3,840 research outputs found
Robust Cryptography in the Noisy-Quantum-Storage Model
It was shown in [WST08] that cryptographic primitives can be implemented
based on the assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. In this work
we analyze a protocol for the universal task of oblivious transfer that can be
implemented using quantum-key-distribution (QKD) hardware in the practical
setting where honest participants are unable to perform noise-free operations.
We derive trade-offs between the amount of storage noise, the amount of noise
in the operations performed by the honest participants and the security of
oblivious transfer which are greatly improved compared to the results in
[WST08]. As an example, we show that for the case of depolarizing noise in
storage we can obtain secure oblivious transfer as long as the quantum
bit-error rate of the channel does not exceed 11% and the noise on the channel
is strictly less than the quantum storage noise. This is optimal for the
protocol considered. Finally, we show that our analysis easily carries over to
quantum protocols for secure identification.Comment: 34 pages, 2 figures. v2: clarified novelty of results, improved
security analysis using fidelity-based smooth min-entropy, v3: typos and
additivity proof in appendix correcte
Compositional closure for Bayes Risk in probabilistic noninterference
We give a sequential model for noninterference security including probability
(but not demonic choice), thus supporting reasoning about the likelihood that
high-security values might be revealed by observations of low-security
activity. Our novel methodological contribution is the definition of a
refinement order and its use to compare security measures between
specifications and (their supposed) implementations. This contrasts with the
more common practice of evaluating the security of individual programs in
isolation.
The appropriateness of our model and order is supported by our showing that
our refinement order is the greatest compositional relation --the compositional
closure-- with respect to our semantics and an "elementary" order based on
Bayes Risk --- a security measure already in widespread use. We also relate
refinement to other measures such as Shannon Entropy.
By applying the approach to a non-trivial example, the anonymous-majority
Three-Judges protocol, we demonstrate by example that correctness arguments can
be simplified by the sort of layered developments --through levels of
increasing detail-- that are allowed and encouraged by compositional semantics
The Impossibility Of Secure Two-Party Classical Computation
We present attacks that show that unconditionally secure two-party classical
computation is impossible for many classes of function. Our analysis applies to
both quantum and relativistic protocols. We illustrate our results by showing
the impossibility of oblivious transfer.Comment: 10 page
Why Botnets Work: Distributed Brute-Force Attacks Need No Synchronization
In September 2017, McAffee Labs quarterly report estimated that brute force
attacks represent 20\% of total network attacks, making them the most prevalent
type of attack ex-aequo with browser based vulnerabilities. These attacks have
sometimes catastrophic consequences, and understanding their fundamental limits
may play an important role in the risk assessment of password-secured systems,
and in the design of better security protocols. While some solutions exist to
prevent online brute-force attacks that arise from one single IP address,
attacks performed by botnets are more challenging. In this paper, we analyze
these distributed attacks by using a simplified model. Our aim is to understand
the impact of distribution and asynchronization on the overall computational
effort necessary to breach a system. Our result is based on Guesswork, a
measure of the number of queries (guesses) required of an adversary before a
correct sequence, such as a password, is found in an optimal attack. Guesswork
is a direct surrogate for time and computational effort of guessing a sequence
from a set of sequences with associated likelihoods. We model the lack of
synchronization by a worst-case optimization in which the queries made by
multiple adversarial agents are received in the worst possible order for the
adversary, resulting in a min-max formulation. We show that, even without
synchronization, and for sequences of growing length, the asymptotic optimal
performance is achievable by using randomized guesses drawn from an appropriate
distribution. Therefore, randomization is key for distributed asynchronous
attacks. In other words, asynchronous guessers can asymptotically perform
brute-force attacks as efficiently as synchronized guessers.Comment: Accepted to IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Securit
Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques
We develop cryptographically secure techniques to guarantee unconditional
privacy for respondents to polls. Our constructions are efficient and
practical, and are shown not to allow cheating respondents to affect the
``tally'' by more than their own vote -- which will be given the exact same
weight as that of other respondents. We demonstrate solutions to this problem
based on both traditional cryptographic techniques and quantum cryptography.Comment: 21 page
Secure bit commitment from relativistic constraints
We investigate two-party cryptographic protocols that are secure under
assumptions motivated by physics, namely relativistic assumptions
(no-signalling) and quantum mechanics. In particular, we discuss the security
of bit commitment in so-called split models, i.e. models in which at least some
of the parties are not allowed to communicate during certain phases of the
protocol. We find the minimal splits that are necessary to evade the
Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go argument and present protocols that achieve security in
these split models. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of local versus global
command, a subtle issue that arises when the split committer is required to
delegate non-communicating agents to open the commitment. We argue that
classical protocols are insecure under global command in the split model we
consider. On the other hand, we provide a rigorous security proof in the global
command model for Kent's quantum protocol [Kent 2011, Unconditionally Secure
Bit Commitment by Transmitting Measurement Outcomes]. The proof employs two
fundamental principles of modern physics, the no-signalling property of
relativity and the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics.Comment: published version, IEEE format, 18 pages, 8 figure
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