22 research outputs found
How to prove security of communication protocols? A discussion on the soundness of formal models w.r.t. computational ones.
Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Their design is known to be error-prone with flaws found years later. That is why they deserve a careful security analysis, with rigorous proofs. Two main lines of research have been (independently) developed to analyse the security of protocols. On the one hand, formal methods provide with symbolic models and often automatic proofs. On the other hand, cryptographic models propose a tighter modeling but proofs are more difficult to write and to check. An approach developed during the last decade consists in bridging the two approaches, showing that symbolic models are sound w.r.t. symbolic ones, yielding strong security guarantees using automatic tools. These results have been developed for several cryptographic primitives (e.g. symmetric and asymmetric encryption, signatures, hash) and security properties.
While proving soundness of symbolic models is a very promising approach, several technical details are often not satisfactory. Focusing on symmetric encryption, we describe the difficulties and limitations of the available results
08491 Abstracts Collection -- Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security
From 30.11. to 05.12.2008, the Dagstuhl Seminar 08491 ``Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security \u27\u27 was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Probabilistic Opacity for a Passive Adversary and its Application to Chaum\u27s Voting Scheme
A predicate is opaque for a given system, if an adversary will never
be able to establish truth or falsehood of the predicate for any
observed computation. This notion has been essentially introduced and
studied in the context of transition systems whether describing the
semantics of programs, security protocols or other systems. In this
paper, we are interested in studying opacity in the probabilistic
computational world.
Indeed, in other settings, as in the Dolev-Yao model for instance, even
if an adversary is sure of the truth of the predicate, it
remains opaque as the adversary cannot conclude for sure.
In this paper, we introduce a computational version of opacity in the case of
passive adversaries called cryptographic opacity.
Our main result is a composition theorem: if a system is secure in an
abstract formalism and the cryptographic primitives used to implement
it are secure, then this system is secure in a
computational formalism. Security of the abstract system is the usual
opacity and security of the cryptographic primitives is IND-CPA security.
To illustrate our result, we give two applications:
a short and elegant proof of the classical Abadi-Rogaway result and
the first computational proof of Chaum\u27s visual electronic
voting scheme