3,741 research outputs found

    Jamming Games in the MIMO Wiretap Channel With an Active Eavesdropper

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    This paper investigates reliable and covert transmission strategies in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with a transmitter, receiver and an adversarial wiretapper, each equipped with multiple antennas. In a departure from existing work, the wiretapper possesses a novel capability to act either as a passive eavesdropper or as an active jammer, under a half-duplex constraint. The transmitter therefore faces a choice between allocating all of its power for data, or broadcasting artificial interference along with the information signal in an attempt to jam the eavesdropper (assuming its instantaneous channel state is unknown). To examine the resulting trade-offs for the legitimate transmitter and the adversary, we model their interactions as a two-person zero-sum game with the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate as the payoff function. We first examine conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (NE) and the structure of mixed-strategy NE for the strategic form of the game.We then derive equilibrium strategies for the extensive form of the game where players move sequentially under scenarios of perfect and imperfect information. Finally, numerical simulations are presented to examine the equilibrium outcomes of the various scenarios considered.Comment: 27 pages, 8 figures. To appear, IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin

    Vulnerability analysis of satellite-based synchronized smart grids monitoring systems

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    The large-scale deployment of wide-area monitoring systems could play a strategic role in supporting the evolution of traditional power systems toward smarter and self-healing grids. The correct operation of these synchronized monitoring systems requires a common and accurate timing reference usually provided by a satellite-based global positioning system. Although these satellites signals provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds the needs of the power industry, they are extremely vulnerable to radio frequency interference. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying their potential vulnerabilities is of paramount importance for correct and safe wide-area monitoring system operation. Armed with such a vision, this article presents and discusses the results of an experimental analysis aimed at characterizing the vulnerability of global positioning system based wide-area monitoring systems to external interferences. The article outlines the potential strategies that could be adopted to protect global positioning system receivers from external cyber-attacks and proposes decentralized defense strategies based on self-organizing sensor networks aimed at assuring correct time synchronization in the presence of external attacks

    One Breaker is Enough: Hidden Topology Attacks on Power Grids

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    A coordinated cyber-attack on grid meter readings and breaker statuses can lead to incorrect state estimation that can subsequently destabilize the grid. This paper studies cyber-attacks by an adversary that changes breaker statuses on transmission lines to affect the estimation of the grid topology. The adversary, however, is incapable of changing the value of any meter data and can only block recorded measurements on certain lines from being transmitted to the control center. The proposed framework, with limited resource requirements as compared to standard data attacks, thus extends the scope of cyber-attacks to grids secure from meter corruption. We discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible attacks using a novel graph-coloring based analysis and show that an optimal attack requires breaker status change at only ONE transmission line. The potency of our attack regime is demonstrated through simulations on IEEE test cases.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figures, Accepted to the IEEE PES General Meeting 201

    Jamming aided Generalized Data Attacks: Exposing Vulnerabilities in Secure Estimation

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    Jamming refers to the deletion, corruption or damage of meter measurements that prevents their further usage. This is distinct from adversarial data injection that changes meter readings while preserving their utility in state estimation. This paper presents a generalized attack regime that uses jamming of secure and insecure measurements to greatly expand the scope of common 'hidden' and 'detectable' data injection attacks in literature. For 'hidden' attacks, it is shown that with jamming, the optimal attack is given by the minimum feasible cut in a specific weighted graph. More importantly, for 'detectable' data attacks, this paper shows that the entire range of relative costs for adversarial jamming and data injection can be divided into three separate regions, with distinct graph-cut based constructions for the optimal attack. Approximate algorithms for attack design are developed and their performances are demonstrated by simulations on IEEE test cases. Further, it is proved that prevention of such attacks require security of all grid measurements. This work comprehensively quantifies the dual adversarial benefits of jamming: (a) reduced attack cost and (b) increased resilience to secure measurements, that strengthen the potency of data attacks.Comment: 11 pages, 8 figures, A version of this will appear in HICSS 201
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