850 research outputs found
Jump-starting coordination in a stag hunt: Motivation, mechanisms, and their analysis
The stag hunt (or assurance game) is a simple game that has been used as a
prototype of a variety of social coordination problems (ranging from the social
contract to the adoption of technical standards). Players have the option to
either use a superior cooperative strategy whose payoff depends on the other
players' choices or use an inferior strategy whose payoff is independent of
what other players do; the cooperative strategy may incur a loss if
sufficiently many other players do not cooperate. Stag hunts have two (strict)
pure Nash equilibria, namely, universal cooperation and universal defection (as
well as a mixed equilibrium of low predictive value). Selection of the inferior
(pure) equilibrium is called a coordination failure. In this paper, we present
and analyze using game-theoretic techniques mechanisms aiming to avert
coordination failures and incite instead selection of the superior equilibrium.
Our analysis is based on the solution concepts of Nash equilibrium, dominance
solvability, as well as a formalization of the notion of "incremental
deployability," which is shown to be keenly relevant to the sink equilibrium.Comment: Some overlap with arXiv:1210.778
Power Allocation Games in Interference Relay Channels: Existence Analysis of Nash Equilibria
We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where
the two transmitters can exploit one common relay node to improve their
individual transmission rate. Communications are assumed to be multi-band and
transmitters are assumed to selfishly allocate their resources to optimize
their individual transmission rate. The main objective of this paper is to show
that this conflicting situation (modeled by a non-cooperative game) has some
stable outcomes, namely Nash equilibria. This result is proved for three
different types of relaying protocols: decode-and-forward,
estimate-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. We provide additional results on
the problems of uniqueness, efficiency of the equilibrium, and convergence of a
best-response based dynamics to the equilibrium. These issues are analyzed in a
special case of the amplify-and-forward protocol and illustrated by simulations
in general.Comment: To appear in EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and
Networking (JWCN
Agame-theoretical approach to network capacity planning under competition
The paper discusses the dimensioning strategies of two network providers (operators) that supply channels to the same population of users in a competitive environment. Usersare assumed to compete for best service (lowest blocking probability of new request), while operators wishto maximize their profits. This setting gives rise to two interconnected, noncooperative games: a) a users game, in which the partition of primary traffic between operators is determined by the operators' channel capacities and by the users' blocking-avoidance strategy; and b) a network dimensioning game between operators in which the players alternate dimensioning decisions thatmaximize their profit rate under the current channel capacity of his/her opponent. At least for two plausible users' blocking avoidance strategies discussed in the paper, the users game will always reach some algorithmic equilibrium. In the operators' game, the player strategies are given by their numbers of deployed chanels, limited by their available infrastructure resources. If the infrastrucutre is under-dimensioned with respect to the traffic rate, the operators game willreach a Nash equilibrium when both players reach full use of their available infrastructures. Otherweise, a Nash equilibrium may also arise if both operators incur the same deployment costs. If costs are asymmetric, though, the alternating game may enter a loop. If the asymmetry is modest, both players may then try to achieve a competitive monopoly in which the opponent is forced to leave the game or operate with a loss (negative profit). However, if the asymmetry is high enough, only the player with the lower costs can force his opponent to leave the game while still holding a profitable operation. --network dimensioning,game theory,duopoly,Nash equilibrium,circuit switching,blocking probability
Prices of Anarchy, Information, and Cooperation in Differential Games
The price of anarchy (PoA) has been widely used in static games to quantify
the loss of efficiency due to noncooperation. Here, we extend this concept to a
general differential games framework. In addition, we introduce the price of
information (PoI) to characterize comparative game performances under different
information structures, as well as the price of cooperation to capture the
extent of benefit or loss a player accrues as a result of altruistic behavior.
We further characterize PoA and PoI for a class of scalar linear quadratic
differential games under open-loop and closed-loop feedback information
structures. We also obtain some explicit bounds on these indices in a large
population regime
Approximate Best-Response Dynamics in Random Interference Games
In this paper we develop a novel approach to the convergence of Best-Response
Dynamics for the family of interference games. Interference games represent the
fundamental resource allocation conflict between users of the radio spectrum.
In contrast to congestion games, interference games are generally not potential
games. Therefore, proving the convergence of the best-response dynamics to a
Nash equilibrium in these games requires new techniques. We suggest a model for
random interference games, based on the long term fading governed by the
players' geometry. Our goal is to prove convergence of the approximate
best-response dynamics with high probability with respect to the randomized
game. We embrace the asynchronous model in which the acting player is chosen at
each stage at random. In our approximate best-response dynamics, the action of
a deviating player is chosen at random among all the approximately best ones.
