Ranking Electoral Systems through Hierarchical Properties Ranking

Electoral systems are characterized by a wide spectrum of properties that cannot be all satisfied at the same time. We aim at examining such properties within a hierarchical framework, based on Analytic Hierarchy Process, performing pairwise comparisons at various levels of a hierarchy to get a global ranking of the electoral systems. In this way it should be possible to estimate the relative importance of each property with respect to the final ranking of every electoral formula.Electoral systems, global ranking, hierarchy, aggregations

Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond

This essay surveys the literature on the axiomatic model of bargaining formulated by Nash ("The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica 28, 1950, 155-162).Nash's bargaining model, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Egalitarian solution

Becker random behavior and the as-if defense of rational choice theory in demand analysis

In discussing rational choice theory (RCT) as an explanation of demand behavior, Becker (1962, Journal of Political Economy, 70, 1–13) proposed a model of random choice in which consumers pick a bundle on their budget line according to a uniform distribution. This model has then been used in various ways to assess the validity of RCT and to support as-if arguments in defense of it. This paper makes both historical and methodological contributions. Historically, it investigates how the interpretation of Becker random behavior evolved between the original 1962 article and the modern experimental literature on individual demand, and surveys six experiments in which it has been used as an alternative hypothesis to RCT. Methodologically, this paper conducts an assessment of the as-if defense of RCT from the standpoint of Becker’s model. It argues that this defense is ‘weak’ in a number of senses, and that it has negatively influenced the design of experiments about RCT

Adequate Moods for Non-EU Decision Making in a Sequential Framework

In a dynamic (sequential) framework, departures from the independence axiom (IND) are reputed to induce violations of dynamic consistency (DC), which may in turn have undesirable normative consequences. This result thus questions the normative acceptability of non expected-utility (non-EU) models, which precisely relax IND. This paper pursues a twofold objective. The main one is to discuss the normative conclusion: we show that usual arguments linking violations of DC to departures from IND are actually based on specific (but usually remaining implicit) assumptions which may rightfully be released, so that it is actually possible for a non-EU maximizer to be dynamically consistent and thus avoid normative difficulties. Our second objective is to introduce a kind of 'reality principle' (through two other evaluation criteria) in order to mitigate the normative requirement when examining adequate moods for non-EU decision making.Non-expected utility, sequential choice, dynamic consistency, money pump, consequentialism.

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Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria