4,983 research outputs found

    Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques

    Full text link
    We develop cryptographically secure techniques to guarantee unconditional privacy for respondents to polls. Our constructions are efficient and practical, and are shown not to allow cheating respondents to affect the ``tally'' by more than their own vote -- which will be given the exact same weight as that of other respondents. We demonstrate solutions to this problem based on both traditional cryptographic techniques and quantum cryptography.Comment: 21 page

    Quantum Cryptography Beyond Quantum Key Distribution

    Get PDF
    Quantum cryptography is the art and science of exploiting quantum mechanical effects in order to perform cryptographic tasks. While the most well-known example of this discipline is quantum key distribution (QKD), there exist many other applications such as quantum money, randomness generation, secure two- and multi-party computation and delegated quantum computation. Quantum cryptography also studies the limitations and challenges resulting from quantum adversaries---including the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, the difficulty of quantum rewinding and the definition of quantum security models for classical primitives. In this review article, aimed primarily at cryptographers unfamiliar with the quantum world, we survey the area of theoretical quantum cryptography, with an emphasis on the constructions and limitations beyond the realm of QKD.Comment: 45 pages, over 245 reference

    Security and Efficiency Analysis of the Hamming Distance Computation Protocol Based on Oblivious Transfer

    Get PDF
    open access articleBringer et al. proposed two cryptographic protocols for the computation of Hamming distance. Their first scheme uses Oblivious Transfer and provides security in the semi-honest model. The other scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer and is claimed to provide full security in the malicious case. The proposed protocols have direct implications to biometric authentication schemes between a prover and a verifier where the verifier has biometric data of the users in plain form. In this paper, we show that their protocol is not actually fully secure against malicious adversaries. More precisely, our attack breaks the soundness property of their protocol where a malicious user can compute a Hamming distance which is different from the actual value. For biometric authentication systems, this attack allows a malicious adversary to pass the authentication without knowledge of the honest user's input with at most O(n)O(n) complexity instead of O(2n)O(2^n), where nn is the input length. We propose an enhanced version of their protocol where this attack is eliminated. The security of our modified protocol is proven using the simulation-based paradigm. Furthermore, as for efficiency concerns, the modified protocol utilizes Verifiable Oblivious Transfer which does not require the commitments to outputs which improves its efficiency significantly

    On the Design of Cryptographic Primitives

    Full text link
    The main objective of this work is twofold. On the one hand, it gives a brief overview of the area of two-party cryptographic protocols. On the other hand, it proposes new schemes and guidelines for improving the practice of robust protocol design. In order to achieve such a double goal, a tour through the descriptions of the two main cryptographic primitives is carried out. Within this survey, some of the most representative algorithms based on the Theory of Finite Fields are provided and new general schemes and specific algorithms based on Graph Theory are proposed

    How to Work with Honest but Curious Judges? (Preliminary Report)

    Get PDF
    The three-judges protocol, recently advocated by Mclver and Morgan as an example of stepwise refinement of security protocols, studies how to securely compute the majority function to reach a final verdict without revealing each individual judge's decision. We extend their protocol in two different ways for an arbitrary number of 2n+1 judges. The first generalisation is inherently centralised, in the sense that it requires a judge as a leader who collects information from others, computes the majority function, and announces the final result. A different approach can be obtained by slightly modifying the well-known dining cryptographers protocol, however it reveals the number of votes rather than the final verdict. We define a notion of conditional anonymity in order to analyse these two solutions. Both of them have been checked in the model checker MCMAS
    corecore