How to score alternatives when criteria are scored on an ordinal scale

We address in this paper the problem of scoring alternatives when they are evaluated with respect to several criteria on a finite ordinal scale $E$. We show that in general, the ordinal scale $E$ has to be refined or shrunk in order to be able to represent the preference of the decision maker by an aggregation operator belonging to the family of mean operators. The paper recalls previous theoretical results of the author giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a representation of preferences, and then focusses on describing practical algorithms and examples.ordinal scale, aggregation of scores, mean operator, refinement of scale

How to score alternatives when criteria are scored on an ordinal scale

International audienceWe address in this paper the problem of scoring alternatives when they are evaluated with respect to several criteria on a finite ordinal scale $E$. We show that in general, the ordinal scale $E$ has to be refined or shrunk in order to be able to represent the preference of the decision maker by an aggregation operator belonging to the family of mean operators. The paper recalls previous theoretical results of the author giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a representation of preferences, and then focusses on describing practical algorithms and examples

Axiomatic Testing of Structure Metrics

Axiomatic testing of software metrics is described, based on axioms from representational measurement theory. In a case study, the axioms are given for the formal relational structure and the empirical relational structure. Two approaches to axiomatic testing are elaborated: deterministic testing and probabilistic testin

Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments

The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections

Non-Archimedean Preferences Over Countable Lotteries

We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over countably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence axiom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexicographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces