5,941 research outputs found
Stopping time signatures for some algorithms in cryptography
We consider the normalized distribution of the overall running times of some
cryptographic algorithms, and what information they reveal about the
algorithms. Recent work of Deift, Menon, Olver, Pfrang, and Trogdon has shown
that certain numerical algorithms applied to large random matrices exhibit a
characteristic distribution of running times, which depends only on the
algorithm but are independent of the choice of probability distributions for
the matrices. Different algorithms often exhibit different running time
distributions, and so the histograms for these running time distributions
provide a time-signature for the algorithms, making it possible, in many cases,
to distinguish one algorithm from another. In this paper we extend this
analysis to cryptographic algorithms, and present examples of such algorithms
with time-signatures that are indistinguishable, and others with
time-signatures that are clearly distinct.Comment: 20 page
The Rabin cryptosystem revisited
The Rabin public-key cryptosystem is revisited with a focus on the problem of
identifying the encrypted message unambiguously for any pair of primes. In
particular, a deterministic scheme using quartic reciprocity is described that
works for primes congruent 5 modulo 8, a case that was still open. Both
theoretical and practical solutions are presented. The Rabin signature is also
reconsidered and a deterministic padding mechanism is proposed.Comment: minor review + introduction of a deterministic scheme using quartic
reciprocity that works for primes congruent 5 modulo
Data Leak Detection As a Service: Challenges and Solutions
We describe a network-based data-leak detection (DLD)
technique, the main feature of which is that the detection
does not require the data owner to reveal the content of the
sensitive data. Instead, only a small amount of specialized
digests are needed. Our technique – referred to as the fuzzy
fingerprint – can be used to detect accidental data leaks due
to human errors or application flaws. The privacy-preserving
feature of our algorithms minimizes the exposure of sensitive
data and enables the data owner to safely delegate the
detection to others.We describe how cloud providers can offer
their customers data-leak detection as an add-on service
with strong privacy guarantees.
We perform extensive experimental evaluation on the privacy,
efficiency, accuracy and noise tolerance of our techniques.
Our evaluation results under various data-leak scenarios
and setups show that our method can support accurate
detection with very small number of false alarms, even
when the presentation of the data has been transformed. It
also indicates that the detection accuracy does not degrade
when partial digests are used. We further provide a quantifiable
method to measure the privacy guarantee offered by our
fuzzy fingerprint framework
A new problem in string searching
We describe a substring search problem that arises in group presentation
simplification processes. We suggest a two-level searching model: skip and
match levels. We give two timestamp algorithms which skip searching parts of
the text where there are no matches at all and prove their correctness. At the
match level, we consider Harrison signature, Karp-Rabin fingerprint, Bloom
filter and automata based matching algorithms and present experimental
performance figures.Comment: To appear in Proceedings Fifth Annual International Symposium on
Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC'94), Lecture Notes in Computer Scienc
On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that:
1) BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2+ o(1)].
2) BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1-Theta(1).
3) For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI).
The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS\u2717) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability
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