Scientific requirements for an engineered model of consciousness

The building of a non-natural conscious system requires more than the design of physical or virtual machines with intuitively conceived abilities, philosophically elucidated architecture or hardware homologous to an animal’s brain. Human society might one day treat a type of robot or computing system as an artificial person. Yet that would not answer scientific questions about the machine’s consciousness or otherwise. Indeed, empirical tests for consciousness are impossible because no such entity is denoted within the theoretical structure of the science of mind, i.e. psychology. However, contemporary experimental psychology can identify if a specific mental process is conscious in particular circumstances, by theory-based interpretation of the overt performance of human beings. Thus, if we are to build a conscious machine, the artificial systems must be used as a test-bed for theory developed from the existing science that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious causation in natural systems. Only such a rich and realistic account of hypothetical processes accounting for observed input/output relationships can establish whether or not an engineered system is a model of consciousness. It follows that any research project on machine consciousness needs a programme of psychological experiments on the demonstration systems and that the programme should be designed to deliver a fully detailed scientific theory of the type of artificial mind being developed – a Psychology of that Machine

Categorizing Humans, Animals, and Machines in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein

From Plato to Descartes and Kant and now to modern day, there is a general idea that pervades Western society. This idea is about the uniqueness and superiority of the human being. We are rational and conscious beings that apparently stand alone in the world, separated intellectually from animals and biologically from machines. The relationship between humans, animals, and machines is a tumultuous one and it is not easily definable. For many classical philosophers, this relationship has always been a hierarchy. Humans are on the top and animals and machines fall somewhere below. These beliefs have created a distinct category for the three terms that leaves no room for overlap. Because of the great disparity between these groups, the animal and machine have come to be known as the “Other.” This title demonstrates that they are markedly disregarded and disrespected. All of the points indicated in regard to the relationship between humans, animals, and machines can be seen in the Frankenstein novel. Victor Frankenstein, the maker of the creature, has all of the typical ideas about the rarity and dominance inherent in humans. When working on his creature, he thinks of everything mechanistically. The human remains that he has collected are simply parts in the machine he wants to build. The whole creation is just a scientific procedure. What Frankenstein is doing is trying to make an artificial human or a cyborg. Once his experiment is complete, the creature becomes alive. He is not human-like in appearance and he cannot talk. Frankenstein flees in terror from the monster that he has brought into existence. He treats his work as some sort of animal not worthy of his attention any more. The creature runs away as well and is treated by everyone like a demon. He hides and it is during this time that he learns to read, write, and speak. He has learned what humans prize the most as something that is their own: language. At this point in time when the creature is most clearly human, he still has the qualities of animal and machine. Frankenstein’s creature has blurred the distinct categories of humans, animals, and machines. By analyzing the most contemporary philosophical writing on the boundaries between humans, animals, and machines as well as recent critical analyses on Frankenstein regarding these categories, a more unified view of the separate groups emerges

Proof phenomenon as a function of the phenomenology of proving

Kurt Gödel wrote (1964, p. 272), after he had read Husserl, that the notion of objectivity raises a question: “the question of the objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition (which, incidentally, is an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outer world)”. This “exact replica” brings to mind the close analogy Husserl saw between our intuition of essences in Wesensschau and of physical objects in perception. What is it like to experience a mathematical proving process? What is the ontological status of a mathematical proof? Can computer assisted provers output a proof? Taking a naturalized world account, I will assess the relationship between mathematics, the physical world and consciousness by introducing a significant conceptual distinction between proving and proof. I will propose that proving is a phenomenological conscious experience. This experience involves a combination of what Kurt Gödel called intuition, and what Husserl called intentionality. In contrast, proof is a function of that process — the mathematical phenomenon — that objectively self-presents a property in the world, and that results from a spatiotemporal unity being subject to the exact laws of nature. In this essay, I apply phenomenology to mathematical proving as a performance of consciousness, that is, a lived experience expressed and formalized in language, in which there is the possibility of formulating intersubjectively shareable meanings

