385 research outputs found

    On Collaborative Predictive Blacklisting

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    Collaborative predictive blacklisting (CPB) allows to forecast future attack sources based on logs and alerts contributed by multiple organizations. Unfortunately, however, research on CPB has only focused on increasing the number of predicted attacks but has not considered the impact on false positives and false negatives. Moreover, sharing alerts is often hindered by confidentiality, trust, and liability issues, which motivates the need for privacy-preserving approaches to the problem. In this paper, we present a measurement study of state-of-the-art CPB techniques, aiming to shed light on the actual impact of collaboration. To this end, we reproduce and measure two systems: a non privacy-friendly one that uses a trusted coordinating party with access to all alerts (Soldo et al., 2010) and a peer-to-peer one using privacy-preserving data sharing (Freudiger et al., 2015). We show that, while collaboration boosts the number of predicted attacks, it also yields high false positives, ultimately leading to poor accuracy. This motivates us to present a hybrid approach, using a semi-trusted central entity, aiming to increase utility from collaboration while, at the same time, limiting information disclosure and false positives. This leads to a better trade-off of true and false positive rates, while at the same time addressing privacy concerns.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in ACM SIGCOMM's Computer Communication Review (Volume 48 Issue 5, October 2018). This is the full versio

    Controlled Data Sharing for Collaborative Predictive Blacklisting

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    Although sharing data across organizations is often advocated as a promising way to enhance cybersecurity, collaborative initiatives are rarely put into practice owing to confidentiality, trust, and liability challenges. In this paper, we investigate whether collaborative threat mitigation can be realized via a controlled data sharing approach, whereby organizations make informed decisions as to whether or not, and how much, to share. Using appropriate cryptographic tools, entities can estimate the benefits of collaboration and agree on what to share in a privacy-preserving way, without having to disclose their datasets. We focus on collaborative predictive blacklisting, i.e., forecasting attack sources based on one's logs and those contributed by other organizations. We study the impact of different sharing strategies by experimenting on a real-world dataset of two billion suspicious IP addresses collected from Dshield over two months. We find that controlled data sharing yields up to 105% accuracy improvement on average, while also reducing the false positive rate.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in DIMVA 2015. This is the full version. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1403.212

    Privacy-Friendly Collaboration for Cyber Threat Mitigation

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    Sharing of security data across organizational boundaries has often been advocated as a promising way to enhance cyber threat mitigation. However, collaborative security faces a number of important challenges, including privacy, trust, and liability concerns with the potential disclosure of sensitive data. In this paper, we focus on data sharing for predictive blacklisting, i.e., forecasting attack sources based on past attack information. We propose a novel privacy-enhanced data sharing approach in which organizations estimate collaboration benefits without disclosing their datasets, organize into coalitions of allied organizations, and securely share data within these coalitions. We study how different partner selection strategies affect prediction accuracy by experimenting on a real-world dataset of 2 billion IP addresses and observe up to a 105% prediction improvement.Comment: This paper has been withdrawn as it has been superseded by arXiv:1502.0533

    Predictive Cyber Situational Awareness and Personalized Blacklisting: A Sequential Rule Mining Approach

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    Cybersecurity adopts data mining for its ability to extract concealed and indistinct patterns in the data, such as for the needs of alert correlation. Inferring common attack patterns and rules from the alerts helps in understanding the threat landscape for the defenders and allows for the realization of cyber situational awareness, including the projection of ongoing attacks. In this paper, we explore the use of data mining, namely sequential rule mining, in the analysis of intrusion detection alerts. We employed a dataset of 12 million alerts from 34 intrusion detection systems in 3 organizations gathered in an alert sharing platform, and processed it using our analytical framework. We execute the mining of sequential rules that we use to predict security events, which we utilize to create a predictive blacklist. Thus, the recipients of the data from the sharing platform will receive only a small number of alerts of events that are likely to occur instead of a large number of alerts of past events. The predictive blacklist has the size of only 3 % of the raw data, and more than 60 % of its entries are shown to be successful in performing accurate predictions in operational, real-world settings

    Network entity characterization and attack prediction

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    The devastating effects of cyber-attacks, highlight the need for novel attack detection and prevention techniques. Over the last years, considerable work has been done in the areas of attack detection as well as in collaborative defense. However, an analysis of the state of the art suggests that many challenges exist in prioritizing alert data and in studying the relation between a recently discovered attack and the probability of it occurring again. In this article, we propose a system that is intended for characterizing network entities and the likelihood that they will behave maliciously in the future. Our system, namely Network Entity Reputation Database System (NERDS), takes into account all the available information regarding a network entity (e. g. IP address) to calculate the probability that it will act maliciously. The latter part is achieved via the utilization of machine learning. Our experimental results show that it is indeed possible to precisely estimate the probability of future attacks from each entity using information about its previous malicious behavior and other characteristics. Ranking the entities by this probability has practical applications in alert prioritization, assembly of highly effective blacklists of a limited length and other use cases.Comment: 30 pages, 8 figure
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