31,365 research outputs found
The Original Risk: Overtheologizing Ethics and Undertheologizing Sin
The project of articulating a theological ethics on the basis of liturgical anthropology is bound to fail if the necessary consequence is that one has to quit the forum of critical modern rationality. The risk of Engelhardt's approach is to limit rationality to a narrow vision of reason. Sin is not to be understood as the negation of human holiness, but as the negation of divine holiness. The only way to renew theological ethics is to understand sin as the anthropological and ethical expression of the biblical message of the justification by faith only. Sin is therefore a secondary category, which can only by interpreted in light of the positive manifestation of liberation, justification, and grace. The central issue of Christian ethics is not ritual purity or morality, but experience, confession and recognition of our own injustice in our dealing with God and me
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem
Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (âcredencesâ) and also binary beliefs (âbeliefs simpliciterâ). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the âlottery paradoxâ: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem generalizes: there exists no local function from degrees of belief to binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions of rationality and non-triviality. âLocalityâ means that the binary belief in each proposition depends only on the degree of belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. One might think that the impossibility can be avoided by dropping the assumption that binary beliefs are a function of degrees of belief. We prove that, even if we drop the âfunctionalityâ restriction, there still exists no local relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions. Thus functionality is not the source of the impossibility; its source is the condition of locality. If there is any non-trivial relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs at all, it must be a âholisticâ one. We explore several concrete forms this âholisticâ relation could take
On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even the proponent of the Expected Utility Objection should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument
Modelling practical certainty and its link with classical propositional logic
We model practical certainty in the language of accept & reject statement-based uncertainty models. We present three different ways, each time using a different nature of assessment: we study coherent models following from (i) favourability assessments, (ii) acceptability assessments, and (iii) indifference assessments. We argue that a statement of favourability, when used with an appropriate background model, essentially boils down to stating a belief of practical certainty using acceptability assessments. We show that the corresponding models do not form an intersection structure, in contradistinction with the coherent models following from an indifferenc assessment. We construct embeddings of classical propositional logic into each of our models for practical certainty
A New Rational Algorithm for View Updating in Relational Databases
The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any
autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information.
In order to apply the rationality result of belief dynamics theory to various
practical problems, it should be generalized in two respects: first it should
allow a certain part of belief to be declared as immutable; and second, the
belief state need not be deductively closed. Such a generalization of belief
dynamics, referred to as base dynamics, is presented in this paper, along with
the concept of a generalized revision algorithm for knowledge bases (Horn or
Horn logic with stratified negation). We show that knowledge base dynamics has
an interesting connection with kernel change via hitting set and abduction. In
this paper, we show how techniques from disjunctive logic programming can be
used for efficient (deductive) database updates. The key idea is to transform
the given database together with the update request into a disjunctive
(datalog) logic program and apply disjunctive techniques (such as minimal model
reasoning) to solve the original update problem. The approach extends and
integrates standard techniques for efficient query answering and integrity
checking. The generation of a hitting set is carried out through a hyper
tableaux calculus and magic set that is focused on the goal of minimality.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1301.515
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (updated version)
All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions have one of two restrictions: they either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to special agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. An important open question is whether judgment aggregation faces any serious impossibilities without these restrictions. Here we prove the first impossibility theorem without systematicity that applies to all standard agendas: there exists no judgment aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, anonymity and a new condition called unbiasedness. For many agendas, anonymity can be weakened. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in the judgment aggregation model, our result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain depends only on a single individual.judgment aggregation, discursive dilemma, formal logics, impossibility theorem, unbiasedness, systematicity, agendas
Epistemic Pluralism
The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and semi-negations
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