Linear-quadratic-singular stochastic differential games and applications

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is quadratic in the state and linear in the control. We call these games linear-quadratic-singular stochastic differential games. Under natural assumptions, we show the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria, which are characterized through a linear system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The proof is based on an approximation via a sequence of games in which players are restricted to play Lipschitz continuous strategies. We then discuss an application of these results to a model of capacity expansion in oligopoly markets

Regional allocation of investment as a hierarchical optimization problem

A new formulation is given for the well-known problem of investment allocation between regions in the framework of a planning model. The case of a dual economy with a Cobb-Douglas production function is worked out in detail with an illustrative numerical example. The corresponding problem for an industrial economy with income disparity between two regions is also discussed

Jeux différentiels stochastiques de somme non nulle et équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades multidimensionnelles

This dissertation studies the multiple players nonzero-sum stochastic differential games (NZSDG) in the Markovian framework and their connections with multiple dimensional backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). There are three problems that we are focused on. Firstly, we consider a NZSDG where the drift coefficient is not bound but is of linear growth. Some particular cases of unbounded diffusion coefficient of the diffusion process are also considered. The existence of Nash equilibrium point is proved under the generalized Isaacs condition via the existence of the solution of the associated BSDE. The novelty is that the generator of the BSDE is multiple dimensional, continuous and of stochastic linear growth with respect to the volatility process. The second problem is of risk-sensitive type, i.e. the payoffs integrate utility exponential functions, and the drift of the diffusion is unbounded. The associated BSDE is of multi-dimension whose generator is quadratic on the volatility. Once again we show the existence of Nash equilibria via the solution of the BSDE. The last problem that we treat is a bang-bang game which leads to discontinuous Hamiltonians. We reformulate the verification theorem and we show the existence of a Nash point for the game which is of bang-bang type, i.e., it takes its values in the border of the domain according to the sign of the derivatives of the value function. The BSDE in this case is a coupled multi-dimensional system, whose generator is discontinuous on the volatility process.Cette thèse traite les jeux différentiels stochastiques de somme non nulle (JDSNN) dans le cadre de Markovien et de leurs liens avec les équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSR) multidimensionnelles. Nous étudions trois problèmes différents. Tout d'abord, nous considérons un JDSNN où le coefficient de dérive n'est pas borné, mais supposé uniquement à croissance linéaire. Ensuite certains cas particuliers de coefficients de diffusion non bornés sont aussi considérés. Nous montrons que le jeu admet un point d'équilibre de Nash via la preuve de l'existence de la solution de l'EDSR associée et lorsque la condition d'Isaacs généralisée est satisfaite. La nouveauté est que le générateur de l'EDSR, qui est multidimensionnelle, est de croissance linéaire stochastique par rapport au processus de volatilité. Le deuxième problème est aussi relatif au JDSNN mais les payoffs ont des fonctions d'utilité exponentielles. Les EDSRs associées à ce jeu sont de type multidimensionnelles et quadratiques en la volatilité. Nous montrons de nouveau l'existence d’un équilibre de Nash. Le dernier problème que nous traitons, est un jeu bang-bang qui conduit à des hamiltoniens discontinus. Dans ce cas, nous reformulons le théorème de vérification et nous montrons l’existence d’un équilibre de Nash qui est du type bang-bang, i.e., prenant ses valeurs sur le bord du domaine en fonction du signe de la dérivée de la fonction valeur ou du processus de volatilité. L'EDSR dans ce cas est un système multidimensionnel couplé, dont le générateur est discontinu par rapport au processus de volatilité

Suboptimal Minimax Design of Constrained Parabolic Systems with Mixed Boundary Control

The paper concerns minimax control problems for linear multidimensional parabolic systems with distributed uncertain perturbations and control functions acting in mixed (Robin) boundary conditions. The main goal is to design a feedback control regulator that ensures the required state performance and robust stability under any feasible perturbations and minimize an energy-type functional under the worst perturbations from the given area. We design and justify an easily implemented suboptimal structure of the feedback boundary regulator and compute its optimal parameters ensuring the required state performance and robust stability of the nonlinear closed-loop control system on the infinite horizon

Receding Horizon Control for Uncertain Pursuit-Evasion Games

A robust technique for handling parameter and strategy uncertainty in a pursuit-evasion framework is developed. The method is a receding horizon controller valid for problem classes with singularly perturbed trajectories that approximates the optimal feedback solution with small loss in optimality. The receding horizon method is used to ensure the controller is robust to incorrect or extraneous information about an opposing player's dynamics or strategy. A simple analytic pursuit-evasion game motivates the method by demonstrating that the receding horizon solution closely approximates the optimal solution and may be solved much faster. Simulations of a nonlinear game show that the receding horizon controller is especially useful when it is unknown whether the opposing player is performing an active or passive maneuver. In several cases, the receding horizon controller is shown to become more effective than a game-optimal controller acting with an incorrect strategy estimate. The major limitation of the technique for a nonlinear system is the expensive solution time; therefore, the optimal control problem is translated to a nonlinear programming problem and the test cases are repeated. Finally, the test cases are run on hardware to validate the method for real-time practical operation. The singular-perturbation algorithm applied herein is valid only for a small subset of all pursuit and evasion games. Nonetheless, the methods developed here can in theory be used for any generic game scenario, given that sufficient computing power is available to find the numerical solutions.