41 research outputs found
Differential games with asymmetric information and without Isaacs condition
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric
information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an
ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the
players. Each player has a private information on the payoff of the game, while
his opponent knows only the probability distribution on the information of the
other player. We show that a suitable definition of random strategies allows to
prove the existence of a value in mixed strategies. Moreover, the value
function can be characterised in term of the unique viscosity solution in some
dual sense of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. Here we do not suppose the
Isaacs condition which is usually assumed in differential games
Optimal Mixed Strategies to the Zero-sum Linear Differential Game
This paper exploits the weak approximation method to study a zero-sum linear
differential game under mixed strategies. The stochastic nature of mixed
strategies poses challenges in evaluating the game value and deriving the
optimal strategies. To overcome these challenges, we first define the mixed
strategy based on time discretization given the control period . Then,
we design a stochastic differential equation (SDE) to approximate the
discretized game dynamic with a small approximation error of scale
in the weak sense. Moreover, we prove that the game
payoff is also approximated in the same order of accuracy. Next, we solve the
optimal mixed strategies and game values for the linear quadratic differential
games. The effect of the control period is explicitly analyzed when the payoff
is a terminal cost. Our results provide the first implementable form of the
optimal mixed strategies for a zero-sum linear differential game. Finally, we
provide numerical examples to illustrate and elaborate on our results
Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète
L'objectif de cette thèse est l'étude des jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète. Nous considérons un jeu à deux joueurs adverses qui contrôlent une diffusion afin de minimiser, respectivement de maximiser un paiement spécifique. Pour modéliser l'incomplétude des informations, nous suivrons la célèbre approche d'Aumann et Maschler. Nous supposons qu'il existe des états de la nature différents dans laquelle le jeu peut avoir lieu. Avant que le jeu commence, l'état est choisi au hasard. L'information est ensuite transmise à un joueur alors que le second ne connaît que les probabilités respectives pour chaque état.Dans cette thèse nous établissons une représentationduale pour les jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète. Ici, nous utilisons largement la théorie des équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSRs), qui se révèle être un outilindispensable dans cette étude. En outre, nous montrons comment, sous certaines restrictions, cette représentation permetde construire des stratégies optimales pour le joueur informé. Ensuite, nous donnons, en utilisant la représentation duale, une preuve particulièrement simple de la semiconvexité de la fonction valeur des jeux différentiels à information incomplète.Un autre partie de la thèse est consacré à des schémas numériques pour les jeux différentiels stochastiques à informationincomplète. Dans la dernière partie nous étudions des jeux d'arrêt optimal en temps continue, appelés jeux de Dynkin, à information incomplète. Nous établissons également une représentation duale, qui est utilisé pour déterminer des stratégies optimales pour le joueur informé dans ce cas.The objective of this thesis is the study of stochastic differential games with incomplete information. We consider a game with two opponent players who control a diffusion in order to minimize, respectively maximize a certain payoff. To model the information incompleteness we will follow the famous ansatz of Aumann and Maschler. We assume that there are different states of nature in which the game can take place. Before the game starts the state is chosen randomly. The information is then transmitted to one player while the second one only knows the respective probabilities for each state. In this thesis we establish a dual representation for stochastic differential games with incomplete information. Therein we make a vast use of the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), which turns out to be an indispensable tool in this study. Moreover we show how under some restrictions that this representation allows to construct optimal strategies for the informed player.Morover we give - using the dual representation - a strikingly simple proof for semiconvexity of the value function of differential games with incomplete information. Another part of this thesis is devoted to numerical schemes for stochastic differential games with incomplete information. In the last part we investigate continuous time optimal stopping games, so called Dynkin games, with information incompleteness. We show that these games have a value and a unique characterization by a fully non-linear variational PDE for which we provide a comparison principle. Also we establish a dual representation for Dynkin games with incomplete information.BREST-SCD-Bib. electronique (290199901) / SudocSudocFranceF
Feedback Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in mixed leadership games with an application to cooperative advertising
In this paper we characterize the feedback equilibrium of a general infinite-horizon Stackelberg-Nash differential game where the roles of the players are mixed. By mixed we mean that one player is a leader on some decisions and a follower on other decisions. We prove a verification theorem that reduces the task of finding equilibrium strategies in functional spaces to two simple steps: First solving two static Nash games at the Hamiltonian level in a nested version and then solving the associated system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. As an application, we study a novel manufacturer-retailer cooperative advertising game where, in addition to the traditional setup into which the manufacturer subsidizes the retailer's advertising effort, we also allow the reverse support from the retailer to the manufacturer. We find an equilibrium that can be expressed by a solution of a set of quartic algebraic equations. We then conduct an extensive numerical study to assess the impact of model parameters on the equilibrium