On Secure Network Coding with Nonuniform or Restricted Wiretap Sets

The secrecy capacity of a network, for a given collection of permissible wiretap sets, is the maximum rate of communication such that observing links in any permissible wiretap set reveals no information about the message. This paper considers secure network coding with nonuniform or restricted wiretap sets, for example, networks with unequal link capacities where a wiretapper can wiretap any subset of $k$ links, or networks where only a subset of links can be wiretapped. Existing results show that for the case of uniform wiretap sets (networks with equal capacity links/packets where any $k$ can be wiretapped), the secrecy capacity is given by the cut-set bound, and can be achieved by injecting $k$ random keys at the source which are decoded at the sink along with the message. This is the case whether or not the communicating users have information about the choice of wiretap set. In contrast, we show that for the nonuniform case, the cut-set bound is not achievable in general when the wiretap set is unknown, whereas it is achievable when the wiretap set is made known. We give achievable strategies where random keys are canceled at intermediate non-sink nodes, or injected at intermediate non-source nodes. Finally, we show that determining the secrecy capacity is a NP-hard problem.Comment: 24 pages, revision submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

On secure network coding with uniform wiretap sets

This paper shows determining the secrecy capacity of a unicast network with uniform wiretap sets is at least as difficult as the k-unicast problem. In particular, we show that a general k-unicast problem can be reduced to the problem of finding the secrecy capacity of a corresponding single unicast network with uniform link capacities and one arbitrary wiretap link

Secure Communication over 1-2-1 Networks

This paper starts by assuming a 1-2-1 network, the abstracted noiseless model of mmWave networks that was shown to closely approximate the Gaussian capacity in [1], and studies secure communication. First, the secure capacity is derived for 1-2-1 networks where a source is connected to a destination through a network of unit capacity links. Then, lower and upper bounds on the secure capacity are derived for the case when source and destination have more than one beam, which allow them to transmit and receive in multiple directions at a time. Finally, secure capacity results are presented for diamond 1-2-1 networks when edges have different capacities.Comment: Submitted for ISIT 201

Coding Schemes for Achieving Strong Secrecy at Negligible Cost

We study the problem of achieving strong secrecy over wiretap channels at negligible cost, in the sense of maintaining the overall communication rate of the same channel without secrecy constraints. Specifically, we propose and analyze two source-channel coding architectures, in which secrecy is achieved by multiplexing public and confidential messages. In both cases, our main contribution is to show that secrecy can be achieved without compromising communication rate and by requiring only randomness of asymptotically vanishing rate. Our first source-channel coding architecture relies on a modified wiretap channel code, in which randomization is performed using the output of a source code. In contrast, our second architecture relies on a standard wiretap code combined with a modified source code termed uniform compression code, in which a small shared secret seed is used to enhance the uniformity of the source code output. We carry out a detailed analysis of uniform compression codes and characterize the optimal size of the shared seed.Comment: 15 pages, two-column, 5 figures, accepted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Delay Optimal Secrecy in Two-Relay Network

We consider a two-relay network in which a source aims to communicate a confidential message to a destination while keeping the message secret from the relay nodes. In the first hop, the channels from the source to the relays are assumed to be block-fading and the channel states change arbitrarily -possibly non-stationary and non-ergodic- across blocks. When the relay feedback on the states of the source-to-relay channels is available on the source with no delay, we provide an encoding strategy to achieve the optimal delay. We next consider the case in which there is one-block delayed relay feedback on the states of the source-to-relay channels. We show that for a set of channel state sequences, the optimal delay with one-block delayed feedback differs from the optimal delay with no-delayed feedback at most one block