337,233 research outputs found
On a Bounded Budget Network Creation Game
We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed
budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit
price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local
diameter or its total distance to other players in the (undirected) underlying
graph of the created network. Two versions of the game are studied: in the MAX
version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the maximum distance between the
vertex and other vertices, and in the SUM version, the cost incurred to a
vertex is the sum of distances between the vertex and other vertices. We prove
that in both versions pure Nash equilibria exist, but the problem of finding
the best response of a vertex is NP-hard. We take the social cost of the
created network to be its diameter, and next we study the maximum possible
diameter of an equilibrium graph with n vertices in various cases. When the sum
of players' budgets is n-1, the equilibrium graphs are always trees, and we
prove that their maximum diameter is Theta(n) and Theta(log n) in MAX and SUM
versions, respectively. When each vertex has unit budget (i.e. can establish
link to just one vertex), the diameter of any equilibrium graph in either
version is Theta(1). We give examples of equilibrium graphs in the MAX version,
such that all vertices have positive budgets and yet the diameter is
Omega(sqrt(log n)). This interesting (and perhaps counter-intuitive) result
shows that increasing the budgets may increase the diameter of equilibrium
graphs and hence deteriorate the network structure. Then we prove that every
equilibrium graph in the SUM version has diameter 2^O(sqrt(log n)). Finally, we
show that if the budget of each player is at least k, then every equilibrium
graph in the SUM version is k-connected or has diameter smaller than 4.Comment: 28 pages, 3 figures, preliminary version appeared in SPAA'1
The Price of Anarchy in Cooperative Network Creation Games
In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a
selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost
\alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph)
while selfishly minimizing the link creation costs plus the sum of the
distances to all other players (usage cost). In this paper, we pursue two
important facets of the network creation game. First, we study extensively a
natural version of the game, called the cooperative model, where nodes can
collaborate and share the cost of creating any edge in the host graph. We prove
the first nontrivial bounds in this model, establishing that the price of
anarchy is polylogarithmic in n for all values of α in complete host
graphs. This bound is the first result of this type for any version of the
network creation game; most previous general upper bounds are polynomial in n.
Interestingly, we also show that equilibrium graphs have polylogarithmic
diameter for the most natural range of \alpha (at most n polylg n). Second, we
study the impact of the natural assumption that the host graph is a general
graph, not necessarily complete. This model is a simple example of nonuniform
creation costs among the edges (effectively allowing weights of \alpha and
\infty). We prove the first assemblage of upper and lower bounds for this
context, stablishing nontrivial tight bounds for many ranges of \alpha, for
both the unilateral and cooperative versions of network creation. In
particular, we establish polynomial lower bounds for both versions and many
ranges of \alpha, even for this simple nonuniform cost model, which sharply
contrasts the conjectured constant bounds for these games in complete (uniform)
graphs
Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cost
Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic
point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many
variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback
that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has the same cost and that
this common parameter heavily influences the outcomes and the analysis of these
games.
We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation
games with non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks
where the cost of forming a link is proportional to the popularity of the
targeted node. Besides results on the complexity of computing a best response
and on various properties of the sequential versions, we show that the most
general version of our model has constant Price of Anarchy. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any
network creation game.Comment: To appear at SAGT'1
The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant
We study the price of anarchy and the structure of equilibria in network creation games. A network creation game is played by n players {1,2, ,n}, each identified with a vertex of a graph (network), where the strategy of player i, i=1, ,n, is to build some edges adjacent to i. The cost of building an edge is α>0, a fixed parameter of the game. The goal of every player is to minimize its creation cost plus its usage cost. The creation cost of player i is α times the number of built edges. In the SumGame variant, the usage cost of player i is the sum of distances from i to every node of the resulting graph. In the MaxGame variant, the usage cost is the eccentricity of i in the resulting graph of the game. In this paper we improve previously known bounds on the price of anarchy of the game (of both variants) for various ranges of α, and give new insights into the structure of equilibria for various values of α. The two main results of the paper show that for α>273⋅n all equilibria in SumGame are trees and thus the price of anarchy is constant, and that for α>129 all equilibria in MaxGame are trees and the price of anarchy is constant. For SumGame this answers (almost completely) one of the fundamental open problems in the field—is price of anarchy of the network creation game constant for all values of α?—in an affirmative way, up to a tiny range of
On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Formation
We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge
swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by
Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all
shortest path distances to the other nodes, we use the probabilistic method to
provide a new, structural characterization of equilibrium graphs. We show how
to use this characterization in order to prove upper bounds on the diameter of
equilibrium graphs in terms of the size of the largest -vicinity (defined as
the the set of vertices within distance from a vertex), for any
and in terms of the number of edges, thus settling positively a conjecture of
Alon et al. in the cases of graphs of large -vicinity size (including graphs
of large maximum degree) and of graphs which are dense enough.
Next, we present a new swap-based network creation game, in which selfish
costs depend on the immediate neighborhood of each node; in particular, the
profit of a node is defined as the sum of the degrees of its neighbors. We
prove that, in contrast to the previous model, this network creation game
admits an exact potential, and also that any equilibrium graph contains an
induced star. The existence of the potential function is exploited in order to
show that an equilibrium can be reached in expected polynomial time even in the
case where nodes can only acquire limited knowledge concerning non-neighboring
nodes.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figure
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