Detecting General Algebraic Manipulation Attacks

Algebraic manipulation detection codes are a class of error detecting codes which have found numerous applications in cryptography. In this paper we extend these codes to defeat general algebraic attacks - we call such codes general algebraic manipulation detection (GAMD) codes. Positive results are shown for the existence of GAMDs for the families of tampering functions corresponding to point additions and polynomial functions over a finite field. Compared to non-malleable codes, we demonstrate both positive and negative results regarding the existence of GAMDs for arbitrary families of tampering functions

Efficient non-malleable codes and key derivation for poly-size tampering circuits

Non-malleable codes, defined by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS '10), provide roughly the following guarantee: if a codeword c encoding some message x is tampered to c' = f(c) such that c' ≠ c , then the tampered message x' contained in c' reveals no information about x. The non-malleable codes have applications to immunizing cryptosystems against tampering attacks and related-key attacks. One cannot have an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all efficient tampering functions f. However, in this paper we show 'the next best thing': for any polynomial bound s given a-priori, there is an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all tampering functions f computable by a circuit of size s. More generally, for any family of tampering functions F of size F ≤ 2s , there is an efficient non-malleable code that protects against all f in F . The rate of our codes, defined as the ratio of message to codeword size, approaches 1. Our results are information-theoretic and our main proof technique relies on a careful probabilistic method argument using limited independence. As a result, we get an efficiently samplable family of efficient codes, such that a random member of the family is non-malleable with overwhelming probability. Alternatively, we can view the result as providing an efficient non-malleable code in the 'common reference string' model. We also introduce a new notion of non-malleable key derivation, which uses randomness x to derive a secret key y = h(x) in such a way that, even if x is tampered to a different value x' = f(x) , the derived key y' = h(x') does not reveal any information about y. Our results for non-malleable key derivation are analogous to those for non-malleable codes. As a useful tool in our analysis, we rely on the notion of 'leakage-resilient storage' of Davì, Dziembowski, and Venturi (SCN '10), and, as a result of independent interest, we also significantly improve on the parameters of such schemes

Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper

A UML/OCL framework for the analysis of fraph transformation rules

In this paper we present an approach for the analysis of graph transformation rules based on an intermediate OCL representation. We translate different rule semantics into OCL, together with the properties of interest (like rule applicability, conflicts or independence). The intermediate representation serves three purposes: (i) it allows the seamless integration of graph transformation rules with the MOF and OCL standards, and enables taking the meta-model and its OCL constraints (i.e. well-formedness rules) into account when verifying the correctness of the rules; (ii) it permits the interoperability of graph transformation concepts with a number of standards-based model-driven development tools; and (iii) it makes available a plethora of OCL tools to actually perform the rule analysis. This approach is especially useful to analyse the operational semantics of Domain Specific Visual Languages. We have automated these ideas by providing designers with tools for the graphical specification and analysis of graph transformation rules, including a backannotation mechanism that presents the analysis results in terms of the original language notation

The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management