Tradition as a Communication System. A Pragmatic Approach

A context of my paper is the debate on reason, tradition and traditional communities, in which this moral and epistemological issues were discussed as a part of general socio-philosophical theory of modernity. In particular I intend to locate my considerations in the context of formal-pragmatic theory of modern communicative rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. I will provide a competitive model of the rationality of tradition by applying a conceptual toolkit of pragmatically oriented analysis to explain practices connected with vocabulary of tradition. I argue that tradition as a communication system has a fully rational structure. My main claim is that communicative structure of tradition has a rational structure of language game. This structure includes defined principles of communication for members of closed tradition-grounded community and rule of inclusion for potential new members. Firstly I consider closely internal principles of communication within the framework of tradition contrasting them shortly with normative-deontic rules of the postenlightenment idea of pragmatic communication discussed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. After that I examine the rule of inclusion — the rule, which mediates between closed system of tradition-based community and his environment.Numer został przygotowany przy wsparciu Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego

Developing Ontological Theories for Conceptual Models using Qualitative Research

Conceptual modelling is believed to be at the core of the IS discipline. There have been attempts to develop theoretical foundations for conceptual models, in particular ontological models as axiomatic reference systems. Although the notion of ontology has become popular in modelling theories, criticism has risen as to its philosophical presuppositions. Taking on this criticism, we discuss the task of developing socially constructed ontologies for modelling domains and outline how to enhance the expressiveness of ontological modelling theories by developing them via qualitative research methods such as Grounded Theory

BECOME and its presuppositions

In hindsight, the debate about presupposition following Frege’s discovery that the referential function of names and definite descriptions depended on the fulfillment of an existence and a uniqueness condition was curiously limited for a very long time. On the one hand, it was only in the 1960s that linguists began to take an interest and showed that presupposition was an allpervasive phenomenon far beyond this philosophers’ pet definite descriptions. And on the other hand, and this is our real concern, it is now only too obvious that the uniqueness condition is too restrictive to be applicable to the general case. An utterance of “The cat is on the mat” should not imply that there is only one cat and one mat in the whole world. The obvious move is to limit the uniqueness condition to some notion of utterance context

A philosophical exploration of some unstated educational presuppositions concerning Polynesian education in New Zealand : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Education at Massey University

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION OF SOME UNSTATED EDUCATIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONS CONCERNING POLYNESIAN EDUCATION IN NEW ZEALAND. The prime concern in a multi-racial society should. be to encourage harmonious race relations in a system which aims at 'equality'. The Education system is one way of achieving this objective. Historically New Zealand educational policy has emphasised assimilation or its later more euphemistic derivative integration. This policy effectively increased the rate of acculturation but only at the expense of Polynesian culture and 'Maoritanga'. Subsequent academic failure, coupled with a steady decline in enthusiasm for formal education has resulted in the Polynesian devaluing education for other more tangible rewards. Innovation in educational policy aimed. at providing the Polynesian with an education which is intrinsically valuable to him, has been slow. This despite the immediate urgency and despite the findings and recommendations of the various commissions and committees set up by Government. Specifically, what is needed is the type of innovation which will encourage a greater degree of involvement by both pupil and parent; innovation that will effectively close the gap in attainment level between Polynesian and European. In examining this problem it becomes obvious that the assumptions which may be widely held, either consciously on partly or wholly unconsciously, concerning education must also be explored so that the various types of innovation can be analysed in terms of their effect in the system and on the community. An examination of these presuppositions is necessary to allow for, and to counteract, possible bias which may interfere with any recommendations which may ensue. Also, it allows for critical thought and reflection on that assumption so that the universal tendency to make no systematic attempt to explain and justify the principles on which the education system is based can be avoided. These presuppositions can be found within existing or implemented policies and have largely determined the various policy statements: educational, racial, social, recreational, penal. Any one of these presuppositionse, once exposed and found to be an immediate influence, can be examined to determine just what extent they have influenced, or are influencing, the Polynesian educational structure. A variety of alternatives and possible solutions could instead be implemented. The principle objective then is: to explore these presuppositions and possible alternatives in order that the resultant recommendations might be implemented in an attempt to raise the level of Polynesian under-achievement. The four main steps in this process are: 1. To show that any one educational presupposition 'may' be held or that it is widely held, consciously or unconsciously. 2. To show what effect this presupposition has had, or is having, upon the Polynesian educational system. 3. To examine this effect and to explore the possible variations and solutions of diverse alternative policies. 4. To arrive at and to recommend what action might be taken to alleviate the discrepancies and inequalities that are found to be important determinants of Polynesian under-achievement. The solutions and recommendations that are advanced in this thesis have been the result of careful analysis and examination of the unstated presuppositions, the principal factors affecting them and the principles in which they are embedded. These recommendations are not intended to be prescriptive. They are not the only possible recommendations but are perhaps the most appropriate. They are the end product of an inductive logical inquiry utilizing the findings of empirical research where available and appropriate. Some of them have already been implemented since this thesis was begun. However, it is not desirable, nor necessary, to remove them simply because they have been implemented and therefore rendered obsolete. The argumentation for them, in fact, is given greater credence in a world that views philosophical inquiry as merely a priori. These recommendations must be retained to allow for the continuity of argument and the facts which support them

Independence Day?

Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We argue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic independencies. We show, however, that this assumption is implausible, as updating beliefs with conditional information does not in general preserve independencies. We conclude that the approach taken by van Rooij and Lassiter does not succeed in resolving the proviso problem

And and And*

This paper discusses a recent opposition between the influential dynamic semantic account of presupposition projection and a recent Gricean-pragmatic theory. The Gricean-pragmatic theory is partly motivated by an influential ob- jection to dynamic semantics based on the compatibility of dynamic systems with connectives and operators exhibiting deviant projection behaviors. By identifying key features of the role of prediction and explanation in semantics, it is argued that the objection is based on a mistaken conception of the involve- ment of empirical foundations in semantic theories. The paper shows that the dynamic paradigm does not suffer from either predictive or explanatory inad- equacy. The chapter concludes that while it is too early to decide in favor of either approach, the Gricean alternative to dynamic semantics cannot be seen as motivated by a flaw in the latter theories