices; (2) Power restrictions; (3) Common channel signaling; (4) Mechanism for handling congestion and allocating resources among users/uses in times of congestion; (5) Mechanism to support enforcement (e.g., established procedures to verify protocol is in conformance); (6) Mechanism to support reversibility of policy; and (7) Protection for privacy and security. We explain why each is necessary, examine their implications for current policy, and suggest ways in which they might be implemented. We present a framework that suggests a set of design principles for the protocols that will govern a successful commons management regime. Our design rules lead us to conclude that the appropriate Protocols for a Commons will need to be more liquid ([Reed05]) than in the past: (1) Marketbased instead of C&C; (2) Decentralized/distributed; and, (3) Adaptive and flexible (Anonymous, distributed, decentralized, and locally responsive)

Fostering Collaboration in Emerging Three-Tiered Spectrum Markets

Ensuring optimum spectral efficiency is a critical requirement for current wireless networks to cope with the ever-growing flow of wireless data traffic, using limited spectral resources. As such, spectrum sharing, which allows different grades of users, as well as multiple networking standards to co-exist and utilize in the same frequency band, has become a topic of great intrigue. Due to the inherent advantages of these schemes, the US government has opened up vast amounts of federal spectrum that supports spectrum sharing. The Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) proposed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is one of them. A tiered spectrum sharing approach, CBRS allows end commercial users to share the radio spectrum with federal incumbent users in the 3,550-3,700 MHz range. Employing a light leasing approach, the FCC aims to encourage the licensed providers of CBRS called the Priority Access License (PAL), to lease/share their licensed spectrum with unlicensed users named the General Authorized Access (GAA) for limited duration, which is essential for the maximum utilization of the CBRS bandwidth, but the current approach proves ineffective for that purpose. In this thesis, we propose a novel clustered framework to facilitate this sharing, where GAA users are grouped into multiple distinct geographical clusters and request access to licensed spectrum through the clusters in a collaborative manner rather than individually. Each cluster will nominate a central entity denoted as the GAA leader to communicate their requests to the PAL operators, as well as establish temporary connections with PAL access points once granted permission for licensed CBRS access, to be used by GAAs outside the operators coverage range. The leaders will also receive information from the PAL operators regarding the number of requests they are willing to accept and transmit that to the GAAs within the cluster. This process reduces the amount of information flow between the licensed and unlicensed entities, thereby providing a convenient platform for CBRS spectrum sharing. In order to determine the leader, the role of which can be assumed by any of the GAA users within the cluster, we formulate a distributed leader selection algorithm algorithm called the LSA, which takes into account the signal strength of the PAL access points available the GAA users, as well as the network density of each GAA node, to assign a score called the leader evaluation score (LES) to each GAA user and nominate the user with the highest score as the leader. To encourage PAL operators to frequently share their licensed spectrum, we incorporate a government reward model, where operators are incentivized by gaining access to additional spectrum for limited periods based on their level of sharing