536 research outputs found
The Security of SIMON-like Ciphers Against Linear Cryptanalysis
In the present paper, we analyze the security of SIMON-like ciphers against linear cryptanalysis. First, an upper bound is derived on the squared correlation of SIMON-like round function. It is shown that the upper bound on the squared correlation of SIMON-like round function decreases with the Hamming weight of output mask increasing. Based on this, we derive an upper bound on the squared correlation of linear trails for SIMON and SIMECK, which is for any -round linear trail. We also extend this upper bound to SIMON-like ciphers. Meanwhile, an automatic search algorithm is proposed, which can find the optimal linear trails in SIMON-like ciphers under the Markov assumption. With the proposed algorithm, we find the provably optimal linear trails for , , , and rounds of SIMON. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the provably optimal linear trails for SIMON, SIMON and SIMON are reported. The provably optimal linear trails for , and rounds of SIMECK are also found respectively. Besides the optimal linear trails, we also find the , and -round linear hulls for SIMON, and , and -round linear hulls for SIMECK. As far as we know, these are the best linear hull distinguishers for SIMON and SIMECK so far. Compared with the approach based on SAT/SMT solvers in \cite{KolblLT15}, our search algorithm is more efficient and practical to evaluate the security against linear cryptanalysis in the design of SIMON-like ciphers
The Maiorana-McFarland structure based cryptanalysis of Simon
In this paper we propose the linear hull construction for block ciphers with quadratic Maiorana-McFarland structure round functions. The search for linear trails with high squared correlations from our Maiorana-McFarland structure based constructive linear cryptanalysis is linear algebraic. Hence from this linear algebraic essence, the space of all linear trails has the structure such that good linear hulls can be constructed. Then for the Simon2n and its variants, we prove the lower bound on the potential of the linear hull with the fixed input and output masks at arbitrary long rounds, under independent assumptions. We argue that for Simon2n the potential of the realistic linear hull of the Simon2n with the linear key-schedule should be bigger than .\\
On the other hand we prove that the expected differential probability (EDP) is at least under the independence assumptions. It is argued that the lower bound of EDP of Simon2n of realistic differential trails is bigger than . It seems that at least theoretically the Simon2n is insecure for the key-recovery attack based on our new constructed linear hulls and key-recovery attack based on our constructed differential trails.\
Improved Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-round SIMON
SIMON is a family of ten lightweight block ciphers published by Beaulieu et al.\ from U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). In this paper we investigate the security of SIMON against different variants of linear cryptanalysis techniques, i.e.\ classical and multiple linear cryptanalysis and linear hulls. We present a connection between linear- and differential characteristics as well as differentials and linear hulls in SIMON. We employ it to adapt the current known results on differential cryptanalysis of SIMON into the linear setting. In addition to finding a linear approximation with a single characteristic, we show the effect of the linear hulls in SIMON by finding better approximations that enable us to improve the previous results.
Our best linear cryptanalysis employs average squared correlation of the linear hull of SIMON based on correlation matrices. The result covers 21 out of 32 rounds of SIMON32/64 with time and data complexity and respectively. We have implemented our attacks for small scale variants of SIMON and our experiments confirm the theoretical biases and correlation presented in this work. So far, our results are the best known with respect to linear cryptanalysis for any variant of SIMON
A General Framework for the Related-key Linear Attack against Block Ciphers with Linear Key Schedules
We present a general framework for the related-key linear attack that can be applied to iterative block ciphers with linear key schedules.
The attack utilizes a newly introduced related-key linear approximation that is obtained directly from a linear trail.
The attack makes use of a known related-key data consisting of triplets of a plaintext, a ciphertext, and a key difference such that the ciphertext is the encrypted value of the plaintext under the key that is the xor of the key to be recovered and the specified key difference.
If such a block cipher has a linear trail with linear correlation \epsilon, it admits attacks with related-key data of size \epsilon^{-2} just as in the case of classical Matsui\u27s Algorithms.
But since the attack makes use of a related-key data, the attacker can use a linear trail with the squared correlation less than 2^{-n}, n being the block size, in case the key size is larger than n.
Moreover, the standard key hypotheses seem to be appropriate even when the trail is not dominant as validated by experiments.
The attack can be applied in two ways.
