62,858 research outputs found
Technical note : TRACKFlow, a new versatile microscope system forfission track analysis
We here present TRACKFlow, a new system with dedicated modules for the fission track (FT) laboratory. It is based on the motorised Nikon Eclipse Ni-E upright microscope with the Nikon DS-Ri2 full frame camera and is embedded within the Nikon NIS-Elements Advanced Research software package. TRACKFlow decouples image acquisition from analysis to decrease schedule stress of the microscope. The system further has the aim of being versatile, adaptable to multiple preparation protocols and analysis approaches. It is both suited for small-scale laboratories and is also ready for upscaling to high-throughput imaging. The versatility of the system, based on the operators’ full access to the NIS-Elements package, exceeds that of other systems for FT and further expands to stepping away from the dedicated FT microscope towards a general microscope for Earth Sciences, including dedicated modules for FT research.
TRACKFlow consists of a number of user-friendly protocols which are based on the well plate design that allows sequential scanning of multiple samples without the need of replacing the slide on the stage. All protocols include a sub-protocol to scan a map of the mount for easy navigation through the samples on the stage. Two protocols are designed for the External Detector Method (EDM) and the LA–ICP–MS apatite fission track (LAFT) approach, with tools for repositioning and calibration to the external detector. Two other tools are designed for large crystals, such as the Durango age standard and U-doped glass external detectors. These protocols generate a regular grid of points and inspect if each point is suitable for analysis. Both protocols also include an option to image each withheld point. One more protocol is included for the measurement of etch pit diameters and one last protocol prepares a list of coordinates for correlative microscopy. In a following phase of development TRACKFlow can be expanded towards fully autonomous calibration, grain detection and imaging
Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications
Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for
the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research
experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts
today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited
abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes,
thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led
to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at
formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism
are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of
clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN)
paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right
kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence
in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and
synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a
self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in
formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial
Symbolic Abstractions for Quantum Protocol Verification
Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange
qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants
thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security
proofs in that field are mostly tedious, error-prone pen-and-paper proofs of
the core protocol only that rarely account for other crucial components such as
authentication. This calls for formal and automated verification techniques
that exhaustively explore all possible intruder behaviors and that scale well.
The symbolic approach offers rigorous, mathematical frameworks and automated
tools to analyze security protocols. Based on well-designed abstractions, it
has allowed for large-scale formal analyses of real-life protocols such as TLS
1.3 and mobile telephony protocols. Hence a natural question is: Can we use
this successful line of work to analyze quantum protocols? This paper proposes
a first positive answer and motivates further research on this unexplored path
Automatic verification of any number of concurrent, communicating processes
The automatic verification of concurrent systems by model-checking is limited due to the inability to generalise results to systems consisting of any number of processes. We use abstraction to prove general results, by model-checking, about feature interaction analysis of a telecommunications service involving any number of processes. The key idea is to model-check a system of constant number (m) of concurrent processes, in parallel with an "abstract" process which represents the product of any number of other processes. The system, for any specified set of selected features, is generated automatically using Perl scripts
Analysis and Verification of Service Interaction Protocols - A Brief Survey
Modeling and analysis of interactions among services is a crucial issue in
Service-Oriented Computing. Composing Web services is a complicated task which
requires techniques and tools to verify that the new system will behave
correctly. In this paper, we first overview some formal models proposed in the
literature to describe services. Second, we give a brief survey of verification
techniques that can be used to analyse services and their interaction. Last, we
focus on the realizability and conformance of choreographies.Comment: In Proceedings TAV-WEB 2010, arXiv:1009.330
PROVIDE: hiding from automated network scans with proofs of identity
Network scanners are a valuable tool for researchers and administrators, however they are also used by malicious actors to identify vulnerable hosts on a network. Upon the disclosure of a security vulnerability, scans are launched within hours. These opportunistic attackers enumerate blocks of IP addresses in hope of discovering an exploitable host. Fortunately, defensive measures such as port knocking protocols (PKPs) allow a service to remain stealth to unauthorized IP addresses. The service is revealed only when a client includes a special authentication token (AT) in the IP/TCP header. However this AT is generated from a secret shared between the clients/servers and distributed manually to each endpoint. As a result, these defense measures have failed to be widely adopted by other protocols such as HTTP/S due to challenges in distributing the shared secrets. In this paper we propose a scalable solution to this problem for services accessed by domain name. We make the following observation: automated network scanners access servers by IP address, while legitimate clients access the server by name. Therefore a service should only reveal itself to clients who know its name. Based on this principal, we have created a proof of the verifier’s identity (a.k.a. PROVIDE) protocol that allows a prover (legitimate user) to convince a verifier (service) that it is knowledgeable of the verifier’s identity. We present a PROVIDE implementation using a PKP and DNS (PKP+DNS) that uses DNS TXT records to distribute identification tokens (IDT) while DNS PTR records for the service’s domain name are prohibited to prevent reverse DNS lookups. Clients are modified to make an additional DNS TXT query to obtain the IDT which is used by the PKP to generate an AT. The inclusion of an AT in the packet header, generated from the DNS TXT query, is proof the client knows the service’s identity. We analyze the effectiveness of this mechanism with respect to brute force attempts for various strength ATs and discuss practical considerations.This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) awards #1430145, #1414119, and #1012798
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