A Theory of Presentism

Also appears in: (1) L.N.Oaklander and E.Magalhaes (eds.) Presentism: A Reader (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010) (2) L.N. Oaklander (ed.) Routledge Major Works: The Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2008)Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts, this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed statements true. So what is a presentist to do? There are at least three conditions that would ideally be met in a satisfactory solution to this problem: (1) It must preserve our views about which statements are true and which false; (2) It must be transparent what the truthmakers are for those statements; (3) It must accommodate the truth-value links between various times. I shall survey two different families of proposals for the presentist's truthmakers and show that they fail at least one of these three conditions. This is not entirely negative, for it shows us what an adequate solution to the problem would look like. I go on to show where presentists can find suitable objects that satisfy these conditions, and in this way give a clear statement of presentism, something that is lacking in the literature.Peer reviewe

Accompanied selfrehabilitation

Every once in a great while, there arises a young psychiatrist with entirely new rehabilitation ideas for helping patients retrieve their lives from psychosiso Usually such ideas initially cause significant negative reactions from peers but a handful of sturdy physicians continued on to show the world that something different is possible such as George Brooks of Vermont in the U.S., E.E. Antinnen of Finland, and Franco Basaglia of Italy. Now we have to add to this illustrious list, the name of Alberto Fergusson of Colombia, South America. (Extrae of the Forward) Prof Courtenay M. Hardin

Mad Qualia

This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. One conclusion is that it is not obvious if qualia epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false—or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, physicalism, and non-physicalist property dualism are further explored

The Eternal Unprovability Filter – Part I

I prove both the mathematical conjectures P ≠ NP and the Continuum Hypothesis are eternally unprovable using the same fundamental idea. Starting with the Saunders Maclane idea that a proof is eternal or it is not a proof, I use the indeterminacy of human biological capabilities in the eternal future to show that since both conjectures are independent of Axioms and have definitions connected with human biological capabilities, it would be impossible to prove them eternally without the creation and widespread acceptance of new axioms. I also show that the same fundamental concepts cannot be used to demonstrate the eternal unprovability of many other mathematical theorems and open conjectures. Finally I investigate the idea’s implications for the foundations of mathematics including its relation to Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem and Tarsky’s Undefinability Theorem

Thoughts, Things, and Theories

We to critique the following question: can we have reasonable certainty that the terms in speculative or empirical theories correspond meaningfully to things in the ontological structure of the world, or are they only convenient fictions useful for predicting phenomena? We first justify this question as meaningful, and capable of admitting a meaningful answer. We then analyze question itself with examples from physics and biology. We conclude that we can be reasonably certain that the terms in an empirical theory have some degree of ontological significance, provided that they are directly related to phenomenal experiences. We also suggest that the advance of science can be aided through this understanding. Finally we use these conclusions to analyze the existence of the mind and certain physical structures

Divisibility, Logic, Radical Empiricism, and Metaphysics

We will explore the problem of the manner in which the world may be divided into parts, and how this affects the application of logic. We will also consider how this affects the problem of knowing the world. Such considerations bring us to discuss how the divisibility of the world relates to idealism, realism, and the radical empiricist program of James. The epistemological difficulties sometimes associated with realism will in particular be shown to be in principle the result of misunderstanding the nature of the divisibility of the world. When such divisibility is properly understood, we claim that there is no epistemological dilemma, at least in principle, although of course in practice there may be other difficulties. We conclude by tentatively analyzing these practical difficulties

Was Jekyll Hyde?

Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals