121 research outputs found

    Some geometrical methods for constructing contradiction measures on Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy sets

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    Trillas et al. (1999, Soft computing, 3 (4), 197–199) and Trillas and Cubillo (1999, On non-contradictory input/output couples in Zadeh's CRI proceeding, 28–32) introduced the study of contradiction in the framework of fuzzy logic because of the significance of avoiding contradictory outputs in inference processes. Later, the study of contradiction in the framework of Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy sets (A-IFSs) was initiated by Cubillo and Castiñeira (2004, Contradiction in intuitionistic fuzzy sets proceeding, 2180–2186). The axiomatic definition of contradiction measure was stated in Castiñeira and Cubillo (2009, International journal of intelligent systems, 24, 863–888). Likewise, the concept of continuity of these measures was formalized through several axioms. To be precise, they defined continuity when the sets ‘are increasing’, denominated continuity from below, and continuity when the sets ‘are decreasing’, or continuity from above. The aim of this paper is to provide some geometrical construction methods for obtaining contradiction measures in the framework of A-IFSs and to study what continuity properties these measures satisfy. Furthermore, we show the geometrical interpretations motivating the measures

    Obtaining contradiction measure on intuitionistic fuzzy sets from fuzzy connectives

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    In a previous paper, we proposed an axiomatic model for measuring self-contradiction in the framework of Atanassov fuzzy sets. This way, contradiction measures that are semicontinuous and completely semicontinuous, from both below and above, were defined. Although some examples were given, the problem of finding families of functions satisfying the different axioms remained open. The purpose of this paper is to construct some families of contradiction measures firstly using continuous t-norms and t-conorms, and secondly by means of strong negations. In both cases, we study the properties that they satisfy. These families are then classified according the different kinds of measures presented in the above paper

    On the incompatibility between two AIFS

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    The purpose of this paper is to commence studying the incompatibility in the Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy sets framework. In order to do this, firstly we deal with the concept of T -incompatible sets, where T is an intuitionistic t- norm, relating it with the N-contradictory sets, where N is a intuitionistic fuzzy negation. Next, an axiomatic model for measuring T -incompatibility is introduced, and finally some methods for obtaining families of such measures are provided

    Self-Contradiction and Contradiction between two Atanassov's Intuitionistic Fuzzy Sets

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    The paper focuses on the study of the contradiction between two Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy sets. First, taking into account some characterizations obtained in previous papers, some functions are defined in order to measure the degrees of contradiction. Besides the principal properties of these measures are pointed out. Finally, some results relating self-contradiction and contradiction between two Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy sets are achieved

    A Dempster-Shafer theory inspired logic.

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    Issues of formalising and interpreting epistemic uncertainty have always played a prominent role in Artificial Intelligence. The Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of partial beliefs is one of the most-well known formalisms to address the partial knowledge. Similarly to the DS theory, which is a generalisation of the classical probability theory, fuzzy logic provides an alternative reasoning apparatus as compared to Boolean logic. Both theories are featured prominently within the Artificial Intelligence domain, but the unified framework accounting for all the aspects of imprecise knowledge is yet to be developed. Fuzzy logic apparatus is often used for reasoning based on vague information, and the beliefs are often processed with the aid of Boolean logic. The situation clearly calls for the development of a logic formalism targeted specifically for the needs of the theory of beliefs. Several frameworks exist based on interpreting epistemic uncertainty through an appropriately defined modal operator. There is an epistemic problem with this kind of frameworks: while addressing uncertain information, they also allow for non-constructive proofs, and in this sense the number of true statements within these frameworks is too large. In this work, it is argued that an inferential apparatus for the theory of beliefs should follow premises of Brouwer's intuitionism. A logic refuting tertium non daturìs constructed by defining a correspondence between the support functions representing beliefs in the DS theory and semantic models based on intuitionistic Kripke models with weighted nodes. Without addional constraints on the semantic models and without modal operators, the constructed logic is equivalent to the minimal intuitionistic logic. A number of possible constraints is considered resulting in additional axioms and making the proposed logic intermediate. Further analysis of the properties of the created framework shows that the approach preserves the Dempster-Shafer belief assignments and thus expresses modality through the belief assignments of the formulae within the developed logic

    Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics

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    Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims

    Noncomparabilities & Non Standard Logics

    Get PDF
    Many normative theories set forth in the welfare economics, distributive justice and cognate literatures posit noncomparabilities or incommensurabilities between magnitudes of various kinds. In some cases these gaps are predicated on metaphysical claims, in others upon epistemic claims, and in still others upon political-moral claims. I show that in all such cases they are best given formal expression in nonstandard logics that reject bivalence, excluded middle, or both. I do so by reference to an illustrative case study: a contradiction known to beset John Rawls\u27s selection and characterization of primary goods as the proper distribuendum in any distributively just society. The contradiction is avoided only by reformulating Rawls\u27s claims in a nonstandard form, which form happens also to cohere quite attractively with Rawls\u27s intuitive argumentation on behalf of his claims
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