Obligation Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Situations and their Monotonicity Properties

We introduce the class of Obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree situations.The main result of this paper is that such rules are cost monotonic and induce also population monotonic allocation schemes.Another characteristic of Obligation rules is that they assign to a minimum cost spanning tree situation a vector of cost contributions which can be obtained as product of a double stochastic matrix with the cost vector of edges in the optimal tree provided by the Kruskal algorithm.It turns out that the Potters value (P-value) is an element of this class.

The Bird Core for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree problems Revisited: Monotonicity and Additivity Aspects

A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976.The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst-problems is a selection of the Bird core correspondence.Using the additivity property an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core correspondence is obtained.cost allocation;minimum cost spanning tree games;Bird core;cost monotonicity;cone additivity

Cost Monotonic "Cost and Charge" Rules for Connection Situations

The special class of conservative charge systems for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is introduced.These conservative charge systems lead to single-valued rules for mcst situations, which can also be described with the aid of obligation functions and are, consequently, cost monotonic.A value-theoretic interpretation of these rules is also provided.cost allocation;minimum cost spanning tree situations;cost monotonicity;sharing values

OBLIGATION RULES

We provide a characterization of the obligation rules in the context of minimum cost spanning tree games. We also explore the relation between obligation rules and random order values of the irreducible cost game - it is shown that the later is a subset of the obligation rules. Moreover we provide a necessary and sucient condition on obligation function such that the corresponding obligation rule coincides with a random order value.

Additivity in cost spanning tree problems

We characterize a rule in cost spanning tree problems using an additivity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity. In both characterizations we can replace separability by population monotonicity.cost spanning tree problems additivity characterization

A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.minimum cost spanning tree, cost sharing

A Vertex Oriented Approach to Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems

In this paper we consider spanning tree problems, where n players want to be connected to a source as cheap as possible. We introduce and analyze (n!) vertex oriented construct and charge procedures for such spanning tree situations leading in n steps to a minimum cost spanning tree and a cost sharing where each player pays the edge which he chooses in the procedure. The main result of the paper is that the average of the n! cost sharings provided by our procedure is equal to the P-value for minimum cost spanning tree situations introduced and characterized by Branzei et al. (2004). As a side product, we find a new method, the vertex oriented procedure, to construct minimum cost spanning trees.Minimum cost spanning tree games;algorithm;value;cost sharing

No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems

In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This property implies that no group of agents can be better off claiming to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satisfies this property. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using No Advantageous Merging.Minimum cost spanning tree problems; cost sharing; Bird rule; No Advantageous Merging

The Bird Core for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree problems Revisited:Monotonicity and Additivity Aspects

A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, which is introduced by Bird in 1976.The Bird core correspondence turns out to have interesting monotonicity and additivity properties and each stable cost monotonic allocation rule for mcst-problems is a selection of the Bird core correspondence.Using the additivity property an axiomatic characterization of the Bird core correspondence is obtained.