A Cognitive Science Based Machine Learning Architecture

In an attempt to illustrate the application of cognitive science principles to hard AI problems in machine learning we propose the LIDA technology, a cognitive science based architecture capable of more human-like learning. A LIDA based software agent or cognitive robot will be capable of three fundamental, continuously active, humanlike learning mechanisms:\ud 1) perceptual learning, the learning of new objects, categories, relations, etc.,\ud 2) episodic learning of events, the what, where, and when,\ud 3) procedural learning, the learning of new actions and action sequences with which to accomplish new tasks. The paper argues for the use of modular components, each specializing in implementing individual facets of human and animal cognition, as a viable approach towards achieving general intelligence

Artificial Intelligence in the Context of Human Consciousness

Artificial intelligence (AI) can be defined as the ability of a machine to learn and make decisions based on acquired information. AI’s development has incited rampant public speculation regarding the singularity theory: a futuristic phase in which intelligent machines are capable of creating increasingly intelligent systems. Its implications, combined with the close relationship between humanity and their machines, make achieving understanding both natural and artificial intelligence imperative. Researchers are continuing to discover natural processes responsible for essential human skills like decision-making, understanding language, and performing multiple processes simultaneously. Artificial intelligence attempts to simulate these functions through techniques like artificial neural networks, Markov Decision Processes, Human Language Technology, and Multi-Agent Systems, which rely upon a combination of mathematical models and hardware

The imperfect observer: Mind, machines, and materialism in the 21st century

The dualist / materialist debates about the nature of consciousness are based on the assumption that an entirely physical universe must ultimately be observable by humans (with infinitely advanced tools). Thus the dualists claim that anything unobservable must be non-physical, while the materialists argue that in theory nothing is unobservable. However, there may be fundamental limitations in the power of human observation, no matter how well aided, that greatly curtail our ability to know and observe even a fully physical universe. This paper presents arguments to support the model of an inherently limited observer and explores the consequences of this view

Synchronous Online Philosophy Courses: An Experiment in Progress

There are two main ways to teach a course online: synchronously or asynchronously. In an asynchronous course, students can log on at their convenience and do the course work. In a synchronous course, there is a requirement that all students be online at specific times, to allow for a shared course environment. In this article, the author discusses the strengths and weaknesses of synchronous online learning for the teaching of undergraduate philosophy courses. The author discusses specific strategies and technologies he uses in the teaching of online philosophy courses. In particular, the author discusses how he uses videoconferencing to create a classroom-like environment in an online class

'Pleasure balks, bliss appears' or 'The apparatus shines like a blade' : towards a theory of a progressive reading praxis in creative writing pedagogy

This article argues that a reformation of Creative Writing’s reading praxis is required if it is to develop its unique potential as a field of intellectual enquiry. Roland Barthes, in his essay ‘On Reading’, identifies three types of reading pleasure. The third of these modes is that of ‘Writing’, in which ‘reading is a conductor of the Desire to write’. Of this mode, Barthes writes: Is this pleasure of production an elitist pleasure, reserved only to potential writers? In our society, a society of consumption and not production, a society of reading … and not a society of writing ... everything is done to block the answer ... my profound and -constant conviction is that it will never be possible to liberate reading if, in the same impulse, we do not liberate writing. (Barthes 1989: 41) It is the contention of the author of this article that the teaching of the ‘reading as a writer’ method in Creative Writing classrooms gives rise to a situation the inverse of that Barthes describes; it makes Creative Writing into a ‘society of writing’ in which reading is trammelled. The article explores and critiques the ‘reading as a writer’ technique, examines various progressive models of Creative Writing reading praxis, and proposes a radical ‘writerly reading’ praxis suggested by concepts from the work of Michel de Certeau. Keywords: Pedagogy, 'reading as a writer', experimental fictio

Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Social Cognition

The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particular conscious or unconscious cognition and provides the “framing” or interpretation of that cognition. Central to this framing is the concept of intentionality, which distinguishes intentional action (caused by the agent’s intention and decision) from unintentional behavior (caused by internal or external events without the intervention of the agent’s decision). A second important distinction separates publicly observable from publicly unobservable (i.e., mental) events. Together, the two distinctions define the kinds of events in social interaction that people attend to, wonder about, and try to explain. A special focus of this chapter is the powerful tool of behavior explanation, which relies on the folk theory of mind but is also intimately tied to social demands and to the perceiver’s social goals. A full understanding of social cognition must consider the folk theory of mind as the conceptual underpinning of all (conscious and unconscious) perception and thinking about the social world