First, using a linear trail with squared correlation smaller than 2^{-n}, one can get an effective attack covering more rounds than existing attacks against some ciphers, such as Simon48/96, Simon64/128 and Simon128/256.
Secondly, using a trail with large squared correlation, one can use related-key data for key recovery even when the data is not suitable for existing linear attacks
Generating graphs packed with paths: Estimation of linear approximations and differentials:Estimation of linear approximations and differentials
When designing a new symmetric-key primitive, the designer must show resistance to known attacks. Perhaps most prominent amongst these are linear and differential cryptanalysis. However, it is notoriously difficult to accurately demonstrate e.g. a block cipher’s resistance to these attacks, and thus most designers resort to deriving bounds on the linear correlations and differential probabilities of their design. On the other side of the spectrum, the cryptanalyst is interested in accurately assessing the strength of a linear or differential attack.
While several tools have been developed to search for optimal linear and differential trails, e.g. MILP and SAT based methods, only few approaches specifically try to find as many trails of a single approximation or differential as possible. This can result in an overestimate of a cipher’s resistance to linear and differential attacks, as was for example the case for PRESENT.
In this work, we present a new algorithm for linear and differential trail search. The algorithm represents the problem of estimating approximations and differentials as the problem of finding many long paths through a multistage graph. We demonstrate that this approach allows us to find a very large number of good trails for each approximation or differential. Moreover, we show how the algorithm can be used to efficiently estimate the key dependent correlation distribution of a linear approximation, facilitating advanced linear attacks. We apply the algorithm to 17 different ciphers, and present new and improved results on several of these
Generating Graphs Packed with Paths
When designing a new symmetric-key primitive, the designer must show resistance to known attacks. Perhaps most prominent amongst these are linear and differential cryptanalysis. However, it is notoriously difficult to accurately demonstrate e.g. a block cipher\u27s resistance to these attacks, and thus most designers resort to deriving bounds on the linear correlations and differential probabilities of their design. On the other side of the spectrum, the cryptanalyst is interested in accurately assessing the strength of a linear or differential attack.
While several tools have been developed to search for optimal linear and differential trails, e.g. MILP and SAT based methods, only few approaches specifically try to find as many trails of a single approximation or differential as possible. This can result in an overestimate of a cipher\u27s resistance to linear and differential attacks, as was for example the case for PRESENT.
In this work, we present a new algorithm for linear and differential trail search. The algorithm represents the problem of estimating approximations and differentials as the problem of finding many long paths through a multistage graph. We demonstrate that this approach allows us to find a very large number of good trails for each approximation or differential. Moreover, we show how the algorithm can be used to efficiently estimate the key dependent correlation distribution of a linear approximation, facilitating advanced linear attacks. We apply the algorithm to 17 different ciphers, and present new and improved results on several of these
Linear Hull Attack on Round-Reduced Simeck with Dynamic Key-guessing Techniques
Simeck is a new family of lightweight block ciphers proposed by Yang in CHES\u2715, which has efficient hardware implementation.
In this paper, we find differentials with low hamming weight and high probability for Simeck using Kölbl\u27s tool,
then we consider the links between the differential and linear characteristic to construct linear hulls for Simeck. We give improved linear hull attack with dynamic key-guessing techniques on Simeck
according to the property of the AND operation. Our best results cover Simeck 32/64 reduced to 23 rounds, Simeck 48/96 reduced to 30 rounds, Simeck 64/128 reduced to 37 rounds. Our result is the best known so far for any variant of Simeck
Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SIMON Using Super Rounds
We present attacks on 21-rounds of SIMON 32/64, 21-rounds of SIMON 48/96, 25-rounds of SIMON 64/128, 35-rounds of SIMON 96/144 and 43-rounds of SIMON 128/256, often with direct recovery of the full master key without repeating the attack over multiple rounds. These attacks result from the observation that, after four rounds of encryption, one bit of the left half of the state of 32/64 SIMON depends on only 17 key bits (19 key bits for the other variants of SIMON). Further, linear cryptanalysis requires the guessing of only 16 bits, the size of a single round key of SIMON 32/64. We partition the key into smaller strings by focusing on one bit of state at a time, decreasing the cost of the exhaustive search of linear cryptanalysis to 16 bits at a time for SIMON 32/64. We also present other example linear cryptanalysis, experimentally verified on 8, 10 and 12 rounds for SIMON 32/64
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