Incentive-driven QoS in peer-to-peer overlays

A well known problem in peer-to-peer overlays is that no single entity has control over the software, hardware and configuration of peers. Thus, each peer can selfishly adapt its behaviour to maximise its benefit from the overlay. This thesis is concerned with the modelling and design of incentive mechanisms for QoS-overlays: resource allocation protocols that provide strategic peers with participation incentives, while at the same time optimising the performance of the peer-to-peer distribution overlay. The contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we present PledgeRoute, a novel contribution accounting system that can be used, along with a set of reciprocity policies, as an incentive mechanism to encourage peers to contribute resources even when users are not actively consuming overlay services. This mechanism uses a decentralised credit network, is resilient to sybil attacks, and allows peers to achieve time and space deferred contribution reciprocity. Then, we present a novel, QoS-aware resource allocation model based on Vickrey auctions that uses PledgeRoute as a substrate. It acts as an incentive mechanism by providing efficient overlay construction, while at the same time allocating increasing service quality to those peers that contribute more to the network. The model is then applied to lagsensitive chunk swarming, and some of its properties are explored for different peer delay distributions. When considering QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet, the quality received by a client cannot be adjudicated completely to either its serving peer or the intervening network between them. By drawing parallels between this situation and well-known hidden action situations in microeconomics, we propose a novel scheme to ensure adherence to advertised QoS levels. We then apply it to delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlays and present the optimal contract payments required, along with a method for QoS contract enforcement through reciprocative strategies. We also present a probabilistic model for application-layer delay as a function of the prevailing network conditions. Finally, we address the incentives of managed overlays, and the prediction of their behaviour. We propose two novel models of multihoming managed overlay incentives in which overlays can freely allocate their traffic flows between different ISPs. One is obtained by optimising an overlay utility function with desired properties, while the other is designed for data-driven least-squares fitting of the cross elasticity of demand. This last model is then used to solve for ISP profit maximisation

Peering Strategic Game Models for Interdependent ISPs in Content Centric Internet

Emergent content-oriented networks prompt Internet service providers (ISPs) to evolve and take major responsibility for content delivery. Numerous content items and varying content popularities motivate interdependence between peering ISPs to elaborate their content caching and sharing strategies. In this paper, we propose the concept of peering for content exchange between interdependent ISPs in content centric Internet to minimize content delivery cost by a proper peering strategy. We model four peering strategic games to formulate four types of peering relationships between ISPs who are characterized by varying degrees of cooperative willingness from egoism to altruism and interconnected as profit-individuals or profit-coalition. Simulation results show the price of anarchy (PoA) and communication cost in the four games to validate that ISPs should decide their peering strategies by balancing intradomain content demand and interdomain peering relations for an optimal cost of content delivery

Four essays in behavioral economics

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economic

Cloud provider capacity augmentation through automated resource bartering

© 2017 Elsevier B.V. Growing interest in Cloud Computing places a heavy workload on cloud providers which is becoming increasingly difficult for them to manage with their primary data centre infrastructures. Resource scarcity can make providers vulnerable to significant reputational damage and it often forces customers to select services from the larger, more established companies, sometimes at a higher price. Funding limitations, however, commonly prevent emerging and even established providers from making a continual investment in hardware speculatively assuming a certain level of growth in demand. As an alternative, they may opt to use the current inter-cloud resource sharing systems which mainly rely on monetary payments and thus put pressure on already stretched cash flows. To address such issues, a new multi-agent based Cloud Resource Bartering System (CRBS) is implemented in this work that fosters the management and bartering of pooled resources without requiring costly financial transactions between IAAS cloud providers. Agents in CRBS collaborate to facilitate bartering among providers which not only strengthens their trading relationships but also enables them to handle surges in demand with their primary setup. Unlike existing systems, CRBS assigns resources by considering resource urgency which comparatively improves customers’ satisfaction and the resource utilization rate by more than 50%. The evaluation results verify that our system assists providers to timely acquire the additional resources and to maintain sustainable service delivery. We conclude that the existence of such a system is economically beneficial for cloud providers and enables them to adapt to fluctuating workloads

Context-aware task scheduling in distributed computing systems

These days, the popularity of technologies such as machine learning, augmented reality, and big data analytics is growing dramatically. This leads to a higher demand of computational power not only for IT professionals but also for ordinary device users who benefit from new applications. At the same time, the computational performance of end-user devices increases to meet the demands of these resource-hungry applications. As a result, there is a coexistence of a huge demand of computational power on the one side and a large pool of computational resources on the other side. Bringing these two sides together is the idea of computational resource sharing systems which allow applications to forward computationally intensive workload to remote resources. This technique is often used in cloud computing where customers can rent computational power. However, we argue that not only cloud resources can be used as offloading targets. Rather, idle CPU cycles from end-user administered devices at the edge of the network can be spontaneously leveraged as well. Edge devices, however, are not only heterogeneous in their hardware and software capabilities, they also do not provide any guarantees in terms of reliability or performance. Does it mean that either the applications that require further guarantees or the unpredictable resources need to be excluded from such a sharing system? In this thesis, we propose a solution to this problem by introducing the Tasklet system, our approach for a computational resource sharing system. The Tasklet system supports computation offloading to arbitrary types of devices, including stable cloud instances as well as unpredictable end-user owned edge resources. Therefore, the Tasklet system is structured into multiple layers. The lowest layer is a best-effort resource sharing system which provides lightweight task scheduling and execution. Here, best-effort means that in case of a failure, the task execution is dropped and that tasks are allocated to resources randomly. To provide execution guarantees such as a reliable or timely execution, we add a Quality of Computation (QoC) layer on top of the best-effort execution layer. The QoC layer enforces the guarantees for applications by using a context-aware task scheduler which monitors the available resources in the computing environment and performs the matchmaking between resources and tasks based on the current state of the system. As edge resources are controlled by individuals, we consider the fact that these users need to be able to decide with whom they want to share their resources and for which price. Thus, we add a social layer on top of the system that allows users to establish friendship connections which can then be leveraged for social-aware task allocation and accounting of shared computation