We show that with high probability, with respect to the players' geometry and
asymptotically with the number of players, each action increases the expected
social-welfare (sum of achievable rates). Hence, the induced sum-rate process
is a submartingale. Based on the Martingale Convergence Theorem, we prove
convergence of the strategy profile to an approximate Nash equilibrium with
good performance for asymptotically almost all interference games. We use the
Markovity of the induced sum-rate process to provide probabilistic bounds on
the convergence time. Finally, we demonstrate our results in simulated
examples
A Passivity-Based Approach to Nash Equilibrium Seeking over Networks
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE)
seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local
information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that
converges to an NE under strict monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient and assumes
perfect information, i.e., instantaneous all-to-all player communication. We
consider how to modify this gradient-play dynamics in the case of partial, or
networked information between players. We propose an augmented gradient-play
dynamics with correction in which players communicate locally only with their
neighbours to compute an estimate of the other players' actions. We derive the
new dynamics based on the reformulation as a multi-agent coordination problem
over an undirected graph. We exploit incremental passivity properties and show
that a synchronizing, distributed Laplacian feedback can be designed using
relative estimates of the neighbours. Under a strict monotonicity property of
the pseudo-gradient, we show that the augmented gradient-play dynamics
converges to consensus on the NE of the game. We further discuss two cases that
highlight the tradeoff between properties of the game and the communication
graph.Comment: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication.
Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no
longer be accessibl
Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling constraints
We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of
each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy.
As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of
Nash and Wardrop equilibrium. By exploiting a characterization of the two
equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance
with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we
propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are
capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents.
Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of
route choice on a road network.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (Accepted without changes). The
first three authors contributed equall
A Unified Mechanism Design Framework for Networked Systems
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design
strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the
participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game
outcome is optimal with respect to a global criterion (e.g. maximizing a social
welfare function), preference-compatible, and strategy-proof, i.e. players have
no reason to deceive the designer. The mechanism designer achieves these
objectives by introducing specific rules and incentives to the players; in this
case by adding resource prices to their utilities. In auction-based mechanisms,
the mechanism designer explicitly allocates the resources based on bids of the
participants in addition to setting prices. Alternatively, pricing mechanisms
enforce global objectives only by charging the players for the resources they
have utilized. In either setting, the player preferences represented by utility
functions may be coupled or decoupled, i.e. they depend on other player's
actions or only on player's own actions, respectively. The unified framework
and its information structures are illustrated through multiple example
resource allocation problems from wireless and wired networks
Potential Games for Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation in Multipoint-to-Multipoint CDMA Wireless Data Networks
The problem of noncooperative resource allocation in a
multipoint-to-multipoint cellular network is considered in this paper. The
considered scenario is general enough to represent several key instances of
modern wireless networks such as a multicellular network, a peer-to-peer
network (interference channel), and a wireless network equipped with
femtocells. In particular, the problem of joint transmit waveforms adaptation,
linear receiver design, and transmit power control is examined. Several utility
functions to be maximized are considered, and, among them, we cite the received
SINR, and the transmitter energy efficiency, which is measured in bit/Joule,
and represents the number of successfully delivered bits for each energy unit
used for transmission. Resorting to the theory of potential games,
noncooperative games admitting Nash equilibria in multipoint-to-multipoint
cellular networks regardless of the channel coefficient realizations are
designed. Computer simulations confirm that the considered games are
convergent, and show the huge benefits that resource allocation schemes can
bring to the performance of wireless data networks.Comment: Submitted to Physical Communication, ELSEVIE
Network Formation Games Among Relay Stations in Next Generation Wireless Networks
The introduction of relay station (RS) nodes is a key feature in next
generation wireless networks such as 3GPP's long term evolution advanced
(LTE-Advanced), or the forthcoming IEEE 802.16j WiMAX standard. This paper
presents, using game theory, a novel approach for the formation of the tree
architecture that connects the RSs and their serving base station in the
\emph{uplink} of the next generation wireless multi-hop systems. Unlike
existing literature which mainly focused on performance analysis, we propose a
distributed algorithm for studying the \emph{structure} and \emph{dynamics} of
the network. We formulate a network formation game among the RSs whereby each
RS aims to maximize a cross-layer utility function that takes into account the
benefit from cooperative transmission, in terms of reduced bit error rate, and
the costs in terms of the delay due to multi-hop transmission. For forming the
tree structure, a distributed myopic algorithm is devised. Using the proposed
algorithm, each RS can individually select the path that connects it to the BS
through other RSs while optimizing its utility. We show the convergence of the
algorithm into a Nash tree network, and we study how the RSs can adapt the
network's topology to environmental changes such as mobility or the deployment
of new mobile stations. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm
presents significant gains in terms of average utility per mobile station which
is at least 17.1% better relatively to the case with no RSs and reaches up to
40.3% improvement compared to a nearest neighbor algorithm (for a network with
10 RSs). The results also show that the average number of hops does not exceed
3 even for a network with up to 25 RSs.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 59, no. 9, pp. 2528-2542,
September 201
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